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PREFACE: 
JOURNALISM IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
Steve Maharey 
The relationship between journalists and the academics choosing to study them 
has never been an easy one. Journalists have preferred to characterise themselves 
as practical people with a common-sense approach to the world. Their activities 
are guided by the simple questions of What? Who? Where? When? and Why? 
Something so straightforward does not need explanation, particularly in the 
sometimes obscure terms used by academics. 
Academics have begged to disagree, arguing that behind the apparently 
simple questions used by journalists can be found a framework of interpretation 
that needs to be discussed. The academics point out that, for example, journalists 
seldom experience events first-hand so they have to reconstruct what went on by 
talking with a variety of sources. They do not just relate stories, they make them. 
No one is wrong here. Journalists are to be applauded for mounting a spirited 
defence of their work. They want to be understood as objective and independent. 
Equally, academics deserve support for their efforts to tease out and explain 
how news is actually constructed. It is important to understand how a journalist 
knows what questions to ask, and of whom. How is it they know if a question has 
been appropriately answered? What allows them to know something is or is not 
newsworthy? What explains the placing of journalists in particular locations? 
Scooped: The Politics and Power of Journalism in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
according to the editors, grew out of this difference of views between journalists 
and academics. Indeed, they characterise it as a "power struggle" between a 
broader academic perspective and a narrow vocational perspective of at least some 
journalists. This struggle has sometimes been acrimonious and led to conflict. 
The editors are suggesting it is time to move on and I agree. Well, perhaps 
'move on' is the wrong phrase, given that most of the arguments that have 
taken place up until now have been made irrelevant by a new media world that 
is taking shape. 
The media in general and journalists in particular are in the midst of 
economic, sodal, political, technological and cultural changes that demand old 
combatants take a step back to look at the broader context of their work and its 
implications for the practice of producing news. 
It is this concern that unites the contributors to this book. They are drawn 
from the ranks of academics, former journalists turned academics, and currently 
practising journalists. While they do not pretend to have all the answers to all 
of the challenges facing journalism, they do want to inform discussion among 
people within the media and a wider concerned audience. 
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I may be putting words into the minds of the contributors but I sense a 
shared belief that journalism is important and at its best when it challenges 
our thinking, presents alternatives, and seeks the truth (and, yes, 1 am aware 
that in the postmodern era 'truth' is a contested meta-narrative). The vocation 
of journalism derives its mandate from the Enlightenment and has provided a 
means of deliberation, argument, debate and access to information that has been 
vital to the expansion of open, democratic societies. The question is whether this 
tradition has a place or can even survive in what is proving to be testing times. 
Testing because everything we knew about the media, both as academics 
and practitioners, is being transformed. To borrow from Marx, all that is solid 
is melting into air: digital air. Information is now bigger business than ever. In 
the digital world, new information and new communications technologies have 
radically lowered the costs of doing business and ushered in an explosion of new 
opportunities to reach people all over the globe. Traditional forms of media -
regional newspapers, wire services, publishers and terrestrial broadcasters - have 
been challenged by the astonishing speed at which new forms of media have 
emerged: social networking sites, search engines, aggregators, free-streaming 
video portals, websites and pay portals, Facebook, Twitter, Google, Amazon, et 
al. No one quite knows what is next or where it is headed. 
The once dominant public realm is being marginalised, with little complaint 
from audiences dazzled by opportunities to follow what interests them. In the 
new environment, many in the media are seeking to carve out an audience for 
themselves and supply only what is wanted. Despite the volume of information 
available, the trend is toward providing people with what they want to reinforce 
previously held views. Fox News is perhaps the best example of this trend. 
The role of journalists has been challenged, perhaps even marginalised, by 
the rise of bloggers, citizen journalists and other amateurs keen to break the 
news and say what it means. Journalists often find themselves competing in a 
losing battle against a network of people who beat them to the story. 
The huge value of information has led to what Manuel Castells (2009) refers 
to as 'info-capitalism'. Following the rules prevalent in all forms of business, the 
media are falling into fewer hands and their owners, keen to maximise profits, seek 
to satisfy the needs of specific target markets. They research the audiences to fmd 
out what interests and does not interest them. The audience is given what it wants. 
Under pressure to produce profit for owners, the practice of journalism 
has been changing rapidly. At its most brutal, journalists have disappeared. 
Newsrooms that once employed a range of generalist and specialist staff are run 
by a few 'Jacks and Jills' of all trades. Older journalists leave to take on more 
lucrative careers in PR, in politics or large private corporations. They know the 
rules of journalism and produce stories ready-made for the media and insist 
they be published. 
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Fewer journalists means productivity per person has to increase. There is 
less time to check stories, and the subeditors who did that job find their services 
are no longer needed. The slimming down of newsrooms is driven by many 
factors, but the need for speed is one imperative. Competing with Twitter 
means that stories have to be produced and turned over as rapidly as possible 
to remain current. The opportunity to consider and reflect becomes a luxury no 
one can afford. 
The result of these changes in the practices of journalists has been referred 
to by Davies (2008) as churnalism - the reduction of journalism to the processing 
of a vast flow of wire stories and televised media events, all on a 24/7 cycle. 
At its worst, this means stories are published as they unfold, whether they are 
correct or not. Anyone who protests is told that they can always tell their side 
of the story. The media is reduced to being little more than a conveyor belt for 
competing points of view. 
Journalists have not found it easy to resist these trends. Many younger 
journalists know only this emerging world and see no reason to argue with it. 
Indeed, they may champion it, believing that this is how it has always been. 
One reason the collective memory of journalists is so poor can be traced 
to the lack of a professional association. New Zealand journalists belong to the 
Engineers, Printers and Manufacturers Union (EPMU), the biggest and most 
progressive union in New Zealand. But it is symbolic that they do not appear in 
the title of the union. What activity does take place on their behalf is largely of 
an industrial kind. 
The New Zealand Journalists Training Organisation, which is part of the 
Communications and Media Industry Training Organisation (CMITO), sets 
the standards and monitors the training of journalists within ten institutions, 
with the focus being on the acqUisition of occupationally relevant skills. There 
seems to be little enthusiasm for journalism as a profession in possession of its 
own body of knowledge, ethics and accountabilities. The German tradition that 
encourages journalists to attain advanced academic qualifications is not present 
in New Zealand. Few journalists would see the point, particularly when for the 
majority of them salaries are low. The result is that journalists themselves are 
seldom in a position to champion standards and argue in favour of a broader 
role for members. 
What is there to do? A full answer to this question would cover all areas 
of policy. But the editors of this book want to argue for the emerging field of 
journalism studies as one way forward. it is their view that it is essential to place 
the training of journalists in a broader context. This is to be applauded and, I 
hope, supported by all who know that in the digital future we are all coming to 
grips with, journalism will exist - but not as we know it. Whatever the future 
of the digital media world we now live in, the role of the journalist has changed 
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forever. We need to explore what it will be and how it will fit alongside the 
many other information workers. We need to discuss this new information-
overloaded world and try to understand how we, the audience, are being 
served. If the formation of a field of journalism studies will help this, I am in 
total support. But I will close with a word of caution. There has never been an 
open and important debate about journalism in New Zealand. Apart from a few 
worthy exceptions like the edited volumes produced by Judy McGregor et aI, 
the 'field' has been marked more often by the kinds of low-level exchanges that 
motivated the editors of this volume to want to move on. As a result there is no 
substantial intellectual tradition of any note around New Zealand journalism. 
It is time there was, and I hope this book represents the corner we need to turn. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
JOURNALISM AND JOURNALISM STUDIES IN 
AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
Sean Phelan, Verica Rupar and Martin Hirst 
This book is a response to the need for new theoretical and analytical perspectives 
on the condition of journalism and the public sphere in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
It is now more than ten years since McGregor and Comrie (2002) published the 
last of their edited volumes on the state of the country's news media, and neady 
four years since the publication of the second edition of the vocationally oriented 
and widely used textbook, Intro to Journalism (Tully, 2008). Local journalism and 
news media researchers and educators have hardly been inactive in the interim 
period. The emergence of new journalism and media-related degrees at several 
universities, the ongoing contribution oflocal journals like the Pacific Journalism 
Review, the increased visibility of New Zealand-related journalism research in 
national and international journals, and the more general expansion of media 
and communication studies, all point to a stronger, more institutionally secure, 
academic identity. 
That said, when evaluated critically, it is hard to disagree with Matheson's 
(20ID) assessment that the Aotearoa New Zealand journalism and news media 
literature is still at a relatively embryonic stage, and that the particulars of the 
local journalism culture have yet to be satisfactorily captured by academic 
researchers. Moreover, the range of analytical perspectives informing the 
academic and wider public discussion of journalism in Aotearoa New Zealand 
has been narrow and stifling, indicative of a wider historical aversion to the value 
of self-consciously intellectual and theoretical investigations into journalistic 
culture and practice (Zelizer, 2004). 
Scooped: The Politics and Power of Journalism in Aotearoa New Zealand has, 
from a general editorial perspective, two interlinked objectives. First, in line 
with wider international trends (see Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch, 2009), 
it signals the emergence of a more theoretically sophisticated and critically 
engaged journalism studies identity in Aotearoa New Zealand. As in many other 
countries, journalism has been historically thought of as a vocational trade in 
New Zealand; more as a domain of skills-based 'training', rather than scholarship 
and academic learning. This has consequently put limits on how journalism, and 
journalism education, are conceived within the academy and the wider culture, 
and has been the site of an often-fraught cultural politics about what journalism 
is and what it should be. For example, consider the repressive assumptions -
later interrogated by some commentators - underpinning the Dominion Post's 
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(2on) recent matter-of-fact assertion that investigative journalist Nicky Hager, 
one of the contributors to this book, "in the common definition of the craft...is 
not" a journalist. 
A skills-based practitioner perspective on journalism and journalism 
education may be essential - in fact, it would be hard to know what a robust 
journalism curriculum would look like without it. Yet, this collection assumes 
that a narrow focus on skills and the self-contained perspective of the 
practitioner is not enough if we want to understand the political, social, cultural 
and civic importance of the "journalistic field" (Bourdieu, 2005) to all of us in 
today's mediated democracies. Journalism and news media analysis in Aotearoa 
New Zealand should also be a domain of serious scholarship and learning, which 
doesn't have to apologise for using conceptual frameworks that challenge the 
standard commonsense discourses about journalistic practice and the role of 
the media in our everyday lives. 
Second, this book wants to explicitly situate journalism itself as a form of 
cultural practice, politics and power. In one sense, everyone has opinions on the 
power of journalists and the news media. Yet, in another, mainstream journalists 
in Aotearoa New Zealand are often too quick to represent power as something 
others have, rather than something asserted by journalists themselves. 
Characterising journalistic practice as a form of power and cultural politics is 
itself a political gesture, though not in some simple-minded ideological sense. It 
is political because it wants to critically interrogate the dominant assumptions of 
the local journalistic culture and celebrate, rather than condemn, the divergent 
approaches taken by academics and practitioners to understanding journalism. 
Scooped examines some of the most pressing economic, political, cultural 
and technological issues facing journalism and the "mediated polity" (Kemp, 
2010) in Aotearoa New Zealand. Approaching journalism as a field of cultural 
production, the book brings together contributions from a diverse list of 
academics and journalists, thereby ensuring that no single perspective dominates 
others. Contributors may sometimes disagree and contradict each other. They 
may also write in quite different registers: some more theoretical, some more 
personal. Yet all are united by their shared concerns about the current state of 
journalism and the public sphere in Aotearoa New Zealand, in what some have 
described as a time of multiple "crises" for Anglo-American journalism cultures 
(Gitlin, 2009). 
These crises involve both ideological and commercial issues. There is 
a perceived loss of professional confidence in many quarters as journalists 
struggle with competition from non-journalist sources in the blogosphere and 
what we can roughly describe as 'citizen journalism'. There is also a well founded 
apprehension that the industrial business models that dominated journalism 
and news production in the 20th century are broken. The head of the famous 
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Sulzberger family (owner of the New York Times), Arthur Sulzberger, has 
described the financial situation facing newspapers as a "perfect storm" (Hirst, 
lOU). While it is important to tease out the contours and dynamics of both the 
political-ideological crisis and the economic uncertainty, it is also essential to 
note their distinct, if entangled, natures. Both appear to be driven by the digital 
revolution - the appearance of new technological paradigms that shift the 
balance of power away from traditional media. However, it would be a mistake 
to assume the 'technogenic' nature of this crisis period, as Hirst's chapter argues. 
It is more than technology-driven, particularly in a context of global economic 
decline and the crisis in media outlets' traditional advertising model. The news 
media is, first and foremost, big business, and the fortunes of the news industry 
are inextricably linked to those of the general capitalist economy - particularly 
in an economy as vulnerable to transnational capital flows as Aotearoa New 
Zealand (see Hope, chapter 2). 
Journalism, power and the fourth estate 
Where does the power of journalism reside? This question is tackled in different 
ways by different contributors to this volume. The answer is partly determined 
by how one understands the concept of power. One argument in the political 
economy of communication research tradition (see chapters I, 2 and 5 by Hope, 
Hirst, & Thompson) is that the power of the news media is based on the close 
economic, political and personal relationships between those who own and 
control the media and a network of corporate, political and cultural elites (Wasko, 
Murdock, & Sousa, 20U). McChesney (2000) calls this scenario "rich media, poor 
democracy" because it means that instead of serving the public interest, the 
news media often serve the interests of corporate oligarchs and shareholders. 
This ownership and control model provides a solid foundation for observing 
how power works in the interlinked industries of news, telecommunications 
and entertainment, particularly in an Aotearoa New Zealand media system and 
culture dominated by market-driven logics (Ellis, 2010). However, it doesn't 
always account for situations where the independence of journalists asserts 
itself in exposure of corporate malfeasance or political intrigue and lies. Nor 
does it clearly capture the specifically cultural dimensions of journalism 
practice, as Matheson (chapter 7) suggests. It also downplays the significance of 
media representational power as a form of power in its own right - what Phelan 
(chapter 4) describes as the media's power to constitute, rather than just simply 
report on, social reality. 
Bourdieu's concept of the field helps us conceptualise the power struggles 
and relational dynamics between different social spaces - the economic field, the 
political field, the cultural field and so on - each of which operates according to 
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its own distinct set of practices and logics (Benson and Neveu, 2005; Bourdieu, 
1998). The journalistic field can be understood as the site of an inherently 
political conflict between different values systems and objectives. On the one 
hand, the culture of most newsrooms in capitalist liberal democracies like 
Aotearoa New Zealand is based on a strong sense of professional independence 
and an idealistic belief - the one that continues to draw students to journalism 
courses - that journalism should be on the side of social justice. The early 20th 
century journalist and writer Finley Peter Dunne mythologised this role as 
one of "comforting the afflicted and afflicting the comfortable". On the other 
hand, these 'pure' journalistic objectives are locked into an ongoing structural 
conflict with two external forces: first, the economic power of media capital 
and corporations; and second, the often-repressive effects of the dominant 
commonsense assumptions within any particular cultural formation - including, 
as Richard Pamatatau (chapter II) illustrates, within the cultural practices of 
the newsroom itself. These tensions are embodied in different perspectives 
on the fourth estate model, which, as Comrie (chapter 7) shows, remains a key 
conceptual framework for understanding journalistic identities in Aotearoa 
New Zealand (also see Hollings, Lealand, Samson and Tilley, 2007; Matheson, 
2007). To its supporters, the model is the normative basis of journalism's role in 
a democracy. To its critics, however, it is part of a subtle ideological mechanism 
that legitimises the status quo, naturalises the assumptions of a capitalist society, 
and deflects attention from a wider infrastructure of power beyond the world of 
the Beehive, in which media institutions are themselves implicated. 
The term 'fourth estate' has come to signify the news media's assumption of 
an independent 'watchdog' role that should be protected and encouraged within 
the normal workings of liberal democracies (Louw, 2005). The social power 
of the role is said to derive from the vocational commitment of journalists to 
"speak truth to power" and to always act "on behalf of the people" (Schultz, 1998, 
p. 1). The term was first articulated this way in late 18th-century England, at a 
time when the institution of the press was rallying around the democratic ideals 
of an emerging class of merchants and industrialists. This new social strata -
the bourgeoisie - was anxious to shake off the political and cultural shackles of 
earlier modes of economic production and establish capitalism as the dominant 
socio-economic formation. 
English political thinker Thomas Carlyle attributed the 'fourth estate' label 
to the conservative political theorist and parliamentarian Edmund Burke who, in 
1787, reportedly used the term during a parliamentary debate about allowing the 
press gallery to gather news more freely in the corridors of monarchical power. 
According to Carlyle, Burke said there were "Three Estates in Parliamenf; but, in 
the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than 
they all". Carlyle used the phrase in his 1837 book on the French Revolution to 
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praise the activities of independent reporters and publishers who supported the 
democratic aspirations of the growing European bourgeoisie. 
From the late 18th to the early 20th century, the social power of the fourth 
estate was aligned with the interests and aspirations of small business, private 
enterprise and the emerging capitalist class. This rubbed off on the mainly male 
journalists of the time. From the r860s to the early 20th century, the "dominant 
occupational strategy" for journalists was to turn themselves into independent 
publishers (Kaul, 1986, p. 51). However, this wasn't always a successful strategy. 
For those who failed in this entrepreneurial exercise, the only alternative was 
to work 'penny-a-line', or go on the staff of a larger, more successful publisher. 
By the time the Industrial Revolution was completing its work, the competitive 
ethos of a now SOcially embedded capitalism soon replaced the earlier 
revolutionary ideals. So much so that, within 100 years of Burke's parliament 
speech, another Anglo-Irish writer of a more caustic bent, Oscar Wilde, wrote 
scathingly of the fourth estate, lamenting that public opinion was now at the 
mercy of bad journalism: 
In old days men had the rack. Now they have the press. That is an 
improvement certainly. But still it is very badj and wrong, and demoralising. 
Somebody - was it Burke? - called journalism the fourth estate. That was 
true at the time no doubt. But at the present moment it is the only estate. 
It has eaten up the other three. The Lords Temporal say nothing, the Lords 
Spiritual have nothing to say, and the House of Commons has nothing to 
say and says it. We are dominated by journalism (Wilde, 1891). 
The parallel emergence of a newspaper industry and fourth estate identity 
in 19th-century Aotearoa New Zealand was - as Abel, McCreanor and Moewaka 
Barnes (chapter 3) observe - part of the bigger political project of establishing 
the colonial state. Significantly, in the same year that Wilde's observations were 
published, an organisation uniting journalists, editors and proprietors was being 
established in New Zealand to put daily journalism on a more 'professional' level. 
The alliance of owners and news-workers, organised under the rubric of the New 
Zealand Institute of Journalists, was intended to raise journalism above what, 
at times in the 19th century, had been perceived as a 'disreputable' occupation 
(Cryle, 1997). However, the desire for greater professional legitimacy and social 
status was marked by certain contradictions. Elsaka (2005) observes that "the 
ethos of professionalism that surrounded journalistic work [in New Zealand] 
was at odds with the reality of journalists' wages and working conditions" 
(Elsaka, 2005, p. 76). As Wilde's comment highlights, the bourgeois ideals of 
the fourth estate were gradually tarnished by the rise of a more commercially-
oriented journalism in the 19th century, a historical theme that is traced right up 
to the present in Hope's work (chapter 2) on the evolution of the Aotearoa New 
Zealand public sphere. 
15 
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By the r890s, the radical enthusiasm of pioneering Victorian news-
workers had given way to the industrial system of journalism associated with 
the newspaper barons of London and New York, where editors and publishers 
were of a higher social class and often already rich from other business activity 
(Ornebring, 2010). By the 1930S, journalism was turned into a form of process 
work - turning facts and opinion into commodities to create a form of news 
palatable to advertisers, captains of industry and political masters. The 
destruction of what was essentially a craft-based form of journalism by the 
large news machines of the industrial age created new political demands from 
commercial and social elites, whose own public legitimacy was increasingly 
dependent on mass communications channels. In the 20th century, rather than 
agitating for change as independent bourgeois news proprietors had done during 
the French and American revolutions, and in the revolt against newspaper taxes 
in Europe, the role of the press become one of 'manufacturing consent' for the 
existing social and economic order. The wheel has turned so far today that many 
commentators decry how journalism has now become a form of 'churnalism', 
where it is argued that a steady diet of commercial propaganda, government 
spin and corporate PR has almost completely replaced public interest news 
(Davies, 2008). 
However, consent is, by its very nature, a two-way process that involves 
the dominated classes acceding to someone else's power in return for perceived 
benefits. Despite the widespread contamination of journalism's public interest 
objectives by commercial logics, the news media still assert some public 
legitimacy and independence, some field 'autonomy' from the business side of 
news, but this autonomy is limited and the journalistic field remains a semi-
autonomous sphere of action (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 41). 
Today, many would argue that it is the ethos of journalistic professionalism 
that best assumes the mantle of the traditional fourth estate model and the noble 
idea that journalists are there 'to serve the people'. The historical outcome of 
these competing social pressures, in Aotearoa New Zealand and elsewhere, is a 
professional journalism ideology comprised of an uneasy and unstable blending 
of fourth estate principles; a sense of professional pride based on perceived codes 
and educational barriers to entry; and a residual social democratic identification 
with an industrial trade union ethos and a class focus on news as labour 
(Hirst, 1997). 
Writing in 1998, Julianne Schultz (1998) argued that the principles of 
the fourth estate could be revived, though she knew at the time it would be 
difficult because of the rise of "junk journalism" (p. 231). Despite the corrosive 
effects of news sensationalism (Louw, 2005), the ideals of the fourth estate 
still motivate many journalists. The most recent survey of New Zealand 
journalists suggested that most felt "the media was generally performing 
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its watchdog role well" (Hollings et al, 2007, p. 175), though less sanguine 
respondents "indicated that the watchdog role could not be performed 
without more journalists on staff, more time allocated to pursue investigations, 
and more pay to attract and retain experienced journalists both to perform 
investigations and to mentor newer staff into the investigative role" (p. r87). 
These concerns about resourcing illustrate the extent to which the question of 
the future of the fourth estate, and the possible alternatives to that model, is 
enmeshed with a far bigger issue: questions about the very future of journalism 
itself in the digital age (Hirst, WID). Two chapters in this volume discuss this 
issue in detail. 
Hirst (chapter 2) argues that the internet suggests the possibility of a more 
democratically empowering model of journalism, which links the blogosphere 
and the world of user-generated news-like content with professional journalism. 
His hope is that this might potentially give journalism much greater autonomy 
from the news industry. Manning (chapter ro) discusses how his own transition 
into internet-based journalism was a response to the failure of the commercialised 
mainstream media to serve fourth estate ideals. Rather than renouncing the 
fourth estate model, Manning argues that it can be reclaimed by an online model 
of citizen journalism that transcends the arid objectivity norms of mainstream 
journalism practices. 
Comparatively situating Aotearoa 
New Zealand journalism 
The argument put forward in Scooped is that the Aotearoa New Zealand 
journalistic field's interaction with wider power structures in society is defined 
both by contextual factors - political, economic, cultural and ideological - and 
by journalism itself, a set of practical schemes that determine what is important, 
appropriate and preferred in the everyday work of journalists. This set of practical 
schemes, often taken for granted and unconscious, that Bourdieu (2005) calls 
the journalistic doxa holds the key to understanding the basis of journalists' 
professional authority to mediate - thereby simultaneously constructing -
reality for their readers. In a national context, this ethos of journalism assumes a 
specific form of symbolic power that allows journalism to function as a coherent 
interpretative community (Zelizer, 1993), which is a by-product of particular 
national histories, institutional conditions, and political and socio-economic 
formations. 
The question of where journalism in Aotearoa New Zealand stands in 
comparative context to other journalism cultures hinges on the question of how 
journalistic norms, values, conventions and strategies here differ from journalism 
in other parts of the world. Although the history of national journalism has still 
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to be written,I our contributors agree that Aotearoa New Zealand journalism 
shares the general characteristics of other Anglo-American journalism cultures. 
The prevailing British influence on the development of the press has been 
colourfully described as a kind of "enduring hangover from the days of the 
British Empire" (Norris 2001, p. 85), a genealogy encapsulated in the ongoing 
naming of the country's second biggest-selling daily newspaper as the Dominion 
Post. Patrick Day's (1990) history of the New Zealand press demonstrates, for 
example, how newspapers in the first half of the 19th century, like the press 
in the USA and UK a few decades earlier, generally reflected the point of view 
of one person - their publisher. Newspapers acted as political advocates for 
individual politicians until the r860s, when, with the establishment of the 
Otago Daily Times, New Zealand newspapers began a circulation growth as "the 
increase in population made it possible for the first time for newspapers to be 
profitable commercial concerns" (Day, 1990, p. 235). 
Different features of the Aotearoa New Zealand journalistic field, both in 
terms of its historical formation and current condition, are explored in Scooped. 
Abel, McCreanor and Moewaka Barnes (chapter 4) discuss how the ongoing 
tendency to represent Maori identities in sensationalist and negative ways can 
be traced back to newspapers' political desire to legitimise the colonial state and 
disparage the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi settlement. Matheson (chapter 7) 
examines the poor quality of Aotearoa New Zealand's international news coverage, 
and highlights the factors that reproduce an 'insular Anglo-Americanism' and 
'neo-colonial' sensibility in the journalistic culture. Pamatatau (chapter II) 
reflects on his time as Radio New Zealand's Pacific Issues Correspondent, 
and probes the unconscious stereotypes that were projected on to his 'Pacific 
identity' by newsroom colleagues. Gajevic's case study analysis of the newspaper 
coverage of Russell Coutts' departure from the Team New Zealand yachting 
team documents how nationalist discourses ideologically define the submissive 
position of individuals, journalists included, in relation to the supremacy of the 
New Zealand nation (chapter 8). 
One reoccurring theme relates to the rise of the journalism profession. Day 
says that the social position of the journalist was highly regarded in the early years 
of the colonial state. Journalists belonged to a respected profession with "publicly 
recognised political influence and power" (Day 1990, p. 168). The contrast with 
the present seems stark. A 2008 Reader's Digest survey of trusted professions in 
New Zealand ranked journalists 34th out of 40, only a few spots above astrologers 
(35 th), prostitutes (36th), real estate agents and car salesmen (38th), politicians 
(39th) and telemarketers (40th). Similar international surveys show that, over 
'One of the most Significant attempts to profile the historical development of the New Zealand 
journalism profession is Elsaka (2004). 
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the past 20 years, the public view of journalism's professional respectability has 
plummeted, but legitimising appeals to journalistic professionalism continue 
to be invoked (Hirst, 20I1). The ideological implications of professionalism are 
discussed by Hirst (chapter 2). He argues that the discourse of professionalism 
is something of a dead end for a robust journalistic culture, because it masks 
the degree to which the dominant conception of professionalism is ideologically 
camp licit with a capitalist media infrastructure that is now in crisis. Similarly, 
Hager (chapter 13) argues that the development of a robust professional 
journalistic identity in Aotearoa New Zealand has to be nurtured independently 
from the news industry, because the commercial imperatives of the latter are the 
enemies of good journalism. 
The form, structure, content, and design of the news in Aotearoa New 
Zealand follow the cultural patterns and conventions of journalism in the USA 
and the UK. When asked to list the main values that define their work, New 
Zealand journalists state a set of journalistic norms that can be found in any 
democracy: accuracy, objectivity, fairness, balance, integrity, and independence 
(Lealand, 2004). Still, when asked where these principles can be found in written 
form or what document clarifies them, there is a kind of confusion: is it in the 
Press Council's Statement of Principles, the union's code of ethics or the news 
organisatJon's style book? 
Journalistic self-regulation in New Zealand, and the process of monitoring 
journalistic standards and handling disputes, follows the general norms of 
"liberal media systems" (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), in that it is organised in a 
relatively informal way within individual news organisations or the wider news 
industry. In the United States there is no press council or press complaints 
commission; in Canada local press councils, voluntary and relatively weak, are 
funded by the press; in Britain the Press Complaints Commission is still run by 
the newspaper industry; and in Ireland the recently established Press Council 
asserts its independence from both the news industry and government. The 
processes of journalistic self-regulation in New Zealand, "the vehicles for media 
responsibility and accountability" (Tully & Elsaka, 2002) are largely voluntary. 
and reactive to complaints rather than proactive - with the New Zealand Press 
Council regulating the print industry and the Broadcasting Standards AuthOrity 
governing the television and radio industry. 
The discrepancy between the journalistic ideals of providing context and 
background to a story, and the reality, where journalists produce stories around 
'rent-a-quote' sources, has consequences for the quality of news coverage, as 
Comrie's chapter on political reporting discusses (chapter 6). In line with an 
increasing division of labour in the newsroom, the journalistic job has changed 
instead of being gatherers of news, journalists have become news processors. 
These global changes take a specific form in different national contexts, and 
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one of the key objectives of Scooped is to capture some of the particulars of the 
Aotearoa New Zealand news culture. What we know from existing comparative 
studies is that a vibrant news culture comes about as a result of an "intervening 
variable between people - journalists, sources or public - and a given 'objective' 
situation - political and economic context, legal framework, media events, 
organisations, infrastructures, and systems, through which citizens inform 
or are informed" (Deuze, 2002, p. I34). New Zealand journalists are reluctant 
to assume this kind of deliberative role because it is considered to belong to 
advocacy journalism (Matheson, 2007). What the majority of them seem to 
value above all else is the profession's abilities to "provide objective reportage", 
"influence public debate and discussion", and "communicate between the various 
sectors of society" (Lealand, 2004, p. I90). These commitments are articulated 
through a detached reporting style, an emphasis on fairness and the balancing 
of sources, and an insistence on a strong distinction between facts and views -
an empiricism that believes the 'facts speak for themselves' and which refrains 
from a more intellectually engaged form of reporting. This line of argument is 
explored in detail in Phelan's chapter (chapter 4). It discusses how fact-based 
reporting reproduces a methodologically individualist view of the world, which 
fails to take satisfactory account of how identities are structured by social forces 
- including the media itself. 
Another widely observed feature of the New Zealand journalistic field cited 
by different contributors is its alleged anti-intellectualism. This journalistic 
tendency is backgrounded by a more general consensus that Aotearoa New 
Zealand is averse to the idea of the "public intellectual" (see Simmons, 2007). 
Various contemporary political columnists, such as Jane Clifton, Colin James, 
Rod Oram, Chris Trotter, Karl du Fresne and Rosemary McLeod nonetheless 
have the status of influential political analysts and commentators. They not 
only publish their articles, but give public talks, join radio and television panels, 
and are invited to make a contribution on public matters in ways philosophers 
were called upon to do in ancient Greece - as people who know more than 
others and are able to interpret and predict, a role that both Anglo-American 
and continental European journalists still assert in the public sphere. Some 
studies of journalistic practice in New Zealand (Rupar, 2006; Ashwell, 2009; 
Matheson, 2007) show that journalists and currents affairs presenters readily 
take the position of mediators in public disputes, though sometimes in a fashion 
that is spectacle-driven and demagogic (Atkinson, 20ra). Thus, irrespective of 
the question of how the committed is articulated, the idea of journalism as the 
"voice of the public", which Hallin (2006) links to the American journalism of 
the 60S, is still alive in Aotearoa New Zealand today. 
So, if journalists can in one sense be described as "intellectuals of the 
everyday" (see chapter 3 by Hirst), what then is the basis of the claim that the New 
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Zealand journalistic field veers towards anti-intellectualism? This introduction 
is not the place for a detailed parsing of the question, but Macdonald (chapter IZ) 
offers one interesting perspective on this issue. Reflecting on his time as editor 
of and staff writer at the Listener, he discusses how the magazine's relatively 
modest attempt to articulate a more "questioning, opinionated and occasionally 
crusading" brand of journalism, different from the mainstream, fossilised into 
the "shallow stereotype" that it was a bastion of "left wing radicalism" and 
"cultural snobbery". Macdonald's analysis suggests it would be foolish to bracket 
New Zealand journalists, en masse, as anti-intellectual, and he discusses, for 
instance, how the Listener played a particularly important role in the construction 
of a literary public sphere in New Zealand. That said, the repressive cultural 
dynamics documented in his chapter are still evident in the hostile response of 
at least some journalists - on both the right and left of the cultural and political 
mainstream - to ideas and theories that question commonsense norms that are, 
of course, partly moulded by journalists themselves (Phelan, zon; Phelan, 2008; 
Hirst, 2008). 
The journalistic field and the academic field 
Scooped wants to contextualise the charge of anti-intellectualism with 
reference to the institutional relationship between the journalistic field and the 
academic field. The relationship between journalism and the academy is often 
an antagonistic one in Aotearoa New Zealand and elsewhere (see, for example, 
Skinner, Gasher and Compton, 2001; Turner, 2001). The tensions between 
practitioners and academics sometimes illustrate very different views about 
such issues as journalistic objectivity, journalistic engagement, journalistic 
professionalisation, and the relationship between industry and journalistic 
interests. These differences sometimes generate debates that reinforce lazy 
stereotypes and assumptions, rather than encourage open-ended critical 
reflection. These tensions are exemplified in the enduring tendency to see 'theory' 
and 'practice' as irrevocably opposed, a simplistic and hackneyed distinction that 
covers up the extent to which practice is - if we are to understand it critically 
and historically - ultimately grounded in theoretical assumptions (Hirst, ZOw; 
Phelan, 2008). 
These antagonisms are sometimes most visible when the question of 
journalism's formal educational status is being discussed. Is journalism simply 
a vocational trade and skill that is best learned on the job, as some would argue? 
Or should a journalism education also constitute, as Thomas argues (chapter 9), 
a domain of scholarship and learning that explores a critical space beyond the 
situated perspective of the practitioner (Hirst, 20W)? How one answers these 
questions depends, in part, on how the social role of the university and tertiary 
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sector is conceived. Is the university primarily a training ground to "serve" 
(Skinner et aI, 200r) the news industry - in effect, a more socially prestigious 
version of the polytechnic model? Or does the university, as a distinct public 
sphere in its own right (Giroux, 2007), have a duty to produce more than 
'industry-ready' graduates, but also critically engaged citizens with the capacity 
to find voice and intellectual agency within a knowledge economy organised 
around increasingly precarious and exploited forms of 'creative' labour? 
University managers and technocrats are often very good at invoking the 
traditional idea of the university when it is strategically advantageous. However, 
many would argue that the traditional idea of the university - as a domain 
of critical thought and scholarship - is increasingly under threat within the 
university itself (Couldry & McRobbie, 20ro). Far from the stereotypical image of 
the university as a hotbed of radical intellectuals, today's Aotearoa New Zealand 
university is an increasingly docile and apolitical space where one is much more 
likely to publicly hear the managerial and corporate language of , benchmarking', 
'stress-testing', 'auditing' and 'stakeholder relations' rather than the language of 
critical theory. The role of the university is also routinely described as one of 
simply 'serving' the economy and society. These assertions are often made as 
if they were utterly straightforward claims, rather than inherently ideological 
statements that obscure how the constitution of 'society' and 'the economy' are 
sites of political and social struggle. 
Situated in the context of today's neoliberalised university, Scooped's appeal 
to a more critically-inflected journalism studies identity is therefore somewhat 
ironic. On the one hand, the appeal is partly articulated in response to the need 
to give the study of journalism more intellectual and scholarly legitimacy within 
the academy. Yet, on the other hand, to day's university is increasingly keen to 
mimic the kind of industry-centric model that has historically structured the 
relationship between tertiary institutions and the news media industry in 
Aotearoa New Zealand. The political and cultural context is effectively analogous 
to the one Thompson describes (chapter 5) on a state-facilitated capitulation of 
Television New Zealand (TVNZ) to market imperatives. As with the institutions 
of public service broadcasting, the university is becoming increasingly colonised 
by the logic of the market within the institution itself - more eager to serve the 
figure of the student-customer rather than stimulate the consciousness of the 
critical citizen. 
In the parlance of administrators at one large tertiary institution, students 
are increasingly taken on a 'journey of experiences', rather than inculcated in 
critical study and reflection on social issues and trends in their field. The rhetoric 
of 'journey' implies a simple linear education with a beginning, managed 
trajectory, and a final destination. It is an instrumental view that operates upon 
the EFTSU (equivalent fulltime student unit), rather than with or through the 
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student's own sense of agency, At the end of the journey, the transformation 
of the EFTSUs is assumed to be complete - they are 'transitioned' into ILUs 
(indentured labour units), Their education already prefabricated by industry 
imperatives, journalism graduates are deemed 'fit-for-purpose' and can slot into 
the industrial process of news production, without necessarily encountering 
critical and theoretical reflection on what they did along the journey, As Penny 
O'Donnell puts it so well: "universities might well be encouraging precarious, 
, . and market-oriented work practices such as self-censorship in journalism", 
rather than pushing the boundaries of a strait-jacketed profeSSionalism and 
challenging industry norms (2006, p, 35). 
The danger with the strategic confluence of neoliberalised identities and 
perspectives outlined here is that the articulation of a journalism studies 
identity in Aotearoa New Zealand could end up assuming quite an uncritical and 
theoretical form, mainly giving an academic veneer to the old model of 'serving' 
the industry and reproducing inherited cultural norms. These risks are noted 
by Thomas, who suggests that, despite the increasing numbers of New Zealand 
journalism students enrolled in University courses, "this shift has, as yet, made 
little difference to the traditional emphasis on teaching mainly vocational skills", 
The subtlety of Thomas' point should not be lost. There is "nothing wrong with" 
vocational and skills-based practices, she suggests; rather, the point is that "they 
need to be tempered with a broader approach", where journalism students are 
encouraged to engage with the interdisciplinary fields of critical communication 
and media studies in a way that enriches their perspective on journalism 
practice, In that respect, the objective articulated in the first issue of the journal 
Journalism Studies captures the spirit of the kind of journalistic and academic 
field relationship that this book would like to see normalised in the Aotearoa 
New Zealand of the future: 
The overriding ambition"" is to provide a", critical forum for journalists, 
academics, journalism trainers and students of journalism, to debate the 
central issues confronting journalism understood both as a subject focus for 
scholarly and intellectual inquiry as well as a field of professional practice, 
This desire to meld theory and practice represents a substantial ambition 
but, if the marriage between journalism and the academy is problematic, 
we believe that divorce is not merely undesirable but unthinkable (Franklin 
et aI, 2001, p. 5) 
Conclusion: the possibilities of the present 
The desire to signal the emergence of a critical journalism studies identity in 
Aotearoa New Zealand is not a modest one. However, the editors of Scooped 
are very aware that this book is simply a starting point in bringing this identity 
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to the attention of a wider student, academic and public audience, as well as 
crystallising recognition of the kind of work that has already been done by 
researchers either based in, or writing about, Aotearoa New Zealand journalism. 
We would hope that it would encourage others to do work that develops 
and critically interrogates the arguments and perspectives articulated in this 
book. And we would also hope that it might help cultivate more productive 
and intellectually engaged forms of communication between the academic 
field and the journalistic field, rather than tired re-enactments of the familiar 
antagonisms (Phelan, 20n). 
The present historical moment is a crucial one for anyone concerned about 
the condition of our mediated democracies in Aotearoa New Zealand and 
elsewhere. What is at stake has been described by the American media scholar 
Robert McChesney as a "critical juncture" - a moment in the development 
of global media systems where the future is indeterminate and open to the 
possibility of a radically democratic media ecology that puts the citizenry first 
and redeems the idea of public interest journalism (McChesney, 2007). It is a 
moment afforded to us by the digital revolution and the uncertainty surrounding 
what it actually means to be a journalist today. At one level - almost utopian 
and anarchistic in its simplicity - everyone today has the potential to be their 
own reporter and there has never been so much apparent consumer choice of 
news sources. At another level- that of ownership, control and economic power 
- the news industry has proved remarkably resilient ever since the Industrial 
Revolution. What's more, it's a historical moment when the traditional public 
service alternatives to market-driven media models are also in crisis, nowhere 
more so than at TVNZ. 
The critical juncture represents an opportunity to reassess the politics and 
power of journalism in Aotearoa New Zealand and offers perhaps the opportunity 
to redirect it towards a more critical and reflexive position of intellectual 
confidence and independence. Perhaps this will happen in collaboration with 
audiences - or those people we used to call the audience, but who now produce 
their own "news-like" content. One thing is clear; it is no longer business as 
usual for the news industry, journalists or news citizens. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
NEW THOUGHTS ON THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
Wayne Hope 
The idea of a public sphere is made possible by the guaranteed freedoms of 
association, expression and publication. Citizens, groups and intellectuals are 
able to confer without restriction on matters of shared interest. In principle, 
public sphere activities should proceed independently of state prerogatives, 
religious authority and commercial influence. In practice, public sphere activities 
may fall short of these underlying principles. As Jurgen Habermas noted in his 
early writings, the Western, 18th-century bourgeoisie saw itself as the bearer of 
Enlightenment reason and constitutional freedoms. By the mid-19th century, 
however, non-property owners made their own public sphere claims against the 
bourgeoisie. Trade .unionists and the early women's movement, for example, 
demanded a fully franchised electoral system (Habermas, 1992). Furthermore, 
rights of representation and public argumentation were directed against private 
owners of capital and the bourgeois state. Early industrial capitalism and the 
bourgeois public sphere were vulnerable to oppositional challenge from socialist 
points of view. In Western societies the subsequent formation of representative 
political parties, trade union organisations, and tax funded institutions of 
health, education and social welfare were the outcomes of political struggles for 
universal rights and entitlements. 
Public sphere activities can be evaluated within legal environments, artistic 
and literary communities, political parties, the scholarly commons, legislatures 
and media institutions. Overlapping manifestations of the public sphere reflect 
the structures and instabilities of political-economic power. At given historical 
conjunctures, oppositional public spheres may crystallise. When this occurs, 
public fora, as such, become arenas of contestation over the definitions and 
categories through which society as a whole is understood. 
The empirical context of these insights has changed over time. From the 
early 1960S, Jurgen Habermas' public sphere theory presupposed a bounded 
political community with its own territorial state. Global developments over the 
last two decades have generated new formulations such as transnational public 
spheres, diasporic public spheres and global public spheres (Fraser, 2007, p. 7). 
Nationally constituted public spheres remain, but they are no longer assumed to 
be synonymous with the underlying concept. From a critical political economy 
perspective, public spheres unfold within global relations of power. Transnational 
corporations fragment national political economies, while supra-national 
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institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and World Bank strongly influence national policy settings. 
In these circumstances political public sphere formations are no longer reliant 
upon national communication infrastructures. From a 'top down' standpoint, 
national media systems incorporating print, film and broadcasting have been 
hollowed out by global media-entertainment corporations (McChesney, 
2000). Similarly, national telecommunication infrastructures have become 
incorporated within the balance sheets of transnational telecom conglomerates. 
Meanwhile, digitalisation has effectively conjoined the technological capacities 
of mass media, telecommunications and computers. New corporations have 
thereby taken shape in the fields of computer hardware and software, computer-
mediated communication, broadband satellite transmission, mobile telephony, 
electronic games and social media. From a 'bottom up' standpoint these 
developments have enabled the formation of transnational fora incorporating 
union activism, ecological concerns, indigenous rights and related social justice 
issues. The account which follows initially traces the emergence of a nationally 
constituted mass mediated public sphere in Aotearoa New Zealand. In this 
regard, a clear pattern of development and contestation can be identified. In the 
1890s, 1930S and 1960s-70s a conservative, state-centred public sphere widened 
in response to oppositional constructions of public communication. From the 
early 1980s, however, a neo-liberal policy revolution deformed the political 
economy foundations of the mass-mediated public sphere. After explicating 
this process of deformation in national-historical terms, I will reposition the 
national past within a global context. This new consideration will inform my 
evaluation of recent countervailing developments. As media corporations 
commercially colonise what remains of the mass-mediated public sphere, 
computer and telecommunication infrastructures provide new possibilities for 
public communication at a national and transnational level. 
The historical public sphere in Aotearoa New Zealand 
From r840 to 1880 colonial capitalism was established in each New Zealand 
province. The provinces were then nationally co-ordinated through a central 
government strategy of overseas borrowing for public works and infrastructure. 
The early modern political economy was directed by a ruling landowner 
oligarchy and shaped by the contradictory pressures of national development 
and dependence upon Great Britain. In the absence of an urban-industrial 
bourgeoisie, public communication was dominated by the pronouncements of 
regionally based businessmen-politicians. 
Early daily newspapers such as the Otago Daily Times, the Press, the Evening 
Post and the The New Zealand Herald were entrenched family monopolies tied 
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to insular business communities. Politicians, businessmen and newspaper 
owners were often the same people. Readerships were informed about the 
virtues of colonial advancement, moral rectitude and deference to the monarchy. 
Editorials contained occasional outbursts against Maori, vagrants, unions and 
politicians from other provinces. Telegraph installation enabled the birth of 
the United Press Association in December 1879, the forerunner of the New 
Zealand Press Association (NZPA). The resulting formats and news gathering 
practices turned newspapers into dry annals of record rather than forums of 
political debate. 
After the 1880s depression, manufacturers, small traders and small farmers 
mobilised against major landowners, bankers and merchant-financiers to elect a 
succession of liberal-reform governments. Their long-term achievement was 
the introduction of a modern pastoral economy. Large estates were subdivided, 
rural credit was government-guaranteed, and technological innovations such 
as refrigeration diversified farm production (Simkin, 1951, p. 169-71). Politics 
became more democratically inclusive. The right of a landowner to multiple 
votes was abolished in r889 and women gained the vote in r893. As the franchise 
widened, previously excluded economic and social perspectives began to inform 
government policy. A raft of labour and social reform legislation throughout 
the 18905 signified the beginnings of a welfare state and an industrial relations 
system (Martin, 198!, p. I4-18). 
The impact of the depression undermined previously dominant discourses 
and gave social resonance to the views of liberal politicians. In I890, as editor 
of the Lyttelton Times, William Pember Reeves expounded the philosophy of 
benevolent state socialism (Maclntyre & Gardner, 197I, p. I9I-94]. The election 
of the Liberals changed the prevailing climate of opinion. Reeves' controversial 
opinions became institutionalised as the New Zealand political economy was 
transformed. This allowed other newspapers such as the New Zealand Times to 
further articulate Reeves' philosophy. However, under later reform governments 
dominated by farming interests, editors of major daily newspapers espoused 
anti-socialist opinions and drove opposition papers out of business. Thus, the 
New Zealand Times was finally squeezed out in I927 by the Dominion and the 
Evening Post (Scholefield, 1958, p. 20). 
From 1900 to 19IO the expansion of pastoral capitalism spawned small 
towns, rural communities and papers of different kinds. Publications declined 
as road and bridge construction brought rural populations within the orbit of 
commercially focused regional papers. From !9IO to 1920, 25 new titles were 
founded but 30 ceased publication. In the four main centres the only successfully 
established daily paper was Wellington's Dominion. It was founded in 1907 and, 
as already noted, absorbed its major opposition the New Zealand Times 20 years 
later (Scholefield, 1958, p. 19-20). Urbanised economic growth reshaped the 
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owne);'ship and management structures of provincial dailies. Politically involved 
proprietors gave way to staid newspaper companies with new divisions oflabour. 
In small- and medium-size towns, printer-editors were succeeded by 
managing editors, who in turn gave way to a new strata of production executives. 
Central-city newspaper buildings became staffed by printers, reporters and 
sub-editors along with departmental managers of production, circulation 
and advertising. Although these local divisions of labour were not elaborate, 
mass produced newspapers did resemble their overseas counterparts. The old 
broadsheet style was succeeded by pictorial lithographs, classified pages and a 
contents column. Modern news formats relied upon the UPA (later the New 
Zealand Press Association [NZPAJ). These organisations were staffed by the 
owners and executives of newspapers rather than professional journalists. These 
were men of commerce who regarded the press as a paternal institutional voice. 
Individual columnists were thus expected to contribute to newspaper identity 
rather than to journalism as a profession distinct from the news industry. Most 
NZPA news copy emphasised fact over argument and this became the house 
style for reporters nationwide. 
The official public sphere represented by these business elites was shaped by 
a 'colony to nation' narrative whereby New Zealanders congratulated themselves 
on the accomplishments of settlement and economic development. The left-
progressive version of this narrative, expounded by William Pember Reeves 
and the early Liberal Party, emphasised the social advancements of benevolent 
state socialism. In this context, the emergent New Zealand public sphere can be 
characterised in terms of a battle over state machinery and the articulation of 
the national imaginary. This battle assumed a class dimension with the growth 
of union militancy during the early I900S and the founding of the Labour Party 
in I9I6. Labour's socialist aspirations were thwarted by a ruling class alliance 
of bankers, wealthy farmers and merchant importers. Their political vehicle 
was the Reform Party founded in I9I2 (Sutch, I972, p. 219; Martin, 198I, p. 27). 
It subsequently drew upon the electoral support of an expanding middle and 
lower-middle class. This ruling coalition utilised the machinery of state and 
vigilante farmers to crush outbreaks of industrial militancy. 
From I9I6 unions in larger cities and mining areas rallied behind the 
Labour Party. Labour politicians, economists and their supporters confronted 
a conservative press and a nascent radio broadcasting system which proscribed 
innovative journalistic practices and general public discussion. Official 
broadcasting regulations were gazetted in I923 and policed by the Post and 
Telegraph Department. From the outset all radio content was subject to official 
restrictions and ministerial approval. In January I932 it was announced that 
control and operation of a National Broadcasting Service would be vested in 
the state (McKay, 1953, p. 31). Thus, official broadcasting was basically an arm 
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of government with no independent status. National regulations authorised 
an institutional voice that equated the public with public service and public 
service with protection of the so-called public good. This precluded the idea that 
public information might be a resource for social reflection, popular argument 
or intellectual dissent. In this regard, Reform-Coalition governments of the 
192,OS and 1930S initiated broadcasting policies which reflected the conservative, 
'respectable' values of agrarian property owners and the lower middle class. 
Meanwhile, newspapers such as the Maoriland Worker, the Week(y Herald, 
the Transport Worker and the New Zealand Watersider defined the contours of 
a marginalised oppositional public sphere embedded within the developing 
culture of working class activism, socialist thought and Labour politics. During 
the 1930S depression such perspectives entered the mainstream via churches, 
women's groups, literacy journals and the less regulated, more populist 'B' radio 
station programmes. Widely felt experiences of unemployment and working 
poverty dislocated the governing orthodoxies of patriotism, social respectability 
and fiscal austerity. However, in the I935 election year, provincial dailies railed 
against the Savage-led Labour Party and 'B' station operators were harassed by 
the government broadcasting board. No election candidates were allowed to 
broadcast between June and November. When the Reverend Colin Scrimgeour 
broadcast 'The Christian road to socialism' on lZB, it was jammed by the Post 
and Telegraph Department (Day 1994, p. 200-205)· 
In the 1935 general election the incumbent Liberal-Reform coalition was 
supported by large runholders, banks and merchant financiers. Their priorities 
were those of British capital. As long as profits could be gleaned from the 
imperial-colonial trade circuit, they supported the status quo. Prominent 
business figures such as James Fletcher and Henry Kelliher along with local 
manufacturers had a more industry-centred view of New Zealand capitalism. 
They combined with smaller farmers and the union movement to benefit from 
Labour's election victory. The new government, led by Michael Joseph Savage, 
introduced exchange controls, import licensing and protective tariffs for local 
manufacturers. Agricultural production for export was supported by overseas 
government marketing and a guaranteed price scheme for dairy farmers. From 
I939 to 1956 the value of farm produce increased by 500 percent and export 
returns rose relative to import costs. Such returns effectively paid for the overseas 
equipment and materials necessary for manufacturing expansion (Condliife, 
1959, p. n8-19). This was a 'two-legged' capitalist economy; improving farm 
productivity and insulated manufacturing growth was facilitated by a managed 
exchange rate and favourable terms of trade. Farmers and manufacturers also 
benefited from Labour's long-term strategy of building transport and energy 
infrastructures. For this purpose, the board and executive officers of the Reserve 
Bank were brought under the direct control of the Finance Minister through 
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legislation. From 1936 the Bank was empowered to grant overdrafts to state 
corporations and local bodies. Most crucially, it could underwrite government 
loans and regulate exchange transactions. 
Labour's philosophy was that if all available resources were used to create 
public goods and services, this would expand employment and widen the tax 
base needed to fund the macroeconomic system. The consequent redistribution 
of income from taxpayer to beneficiary combined with housing and public 
works programmes underwrote the 'Kiwi' version of the Keynesian welfare 
state. From the 1940S this historic accomplishment became the framework for 
economic growth, aggregate demand, redistribution of revenues and national 
value consensus. The Labour government also integrated unions within the 
state machinery. In 1936 compulsory arbitration was re-established and union 
membership was legally compulsory. Subsequent legislation entrenched the 
principle of the eight-hour day and the 40-hour week. Such measures formed 
part of a historic class compromise between capital and labour. 
Labour's Broadcasting Act of June 1936 replaced the New Zealand 
Broadcasting Board with the National Broadcasting Service (NBS). All but two 
of the regional 'B' stations were purchased by the government and absorbed 
within the National Commercial Broadcasting Service (NCBS). Prime Minister 
Savage perceived radio as a counterbalance to the anti-Labour press. From 1936 
the non-commercial YA stations provided regular parliamentary broadcasts. 
This enabled Labour politicians to publicly argue for their legislative programme 
against conservative opponents. By 1938, two thirds of parliament sitting time 
received broadcast coverage. However, Labour's egalitarian ideas did not 
extend to the structure of the communication itself. Neither the NBS or the 
NCBS employed independent news staff. National news, produced in the Prime 
Minister's office, was to be broadcast as received, without alteration or omission 
(Day, 1994, p. 213-15, 219, 233)· 
In August 1936 Professor James Shelley was appointed director of the NBS. 
He styled himself as a cultural and educational administrator of national radio. 
Listeners were introduced to drama, art commentary, live and recorded music. 
Shelley's apolitical conception of public communication stressed the ideals of 
social cohesion, individual tolerance and aesthetic refinement (Day 1994, p. 
220). Meanwhile, Savage allowed Colin Scrimgeour sole administrative charge 
of the NCBS. He could hire his own staff, broadcast his own programmes and 
was beyond day-to-day ministerial censorship. Such autonomy disappeared 
after Savage's death in March 1940. In 1943 new Prime Minister Peter Fraser 
dismissed Scrimgeour for contravening wartime censorship regulations. 
Scrimgeour had helped initiate a nationwide commercial radio network. Rural 
and urban listeners were brought together to form a common audience. Over 
the post-war period the familiar ZB station format included soaps, serials, 
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popular music, sport commentaries and household product promotions. From 
April 1946 the NBS and the commercial divisions were merged into the New 
Zealand Broadcasting Service (NZBS). The Prime Minister's office retained the 
right to produce New Zealand news content and to veto controversial material 
(Day 1994, p. 247, 283). In 1950, newly elected National Prime Minister Sidney 
Holland announced that news would not be prepared by his officials but by the 
Tourist and Publicity Department (a portfolio he subsequently assumed). In 
an era of Cold War consensus and cultural conformity, critical questioning of 
politicians and their policies was never countenanced. Indeed, during the 1951 
Waterfront lock-out, printing presses were confiscated, private radio broadcasts 
banned and pamphleteers arrested. In these circumstances, it was not surprising 
that the principle of journalistic autonomy developed no professional voice and 
cultural authority. 
From about 1960, old family configurations of agrarian and mercantile 
capital became transformed through corporate ownership. Among New 
Zealand's 12 largest listed companies in 1962, individual shareholders accounted 
for 57 percent of the holdings and 40 percent of the capital (Simpson, 1984, 
p. 61). By 1974, individually held shares accounted for only 22 per cent of the 
capital in large holdings (Pearson & Thorns 1983, p. 57-58). The stock market 
consequently saw a trend toward interlocking directorates culminating in the 
Fletcher-Tasman-Challenge merger of 1980 (Jesson, 1980, p. 38-39). 
As concentrations of corporate capital increased, the national economy 
went into debt. In 1974-75 public and private sector indebtedness absorbed nine 
percent of New Zealand's total exchange earnings. By 1978-79 this figure had risen 
to 13 percent (Rosenberg, 1980, p. 136). The immediate cause of this was rising oil 
prices, making imports more expensive relative to exports. At the same time, long 
run agricultural returns were dependent upon fragile world market prices and 
were vulnerable to overseas tariff barriers. Additionally, local and foreign owned 
manufacturers wanting to export were competing against increased economies 
of scale in First World countries and cheaper labour costs in newly industrialising 
countries. Under these circumstances successive National governments, 
under Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, were pressured by corporate leaders 
and senior civil servants to institute policies which would transfer capital and 
labour from uncompetitive domestic firms to internationally competitive ones. 
Here, National's 'think big' strategy of joint venture fuel plant development 
represented a decision to accede to multinational demands for energy and raw 
materials rather than cheap labour. In this situation, Keynesian policy trade-offs 
between economic growth, inflation management and employment creation 
proved difficult to sustain. By the early 1980s rising national debt, stagflation 
and union militancy compelled Muldoon's National government to institute a 
wage-price freeze. Consequently, backbenchers openly attacked the leadership 
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and, by implication, the very precepts of Keynesian economic management. 
Large corporations and a burgeoning finance sector enthusiastically promoted 
economic deregulation and individual entrepreneurialism. Treasury and Reserve 
Bank staff embraced monetarist critiques of Keynesian and public choice theory. 
Meanwhile, the Labour Party played down its social democratic heritage. From 
1975, with the electoral defeat of the Kirk-led Labour government, emphasis 
was placed on responsible economic management and defence of the welfare 
state. From early 1983, shadow finance minister Roger Douglas and his 
supporters shifted Labour policy toward the new contours of Treasury and 
Reserve Bank orthodoxy. 
Political debates and conflicts played out across a nationally constituted 
public sphere subjected to growing corporate and commercial pressures. 
Thus, the 1960s saw a shift from family to corporate press ownership. By 1969 
about 75 of the 100 publications registered in New Zealand were owned and 
operated by nine major firms of which three later dominated; New Zealand 
News, Wilson and Horton and Independent Newspapers Ltd (a partly Murdoch 
owned subsidiary) (Street, 1983, p. 14-17]. By 1980 they owned 70 percent of all 
daily papers. Over the same period the growth of print-based news journalism 
strengthened public sphere principles. Thus, in the 1960s the parliamentary 
press gallery supplemented NZPA news gathering. Gallery correspondents 
provided day-to-day coverage of parliamentary proceedings along with head 
office material from commerce, industry, agriculture, finance and public service 
departments. Although this dependence upon primary news sources did not 
necessarily foster critical journalism, the available range of commentary and 
genres was extended. Whereas the NZPA simply recorded the facts of a given 
event or situation, senior gallery journalists sought to convey understanding 
by interpreting 'accepted' facts. By 1976, 45 journalists were accredited to the 
press gallery. The major metropolitan newspapers each had between one and six 
journalists reporting daily (Garnier, 1978, p. 150). 
Meanwhile, the emergence of a semi-independent broadcasting system 
also contributed to the national public sphere. The 1961 Broadcasting Act 
and the birth of the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (NZBC) ended 
formal Ministerial control of the airwaves. Although NZBC bureaucrats were 
deferential to government authority and fearful of public opinion, broadcast 
journalists could interpret political issues. In the context of news and current 
affairs, the prevailing notion of 'balance' reinforced the primacy of officially 
sourced facts over contesting points of view. When controversial policy matters 
were addressed, senior politicians could reserve the right of reply. By the late 
1960s, however, the NZBC had conceded that all available viewpoints need 
not be aired on a single programme. This allowed radio programmes such as 
In the News, Checkpoint and Viewpoint to provide political commentary. On 
34 
SCOOPED: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF JOURNALISM IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
television, the first series of Gallery in 1969 introduced Brian Edwards as an all-
purpose interviewer who could challenge ministers and other representatives 
of official authority on the public's behalf. Journalistic autonomy was given 
further institutional support by the 1973 Broadcasting Act. Under the 1972-75 
Labour government the old broadcasting portfolio was abolished in favour of 
an administrative structure similar to the independently chartered BBC model. 
Radio New Zealand and the newly established two-channel Television New 
Zealand (TVNZ) were established as separately run organisations. However, 
with National's election victory of 1975, New Zealand broadcasting became 
re-centralised. The 1976 Broadcasting Act integrated Radio New Zealand, TVI 
and TV2 under a single board, which was answerable to the minister. Despite 
these changes, the traditional order did not return; governments could no 
longer administer news organisations and 'manage' news independently of 
media professionals. As Prime Minister Muldoon threatened broadcasting 
revenues and vilified the likes of Simon Walker, Tom Scott and Ian Fraser, 
current affairs journalism itself gained further national profile. On television the 
stock figures of journalists and politicians were at the foreground of public life. 
This was especially evident in the interview format whereby audiences became 
accustomed to the adversarial dimensions of economic and social policy debate. 
Occasionally, the format was widened to include representatives of trade unions 
and various 'protest' groups. Programmes such as (the original) Close-Up, Dateline 
Monday and News at Ten combined interview and studio discussion formats 
with investigative pieces. These developments reflected the growing centrality 
of television to Kiwi culture. All the major issues of the time - equal pay for 
women, Maori land rights, Vietnam, forest conservation and sporting contact 
with apartheid South Africa - were played out on screen. Urban newspapers 
changed their style and format accordingly. Televisuality and the inter-media 
competition for advertising forced press editors to run large news photos and 
bold type headlines. On some newspapers and magazines such as the Auckland 
Star and the Listener, journalists tackled volatile topics such as race relations, 
gang culture, drug use, student protests and police corruption. 
During the 1960s and 1970S prevailing constructions of national identity 
were openly challenged. The feminist movement protested against the male 
exclusivity of sporting rituals, drinking establishments and professional 
organisations. Publications such as Broadsheet revealed the patriarchal nature of 
the Kiwi family and the gendered inequalities of paid work and welfare provision. 
Ecological activists revealed the environmental damage wrought by the 
national drive for economic growth, resource extraction, energy development 
and agricultural productivity. These concerns underpinned the formation of 
the Values Party in 1972. Student, trade union and left activist opposition to 
American interventions in south-east Asia and New Zealand's involvement 
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in the Vietnam War also raised questions of national identity. Should Anglo-
American allegiances govern foreign policy? How should New Zealand define 
its international role? Most fundamentally, Maori cultural resurgence, and 
the associated struggle for land rights, undermined both sanguine and critical 
versions of the 'colony to nation' myth which had informed mainstream 
constructions of national identity. As Ranginui Walker observed 18 years ago, 
Maori experiences had been previously written out of national history: 
Although the Maori stoutly resisted colonial despoliation by defending their 
land against invasion by guerrilla warfare, petitions to the Queen for a 
Royal Commission to look into their grievances and the formation of Maori 
Parliaments, these efforts are not part of the psyche and collective memory 
of the Pakeha New Zealander. Because these events occurred mainly in the 
last century they are confined to the dustbin of non-history (Walker, 1993, p. 143). 
Contemporary Maori activism began in 1970 with the emergence of 
Nga Tamatoa, a human rights group, which sought to de legitimise official 
commemorations of The Treaty of Waitangi. The 1975 Maori land march and 
the Bastion Point occupation of 1976-77 highlighted the return of a repressed 
national history and a marginalised, oppositional public sphere. 
Capitalist restructuring and neo-liberalism: 
Deformations of the historical public sphere 
From July 1984, Labour's election victory over the Muldoon-led National 
government facilitated major changes in the structure of New Zealand capitalism. 
Directorial elites, institutional investors and shareholders were already caught up 
in an unprecedented wave of mergers and acquisitions. Corporate creditors used 
local or global markets to activate passive shareholders against target companies 
through buyouts and offers of higher dividend returns (Jesson, 1987, p. 74-81). 
From 1984 to 1987, the fourth Labour government accelerated this process by 
cutting tariffs, deregulating the finance sector and floating the New Zealand dollar. 
Consequently, banking, finance and finance-related investment expanded and 
industrial activity declined. These changes in economic structure subsequently 
transformed the role of the state. Under Finance Minister Roger Douglas and with 
Treasury backing, government departments such as telecommunications, lands 
and survey, forestry and mining were transformed into commercial enterprises. 
These measures prefigured a full scale privatisation programme after Labour's 
re-election in 1987 and National's first term of government in 1990. Directors from 
New Zealand's major public companies administered newly formed state-owned 
enterprises and presided over their subsequent absorption into the corporate sector. 
Takeover activity throughout the corporate economy led to further 
concentrations of press ownership. From 1984 to 1987 three major players -
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New Zealand News (Brierley), Independent Newspapers Ltd (INL) and Wilson 
and Horton - dominated the newspaper market. In March 1987 Murdoch's 
News Corp assumed a 40 percent interest in INL. During 1989 its holdings 
increased to 49 percent (McGregor 1992, p. 34). In August of the following year 
the Commerce Commission approved a rapid expansion in INL holdings. This 
resulted from the NZ News (Brierley) decision to sell off its Auckland suburban 
papers along with the Auckland Star and the Sunday Star. New Zealand was 
moving from a triopoly toward a duopoly of newspaper ownership. Over 
the same period, cross-media ownership started to assume a transnational 
configuration that stretched into the telecommunications domain. Four pivotal 
events initiated this process: the deregulation of broadcasting (1989), the entry 
of TV3 and pay television (1989), the sale of Telecom (1990), and the lifting of 
restrictions on foreign media ownership (1991). In July 1987 a report prepared 
by Treasury and Trade and Industry officials recommended that broadcasting 
should have its entry barriers lowered, its ownership restrictions freed up and 
a value placed on the use of the airwaves. In this environment, TVNZ faced 
competition from private television within a finite advertising market at the 
same time as the broadcast licensing fee was declining as a proportion of annual 
revenue (Bell, 1995, p. 182-183). In these uncertain commercial conditions TVNZ 
executives extended their holdings to include Sky Television (16.3 percent), 
Clear Communications (15 percent), a Singapore-based Asian business news 
channel (29.5 percent) and a Fijian state-owned television channel (15 percent). 
The entry ofTV3 was initially unprofitable as local shareholders went bankrupt. 
As of 1994 the new principal shareholders were Canadian media conglomerates 
Canwest (10 percent), Westpac (48 percent) and an official receiver (32 percent) 
(Rosenberg, 1994, p. 6). The sale of Telecom in June 1990 enabled American 
buyers Bell Atlantic and Ameritech (34.2 percent each) to enter the pay television 
market. Together with Time-Warner and Telecommunications Inc they bought 
51 percent of Sky (Dominion November 21,1997, p. 13)· Correspondingly, in 1996 
Radio New Zealand's 4I-station commercial network was sold to a consortium 
of Wilson and Horton, Australian Provincial Newspaper Holdings and the 
United States radio giant Clear Communications. 
Concentrations and convergences in corporate media ownership along with 
the marginalisation or disappearance of publicly funded media organisations 
met with little resistance. These parallel developments thinned out news 
and current affairs journalism and foregrounded neo-liberal constructions 
of economic and social policy. The demise of Brierley owned NZ News, for 
example, precipitated the closure of The Auckland Sun, The Auckland Star 
and The Christchurch Star. Auckland and Christchurch joined Dunedin and 
Christchurch as one~paper towns in which neoliberal editorial opinions framed 
public policy reportage. After 1989 Radio New Zealand management received 15 
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percent salary cuts; other staff either took pay cuts or were placed on part time 
contracts. At TVNZ, competition with TV3 for the advertising dollar resulted 
in major layoffs for news desk and production staff. In December 1990 regional 
news services in Christchurch and Dunedin were removed as were late Sunday 
night news shows (Scott, 1995, p. 47-48). 
Radical economic restructuring was administered through a supervening 
state-corporate network insulated from traditional pressure groups and 
representative institutions. Consequently, a small cluster of primary, legitimated 
news sources framed mainstream news reportage. Thus, as a result of their 
growing influence on New Zealand's political economy, the major corporations 
were able to multiply their sources of media authority. High-profile directors 
and investors made authoritative announcements about economic conditions 
and prospects. During the late 1980s corporate leaders publicly appeared 
on behalf of state-owned enterprises and became involved in the activities 
of powerful lobby groups such as the Business Roundtable. As each set of 
'reforms' was completed, such organisations identified for journalists the next 
stage of the 'free market' agenda. News coverage would focus only upon the 
'reform' package of the moment. Over time, this made the policy course being 
followed appear necessary and inevitable. This impression was reinforced by 
advertising and public relations campaigns designed to promote specific policy 
initiatives. During Labour's second term in office approximately $120 million 
of public money was spent on advertising (NZ Herald, July 7 1993, p. 6). Radio 
and television commercials and pamphlet drops to households were arranged to 
promote education, personal income tax 'reform', export incentive programmes, 
youth training schemes, law and order initiatives, local government 'reform', and 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises. During its first six months in office, 
the National government spent approximately $2 million on information 
campaigns which included promoting the December 1990 benefit cuts and the 
May 1991 Employment Contracts Act. A public relations company, Logos, was 
hired to communicate the June 1991 budget and other major policy events in 
the areas of education, welfare, housing and health administration (Otago Daily 
Times, June 17 1994, p. 4)· 
Promotion of the neoliberal policy agenda was abetted by a changing 
television news culture. Content analysis of primetime TVNZ news undertaken 
by Joe Atkinson for the period 1985-1992 demonstrated a marked decline in 
item length and a preponderance of brief sound bites (Atkinson, 1994, p. 152). 
Over the same period the emphasis shifted from issues relating to politics, 
economics and industrial relations towards those of crime, human interest and 
natural disaster. These findings were updated and confirmed by Daniel Cook's 
analysis of One Network News from I984 to 1996. Over this period the average 
news item length fell from 90 to 70 seconds and commercial breaks increased 
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from 12 to 23 percent of the entire bulletin (Cook, 2001, p. 140-44). These trends 
reflected commercial objectives. Advertisers favoured a fast-paced bulletin 
covering many subjects rather than a few issues in depth. Longer commercial _ 
break time maximised the obtainable revenue within each broadcast. 
It is important here to recall and appreciate the unfolding choreography of 
the mass-mediated public sphere. In the afterglow of Labour's July 1984 election 
victory, Prime Minister David Lange occupied centre stage. His rhetorical 
tone and gestures generated a sense of public confidence. At the same time, 
Finance Minister Roger Douglas imbued the news culture with the sense of 
a new age. The widely used shorthand term Rogernomics implicitly affirmed 
the appositeness of the new policy direction. Politicians, journalists and 
commentators also reproduced a terminology which vilified past economic 
arrangements. Key words and phrases included regulated, interventionist, 
vested interest, feather-bedding, inefficiency, dinosaur unions and so on. These 
signifiers of anachronism and decrepitude served to legitimise the nationwide 
dissemination of market culture. Mainstream news bulletins and the covers 
of glossy magazines celebrated the charisma and entrepreneurial skills of new 
financial moguls. They derived their stature from the distinctive iconography of 
the financial economy. Visual depictions of the Barclay's Index, the stock-market 
leader board, the foreign exchange room and the downtown Auckland skyline 
were synonymous with prosperity and progress. When that choreography was 
sWiftly undermined by the October 1987 stock market crash, mainstream news 
coverage conveyed images of bankruptcies, company layoffs and unemployment. 
In this environment the convergent neo-liberal perspectives of Labour and 
National generated intra-party opposition. Between 1989 and 1993 disenchanted 
National members (The Liberals) and Labour members (New Labour) joined 
the Greens, Mana Matuhake and the Democrats under the Alliance Party 
banner. They mobilised popular support for a referendum in which a winner-
take-all electoral system was replaced by a mixed member proportional (MMP) 
alternative. Media opposition to the neo-liberal policy agenda was inchoate and 
fragmented. Beyond the mainstream media domain, The Republican, Monthly 
Review and various trade union broadsheets documented the growing influence 
of corporate capital and the effects of economic restructuring upon working-
class communities. From 1992 to 1995 the Political Review, Wellington's City Voice 
and Alliance newspapers informed and mobilised activists during local body 
elections, general elections and the campaign for MMP. Broadsheet magazine 
detailed the impact of neo-liberal policies on working women, beneficiaries and 
their families. Radio Aotearoa, provincial iwi stations and publications such 
as Mana magazine continued the Maori cultural renaissance of the I970S and 
voiced opposition against National government attempts in the I990S to broker 
final fiscal reparations agreements with tribal-corporate elites. 
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Global capitalism, economic sovereignty and 
re-inventions of the public sphere 
The preceding account recalls a world in which there was an assumed 
congruence between the national economy, the nation state, national society 
and the national public sphere. Class conflict and protest movement activism 
entailed struggles for the national imaginary. Even Maori sovereignty negations 
of the dominant colony-to-nation narrative occurred within the template of the 
national. Today, however, the underlying template cannot be pre-supposed. 
Over the last two decades nation spaces everywhere have been reconfigured 
by the globalisation of capitalism, the spread of neo-liberal policy regimes, 
along with convergences across computers, telecommunications and media 
organisations. This is not a uniform process; some nation spaces are more 
resilient than others. Nevertheless, national-historical conceptions of the public 
sphere need to be positioned in a wider context. To this end, I will argue that 
global capitalism has fragmented New Zealand's political economy and colonised 
public communication. This general situation is obscured by the superficiality 
of mainstream news reportage and by commercialised depictions of national 
identity. Although internet communication fora have facilitated journalistic 
discussion, political debate and national-transnational activism, an oppositional 
public sphere has yet to take shape. 
From the early 1990S New Zealand domestic business activity was routinely 
incorporated within the flows and networks of global capitalism. Between 1989 
and 2008 foreign controlled sharemarket value increased from 19 to 41 percent. 
From 1989 to 2006 foreign direct investment increased from NZ$I.9 billion 
to $82.7 billion. These funds were focused on the purchase of existing assets 
rather than the creation of new productive capacity. Between 1997 and 2006, 
for example, transnational corporations made NZ$50.3 billion in profits from 
their New Zealand operations; yet only 32 percent of this sum was reinvested 
domestically. This trend reflects a marked decline in manufacturing output as 
a percentage of GDP (from 19 percent in the early 1990S to 16.2 percent in 2004 
and 15.1 percent in 2006) (Gould, 2008, p. 27). Financial activity is no longer 
nationally coordinated. By 1996 six of the seven major banks and nine of the top 
ten insurance companies were overseas-owned (Rosenberg, 1998). As of 2008, 
Australian-owned banks within New Zealand were repatriating approximately 
NZ$2.5 billion per annum (Gould, 2008, p. 28). 
At the same time, global and pan-regional media communication 
conglomerates have proceeded to colonise the mass-mediated public sphere. 
Recent press ownership trends exemplify this process. From 1995 to 1998 Wilson 
and Horton, local owners of the New Zealand Herald, relinquished their shares 
to Independent Newspapers Pic (later to be called Independent News and Media 
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[INM]). In April 2001 INP sold its shareholding to Australian-owned APN News 
and Media (Rosenberg, 2008). 
In June 2003 Fairfax holdings paid NZ$I.88 billion for Independent 
Newspaper Ltd's press and magazine titles. This was to have a major impact upon 
journalism and news culture. At that time Fairfax was Australia's largest print 
and media group with a NZ$ro.2 billion valuation. In 2006 they paid NZ$700 
million for Trade Me in order to increase online holdings, exploit electronic 
commerce and to capture the migration of classified advertising (Thompson, 
Hope, Mollgard and McCullagh, 2009). Fairfax's strategy has been to insulate, 
centralise and restructure New Zealand newspaper operations. During 2.006 
they withdrew from the NZPA's pooling system whereby member newspapers 
would share news content with each other (Kiwiblog 7 April, WIl). In June 
2008 Fairfax announced a new Auckland-based website, businessday.co.nz. 
Content was drawn from the Australian sister site The Independent, stuff.co.nz, 
the Sydney Morning Herald, the Melbourne Age and other non-NZPA sources 
(Rosenberg, 2009, p. 200). In July 2008 Fairfax announced the establishment of 
hubs in Wellington and Christchurch to centralise the subediting of features, 
world and business news across all major titles. In August of the same year they 
announced 160 New Zealand redundancies and introduced a new editorial 
management structure to oversee both the Sunday Star Times and the Sunday 
News (Rosenberg, 2009, p. 201-202). On April 6 20ll Fairfax declared that it 
would withdraw from a co-operative NZPA ownership agreement with APN and 
small independent newspaper companies. This erased a historic remnant of the 
nationally constituted public sphere. The NZPA employed 40 journalists who 
provided up to I,OOO daily news items to metropolitan dailies, the provincial 
press, television channels and radio networks (NZ Herald Online April 6 
:2.011). The absence of such staff reduces daily news beat reportage from major 
institutions such as parliament, the public sector and the courts. Furthermore, 
provincial issues and stories receive little or no regular coverage; news receivers 
are, therefore, less able to derive a collective sense of themselves as a basis for 
national debate. 
Fairfax's commercial strategies are not unique. Sky Network Television has 
weakened and partly colonised New Zealand's television domain. For most of 
the 1990S Sky's corporate ownership structure was complemented by TVNZ's 
16.3 percent holding. In 1999 most of this share was bought out by Newscorp-
controlled Independent Newspapers Ltd which then owned 49 percent of New 
Zealand's daily newspaper circulation, along with holdings in national weeklies, 
magazines and websites (Rosenberg, 2002). This substantially weakened 
TVNZ's commercial position relative to its competitors (Sky and Canwest, then 
owner of TV3). In November 2001 the Labour-Alliance government allowed 
Sky to broadcast TVI and TV2 through its newly established digital network 
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(Rosenberg, 2002). At that time INL controlled 66 percent of Sky shareholdings. 
In June 2003 INL used cash from the sale of print holdings to Fairfax to purchase 
Sky's remaining shares. Effectively, therefore, INL's majority owner Newscorp 
increased its commercial influence over Sky operations and its commercial 
share of Sky revenues. Newscorp's dominance was extended when INL merged 
with Sky in 2005. Commercial returns were generated by Newscorp's exclusive 
live coverage rights to rugby league, Australian and British rugby league, test 
and one-day cricket, premier league soccer, majors tennis and majors golf. In 
February 2006 Sky paid NZ$30.26 million for the free-to-air channel Prime 
Television New Zealand Ltd (Thompson, Hope, Mollgaard and McCullagh, 
2009). This allowed Sky to monopolise re-broadcast rights for live sports while 
competing for free-to-air television ratings. Additionally Sky channels and 
networks were regularly promoted to Prime viewers. By 2007 Sky had over 
600,000 residential subscribers (Thompson et aI, 2009). 
Colonisation of New Zealand's audio-centred public domain forms part of 
a similar cross-media ownership pattern. Recent inter-corporate manoeuvres 
undertaken by CanWest, MediaWorks, APN and Ironbridge Capital have 
reshaped television and radio markets simultaneously. CanWest was Canada's 
largest media conglomerate with film, television and other offshore holdings 
in Ireland, Northern Ireland, the United States and Australia. Between 1994 
and 1996 it assumed control of the consortium which was running TV3. In 
1997 CanWest established TV 4 (six years later this was relaunched as the music 
video channel C4). Also in 1997 CanWest began to make further, extensive radio 
acquisitions. In July it purchased More FM's eight-station radio network for 
NZ$33 million. By December 2000 CanWest had purchased More FM's parent 
company RadioWorks. Its stable included Radio Pacific, The Edge, The Rock and 
Solid Gold networks plus 22 other local stations. Future acquisitions of Gisborne 
Media (February 2005), Queenstown's Q92FM, including six frequencies 
(February 2006) and two Marlborough stations (late 2007) further expanded 
CanWest's New Zealand holdings under the rubric MediaWorks (Mollgaard & 
Rosenberg, 2OIO, p. 89-91). 
Opposing RadioWorks is another branch of transnational corporate 
capitalism, The Radio Network. It originates from the 1996 sale of Radio New 
Zealand's commercial ZB stations to The Radio Network Ltd (then owned 33.3 
each by Australian Provincial Newspaper Holding, Wilson and Horton Ltd 
and Clear Channel Communications). In November of that year its holdings 
expanded with the purchase from British Media Company GWR of Prospect, 
a network of companies which included I2 stations and the Independent Radio 
News and Sports service. This initial colonisation process was completed 
in April 1997 when The Radio Network discontinued its use of Radio New 
Zealand's news service. By 2002, after further acquisitions, the Radio Network 
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had established itself as a second, transnational commercial radio operator 
with 53 stations and over 50 percent of national advertising revenue (Mollgaard 
& Rosenberg, 2010, p. 87-88). These developments have entrenched the 
commercialisation of New Zealand radio broadcasting. The duopoly identified 
here controls approximately 85 percent of national audiences and jointly owns 
The Radio Bureau, a research and sales agency which provides a single source of 
services for advertising agencies. Advertising campaigns and promotions across 
stations nationwide are built around demographically targeted formats such 
as rock, easy listening, coast, classic hits, newstalk and radio sport. Listeners 
are positioned within market segments and addressed as proactive consumers. 
Those wishing to escape commercially driven radio formats can listen to Radio 
New Zealand, Concert FM and/or local clusters of community access stations. 
In 2007 CanWest's 70 percent stake in MediaWorks was sold to HT media 
as a subsidiary of Australian private equity group lronbridge Capital for NZ$790 
million. This exemplified a new phase in the colonisation and commercialisation 
of domestic media institutions. Here, Matt Mollgaard and Bill Rosenberg make 
the following observation: 
Given our general concerns about transnational media ownership, the 
question arises; what worse could these private equity corporations do? The 
answer is that they introduce a further degree of commercialisation of the 
media. They are typically investing for at most 3.5 years - often shorter if an 
attractive offer comes along. They may have no interest in any particular 
industry or sector as long as they can see opportunities for profit (Mollgaard 
& Rosenberg, 2010, p. 100). 
Accordingly, Ironbridge Capital's media investments within New Zealand 
are complemented by holdings in environmental waste management and a 
major rest-home chain. Since the 2008 financial collapse, global recession and 
falling advertising revenues have raised concerns about MediaWorks' financial 
position. In the year to 2009 it posted a NZ$3I4 million loss (Mollgaard & 
Rosenberg, 2010, p. IDO). More recent reports suggest that MediaWorks' 
difficulties in paying for broadcast licences have been partly allayed by a four-
year $43-4 million government loan. Meanwhile, Ironbridge has swapped its own 
financial debt for equity injections from Goldman Sachs, the Bank of Scotland 
and BNZ (NZ Herald, 9 March 20ll, p. I). 
Commercial colonisation of media institutions occurs at a time when the 
very nature of media communication is undergoing historic change. Within 
New Zealand, convergent advances in computer, media and telecommunication 
technologies have produced new communication fora centred upon networked 
personal computers and mobile telephony. These fora can, potentially, be shaped 
by public sphere principles or by corporate commercial imperatives (Hope and 
Hoar, 200.2; Dahlberg, 2005; Goodwin, 2007). Amidst these developments, 
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the fifth Labour government, between 2005 and 2008, introduced a national 
digital strategy, announced a shift from analogue to digital television, launched 
two free-to-air digital channels and proposed two reviews of regulation in 
the context of convergence (via the Ministries of Culture and Heritage and 
Economic Development). The digital channels, comprising advertising-free 
programmes across news, current affairs, sports documentaries, drama and 
children's programmes, contributed to Freeview, a free-to-air digital platform 
initially supported by TVNZ, Radio New Zealand, CanWest, Maori Television 
and The Racing Channel against Sky's subscriber-based model of digital 
transmission. 
By the 2008 general election the following questions remained unanswered. 
In a converging communications environment, should a supervening regulator 
coordinate the operational fields of the Telecommunications Commissioner, 
New Zealand On Air, Te Puni Kokiri and The Broadcasting Standards Authority 
with the media-related functions of the Commerce Commission and the 
Ministry of Economic Development? Should TVNZ 6 and 7 receive a further 
funding instalment after 20n? Should the government direct resources and 
regulatory support to Freeview as a public service digital platform? A newly 
elected National government answered all of these questions in the negative. All 
Ministerial reviews of supra-regulation, digital broadcasting and content were 
abandoned (Thompson, 2009). Within TVNZ digital, 6 was discontinued and 
replaced with a commercial channel focused on youth reality television formats. 
The 'Kidzone' component ofTVNZ 7 was redesigned as a subscriber-only channel 
on Sky's digital platform. Finally, TVNZ 7 itself was denied further funding by 
the government (Thompson, 20n). Together these measures subverted the 
public sphere potentialities of the emergent communications environment. 
This in turn extended further the commercial reach of the Newscorp backed 
Sky Television Network. 
The global absorption of New Zealand capitalism and the corporate 
colonisation of media communication have not been publicly thematised. Even 
under Labour-led administrations between 1999 and 2008, neoliberal precepts 
informed macroeconomic and public policy debate. This meant, for example, 
that various free trade and investment agreements involVing Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand and China escaped parliamentary and journalistic scrutiny 
(Gould, 2010, p. 29-39). Within the national news domain Helen Clark and 
senior Labour ministers employed professional mediators to develop a 
communications strategy congruent with 'third way' rhetoric. This produced 
a brand of governance that made other parties appear ideological and old-
fashioned. Such impressions were sustained by the fusion of media management 
and political management. Complex public policy issues with long-term origins 
and implications such as immigration, monetary strategy or urban development 
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were obscured by poll-driven, case-by~case spin doctoring. This meshed 
with the news values of mainstream political journalism. Major newspapers, 
commercial radio and prime time television continued to personalise events. 
Headline political stories focused upon poll results alongside the performance 
of party leaders, cabinet ministers and public officials. The deficiencies and 
superficialities of news journalism were complemented by a growing reliance 
on public relations material. By 2002 approximately 160 communications 
professionals were employed across 39 core government departments. More 
than twice that number were employed in other public service areas such as 
health, tertiary education and local government (Hope, 2003, p. 338). 
These erosions of the political and journalistic public sphere, irrespective 
of policy differences between the major parties, could be perceived in terms of 
a bleak one-sided narrative. An opposing point of view might regard the Maori 
Television service, for example, as a successful instantiation of a longstanding, 
oppositional public sphere. In addition, a newly formed blogosphere has, 
arguably, displaced mainstream media as a forum of critical journalism and 
strident debate. Thus Scoop, an extensively linked online news outlet, operates 
within a cyberspace populated by an array of political blogs. From the right, the 
likes of Cactus Kate, Whale Oil, No Minister and Not PC stand off against various 
shades of left polemic: The Standard, Boalley Road, Ethical Martini, Liberation 
and No Right Tum. Green, feminist and Maori perspectives, respectively, are to 
be found on Frogblog, Handmirror and Maui Street. These and other blogs inhabit 
a world where public sphere articulations transcend neat national boundaries. 
In this regard left-campaigning groups such as the Campaign Against Foreign 
Control of Aotearoa (CAFCA) and the Action Research and Education Network 
of Aotearoa (ARENA) contribute to the transnational opposition against 
transnational corporations and supranational institutions such as the iMF, 
WTO and World Economic Forum. 
The general picture of transnational capitalism and transnational political 
opposition equally competing for the nation space is too sanguine. The 
colonisation of New Zealand capitalism and the nationally constituted public 
sphere since the mid-1g80s prevents any depiction of how offshore business 
decisions affect local communities and workforces. Furthermore, it is difficult 
to publicly combine Maori cultural expression, left polemics in the blogosphere, 
and anti-corporate activism because the national imaginary, as such, has been 
replaced by corporately branded versions of national identity (True, 2003; Evans, 
2007). Fay Richwhite's 1987 KZ7 campaign, Adidas All Blacks branding, Lord of 
the Rings extravaganzas and international projections of a clean-green national 
image to the tourist market, signity both the occlusion of an oppositional political 
memory and the absence of a recuperable, politically engaged public sphere. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF JOURNALISM: 
QUOTIDIAN INTELLECTUALS AND THE POWER 
OF MEDIA CAPITAL 
Martin Hirst 
If journalists exercise some power of influence and persuasion in public interest 
discourse, from where it is derived? What is the source oflegitimacy that allows 
journalists to exercise power in the public sphere? 
Two sources suggest themselves: the first is the apparent professionalism 
of journalists as a category of intellectual labour. This source is derived from 
notions of a Fourth Estate model of journalism and rests on the principle that 
journalists act on behalf of the public interest. The second source is less direct 
and relies on the economic and social power of capital commonly expressed as 
the power derived from ownership and control of media resources. What unites 
these two aspects of the news media is the increasingly visible contradiction 
between journalism as a public service and the news media's status as a business. 
This chapter argues that the perceived power of journalists to act on behalf of the 
public is limited and controlled by the more rigorous power of media capitaP. 
Consequently the power of journalists is deflected into safe areas of what Daniel 
Hallin (1989) calls "acceptable consensus" and "legitimate controversy". Any 
challenge to this codification of power is seen as 'deviant' by capital and resisted 
as a challenge to its rule. In the second half of the chapter these issues are dealt 
with in relation to conceptualising journalists' class place in the generalised 
system of commodity production - the capitalist mode of production (eMP). 
This is an argument that does not focus on the particular conditions in New 
Zealand; nor does it attempt a full account of the position of freelance journalists 
or the various forms of alternative journalism. A few concluding comments will 
address these issues in relation to the political economy schema developed here. 
I am using the term schema to describe a theoretical modelling of the matrix of 
social forces and power dynamics that construct a class place for journalists in 
the social relations of news production. It is an analytical model operating at the 
level of the mode of production and social formation (Poulantzas, 1978a, 1978b). 
The first section deals with what I describe as the public intellectual role 
of journalists. The news media is seen as acting on behalf of the public interest 
and it is this agency role that legitimises journalists' power to hold public figures 
2 1 am using 'media capital' to represent the economic power of capital in this context - and in 
the political economy sense that it is a particular form of capital: investment in the news and 
entertainment industry. 
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to account, to question and examine pUblic affairs. Journalists are seen to be 
working for the public interest, holding the other branches, or estates of the 
public sphere, responsible. Of course this also establishes another set of power 
relationships: those between the journalists, their editors and the people who 
hold the real power in society - the captains of industry, senior politicians, 
corporate lobby groups, influential 'think tanks' or figures in public life. It is in 
this context that we can talk of journalists being members of that broad group, 
which often denies its own existence: the public intellectuals. 
Section two critiques the idea of journalist as public intellectual by 
examining the technical and social divisions of mental work in the newsroom. 
This approach situates journalists in the social relations of news production 
using a similar schematic to that set out in Classes in Contemporary Capitalism 
in the early 1970S by the Marxist thinker Nicos Poulantzas (1978a). In general my 
argument is that while journalists play an important role in the public sphere, 
as intellectuals of everyday life, their power is circumscribed and directed by 
their conflicted relationship with media capital. In the second half of the 
chapter, this is described in terms of class location and class position to indicate 
that newsworkers occupy contradictory places within the class structure of 
contemporary capitalism. 
Journalist as the everyday intellectual 
The news media is an institution that helps to sustain the everyday intellectual 
life of a society. In one sense, journalism is a key social force for the popularisation 
and dissemination of ideas and journalists, broadly speaking, can be described as 
the quotidian intellectuals who provide the public with a means of understanding 
the world around them. However, in another sense, journalists often play 
a key role in circumscribing the range of ideas discussed within the 'normal' 
parameters of public discourse. Put another way, journalists' intellectual labour 
helps build a 'common sense', or shared worldview based on broadly accepted 
normative values, but, at the same time, it also subtly reinforces the 'hegemonic' 
or dominating ideological ideas promoting class harmony under the benign rule 
of capital (Carpentier & Cammaerts, 2006; Forgacs, 2000 [I988]; Morton, 2007). 
This is not to suggest that the shared worldview is necessarily clear, correct, or 
the only one available, but it does - to some extent - become hegemonic; in 
the public sphere it typically overpowers, drowns out, ridicules and attacks, or 
simply ignores, oppositional or counter-hegemonic argument. 
It is commonplace that journalists and the news media playa gatekeeping 
role; perhaps not telling us what to think, but certainly providing strong 
indicators of what to think about and how to go about thinking about these 
things. So, it is obvious that journalists do think about things - in fact, they are 
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engaged in a form of mental labour (Poulantzas, 1978a; Sparks, 2006). The 
thinking work of journalists is then presented as a series of factual accounts 
and opinion-inflected analyses of the world around us and, because the power 
of journalism is legitimised by its supposed pUblic interest and professional 
motivations, it becomes a guide to social action. While not perhaps on the same 
publicly recognised level as intellectuals such as scientists, theologians, eminent 
scholars and literary figures, journalists deserve to be considered among the 
ranks of public intellectuals, and in many accounts that describe the history of 
public life they are accorded that position. In the New Zealand context journalists 
are included in the cast of public intellectuals discussed by Laurence Simmons 
as those "who provide a bridge between specialist areas of knowledge and the 
general public" (2007, p. 10). The place of journalists as public intellectuals is 
implicit too in the title of Simmons' book, Speaking Truth to Power. At the same 
time, many New Zealand reporters and editors shy away from the description 
as intellectuals; journalists and ex-journos of a certain age often proclaim their 
disdain for 'pointy-head' ideas and personalities. 
Thomas Bender (I997) suggests that the Kuhnian sociology of scientific 
revolution migh thelp explain the history of publicintellectuals in the 20th century. 
Scientific work was "structured and validated" by self-selecting communities 
of scientists, inculcated into the methodology and social practices of their field. 
Scientists operate within "highly organised disciplines" that are "working in the 
context of paradigms" (p. xiii). Bender realised that a similar structuration of 
field could be applied to public intellectuals, particularly if one were to look at 
intellectuals in relation to the institutions that gave their work social status and 
meaning. Bender's focus is on academics as intellectuals with their own social 
and cultural paradigms and institutions. Despite the circumscribed scope of 
journalists' autonomy compared to academics, it is nonetheless feasible and 
fruitful to examine the field of journalism in a similar way within the cultural 
paradigms and institutions of news production (Benson, 2006; Bourdieu, 1998). 
The intellectual work of journalists occurs within a range of institutional 
settings particular to the news business that are in tension and potential conflict 
with each other. The first is the institution of the newsroom; in this space 
the journalistic ideology of serving 'public interest' is one of the determining 
cultural practices. The second setting is the journalistic enterprise - often 
today associated with privately-owned or semi state-managed media capital, 
including entertainment, broadcasting, publishing and data-mining enterprise 
- where the dominant cultural practices are over-determined by the economic 
structuration of commodity production (for example see Benson & Neveu, 2005; 
Bourdieu, 1979, 1998, 2005). A third setting is the institutional relationships 
that journalism has with other fields, in particular other areas of intellectual 
and mental labour (technology, law, ethics, public administration, managerial 
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power). It is the power differentials between the newsroom, capital embodied 
in the media enterprise and structural relations between fields that determines 
how journalists 'read' or 'intuit' their position within a journalistic field that, as 
Bourdieu notes, is heavily impacted by market forces. What is vitally important 
in Bourdieu's analysis is the idea that journalism has its own social force that, 
in a sense, pushes back at the external world. This sense of agency is also an 
essential element of any political economy discourse around power in and 
around the news production process. 
As social actors, journalists can help define and direct the wider public 
discourse about politics and other social phenomena within a relationship of 
'symbolic domination' of, or conversely symbolic subordination to, other fields 
(Bourdieu, 2005, p. 30). Within the field, individual journalists have agency; that 
is, they can act, singularly or in concert, in ways which can either conserve or 
transform the "relations of forces that is constitutive of the field" (Bourdieu, 
2005, p. 30). In other words, the actions of journalists within the field help to 
define and direct the motion of shifting power relations that are expressed as 
the taken-for-granted ideological "doxa" (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 164). Throughout 
social Hfe, this common sense system of beliefs actually reflects and refracts 
"the opposition between the dominant and the dominated" social classes and 
is "inscribed in the division of labour" (Bourdieu, 1979). These insights become 
increasingly important when we move to locating journalists within the 
fractured class relations of late-monopoly capitalism. 
According to Bourdieu, any particular field is defined by "its own laws", its 
position relative to "the world at large" and its dialectical relationship ("attractions 
and repulsions to which it is subject") with other fields, such as the economic or 
legal system, education, religion, social manners, the arts and literature. Each 
field - art, law, literature, politics, journalism, etc - has a level of independence 
from other fields and the wider social formation. This is a concept familiar in 
materialist sociology; the 'relative autonomy' allocated to various social actors, 
social forces and fields, and defined by Bourdieu (2005, p. 33) as the field or 
individual's "own law of functioning, without being completely independent of 
external laws". For Bourdieu the relative autonomy of this cultural matrix is as 
important as economics - market forces - in explaining what journalism is and 
does and what its greater social impacts are. However, it is the constant pressure 
of market forces pushing against journalism's democratic ideals, culture and 
practices that structures the power relations - the "force field" - of the "social 
space" that is news reporting (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 40). It is the tension between 
the economic and the symbolic weight of journalism - the dialectic embrace 
between the journalistic scoop and the profitability of a news brand: "Economic 
competition between networks or newspapers ... takes place concretely in the 
form of a contest between journalists" (Bourdieu, I998, p. 41). 
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Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' is perhaps most easily understood as another 
word for an individual's lived experience of ideology, but with the addition of 
a sense of doing, or agency: "an embodied sense of the world and one's place 
within it - a tacit feel for the game" (Zavisca & Sallaz, 2008, p. 7). Further, 
'habitus' also involves the active construction of meaning and ideology by 
those who are living within it: "an act of construction implementing schemes 
of thought and expression" (Bourdieu, 1979). Atton and Hamilton paraphrase it 
as the "personal social history and context" (2008, p. 131) of individuals within a 
field structured by the matrix of operational social forces. For Bourdieu, and for 
political economy, it is the economic which "most directly express the division 
of labour (between the classes, the age groups and the sexes) or the division of 
the work of domination". Journalists participate in the "work of domination" 
and also "make possible the production of a common, meaningful world, a 
common-sense world" (Bourdieu, 1979) which means their intellectual labour 
has a dominant ideological function. 
Bourdieu argues that journalism is a low-autonomy field in that it is 
subject to both political and economic forces operating externally; but perhaps 
paradoxically, the journalistic field also has an ability to "more and more" impose 
itself on other fields of cultural production. It does so also in contradictory ways: 
on the one hand journalism is the "critical tool" of democratic discourse; on the 
other, it is a "relay of the structure of oppression" (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 42). One 
explanation for this dialectic - one amplified by a Marxist reading of Bourdieu 
- is that ideological or cultural-political contradictions within the field are 
intensified by economic conditions. There are two aspects to this in the present 
historical moment: the precarious financial position of the mainstream news· 
media and the pressure exerted from advertising, coupled with the "current 
situation of precarious employment" which, within individual journalists, 
produces "constraint and censorship" (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 43). 
Bourdieu suggests that the difficult employment regime in the journalistic: 
field - and it has intensified since Bourdieu's work as published - is the result of 
two tendencies endemic to the capitalist cycle of production: over~consumption 
and under-production. In this case Bourdieu (2005) is referring to the cultural 
economy when he mentions "widespread under-employment within the 
intellectual professions" and "overproduction of university graduates", both 
of which contribute to a "reserve army" of intellectual workers. It can be 
suggested that this underemployment of intellectual labour is a driver of the 
phenomena of blogging, user-generated content (UGC), amateur reporting 
and alternative journalism that, in their own way, have also come to bedevil 
the field of journalism as yet another external threat to the doxa of professional 
autonomy. In the second section we turn to examining how the power and 
capacity of journalists to articulate a public intellectual identity is compromised 
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and deflected by the stronger power of capital as manifest in its control over the 
division oflabour. On this basis it is possible to outline a schema for re-assessing 
the status of journalists as public intellectuals on the basis of their class place in 
the social relations that structure the news production process. 
Journalism, journalists and class 
The political economy tradition represents the capitalist media as one of the 
"main mechanisms" of class control and "propaganda" (Sparks, 2006, p. III), but 
for critical scholars this is not enough. Sparks argues that a democratic-popular 
account must explain the news media's role in "the system of class rule" and the 
"apparent anomalies" of the few dissident voices that are allowed (p. II3). Sparks 
reminds us that, when looking at journalism in this context, it is useful to 
remember that the news media operates to promote the interests of the capitalist 
class to an audience, the bulk of which is actually working class or "middle class". 
Reporters and editors themselves are broadly part of this middle class strata, 
even though in their potential role as public intellectuals, this is not always clear 
or apparent even to journalists themselves. Journalists are often described as 
seeking the respectability of professional standing and adhering to supposed 
norms of objectivity, fairness and balance (Hirst & Patching, 2007). It is on this 
basis that many sociological accounts lump newsworkers into the amorphous 
'middle class' which is also divided further along 'professional', 'managerial' and 
'white-collar' lines, each with its own "political allegiances" (Budd, 1970). 
Kaul (I986, p. 52) notes that an ideological adherence to professionalism 
is one cultural-political outcome of the class struggle within journalism and 
rightly suggests it is an expression of the values of social capital aimed at 
"accommodating [newsworkers'] status ambitions while subverting their 
economic claims" that "remain disputed" (p. 48). Sparks also argues that there 
is potential for class conflict within the social relations of news production 
"both over pay and conditions and much wider issues such as editorial content" 
(p. 125). Thus, to grasp the relations of power that operate in the news media 
it is important to first establish the class nature of journalism as a set of work 
practices with technical, mechanical (technological), economic (labour value) 
and social (domination-subordination) characteristics (Bourdieu, 1979; Mosco, 
1996). Placing journalists initially in the class space of a "new middle class" of 
"salaried managers and professionals" (Burris, 1980, p. 17) is a useful place to start 
as it associates them with the mental labour of others in this strata; for example, 
teachers, mid-level managers, engineers and salaried professionals in law, public 
administration, education, health and the sciences. 
Journalists' economic and ideological relationships with the news media 
and media capital are further complicated by the commodity-form that news 
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takes. As an agent of the collective worker or "social labour" (Hope, 20ll, 
p. 1071 involved in the news production process, journalists are also buffeted by 
economic and social pressures linked to their role in the social relations of news 
production (Hirst, 2001, 2003, 2OIO). 
Journalists and news workers are working actors in the field of news practice 
that is itself structured by the relations of generalised commodity production: 
the contradictory and antagonistic relations between capital and labour over the 
division of value, wealth and power (Ornebring, 2010). Much of contemporary 
Marxism accepts that classes are defined "principally but not exclusively by 
their place in the production process: ie in the economic sphere" (Poulantzas, 
1978a, p. 14). This means that the role of the labourer in the production process, 
in the generation of value and return on capital invested in the enterprise, 
plays the principal part in determining the attributes of class, but it is not, by 
itself, sufficient. Political and ideological relations also form part of the matrix 
of social forces that impact on class attributes. It is the "mutual constitution" 
(Mosco, 2004) of the economic relations in contradictory combination with the 
ideological and political that animates the social relations of production. 
The second important element in this mutual constitution of social forces 
is the role of individual and collective agency. Despite the routine suppression 
of class tensions, for social actors in a class society there is no escaping the class 
struggle. The formation of class attributes is "one in the same process both class 
contradictions and class struggle" (Poulantzas, 1978a, p. 14). At the centre of 
these social forces is the division of labour. In this respect, Burris (1980, p. 19) 
suggests the class location of the new middle class retains a "common position" 
with labour in its general commodity form based on non-ownership of capital 
(subordination in property relations) and the "alienation" of exploited labour. 
However, within this stratum there are further hierarchical divisions of labour 
defined by degrees of managerial control of the enterprise, levels of autonomy 
and control over the 'exercise' of your own labour, and levels of control over the 
labour of others. 
These same social relations and contradictions also structure class 
locations within the newsroom as an important field of "cultural production" 
where differentiations in the division of social labour reflect the "fundamental 
contradictions" in the social order "between the dominant and the dominated" 
(Bourdieu, 1979, p. 3). To a large degree journalists retain aspects of a 
common economic class position with the working class, but ideological and 
cultural-political dimensions of the labour process (issues of power, control, 
subordination and domination) also playa role in the social 'structuration' of 
the middle class that separates it from the working class ideologically. 
These "regional structures" (Poulantzas, 1978b, p. 13) of the mode of 
production correspond to the "economic, political, ideological and theoretical 
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instances" or expressions of the dialectic (the class struggle and balance of class 
forces) both within the economic relations of production and the social-cultural 
superstructure. This series of contradictions is expressed in what Poulantzas 
calls "class places". There are two spaces: the class location of the subjectj 
actor and the class position. Location corresponds to the place in the economic 
relations and position to a more subjective place in relation to the balance of 
ideological and political social forces (Poulantzas, 1978a, p. IS). When we come 
to examine the class status of journalists this distinction becomes important as 
an expression of the various divisions of social labour - technical, managerial, 
ideological, dominant or subordinate. In this materialist interpollation, the 
'field' of journalistic practice is articulated within the social relations of news 
production, determined in the last instance by the economic. It also situated in 
dialectical proximity to and in struggle with the ideologically-fractured fields of 
science (including technology and theory), culture, politics, economics, the arts, 
literary production, etc. In other words, this schema clearly situates journalism 
as intellectual or mental labour expressed as social practices in the field and 
on the broader terrain of social (political and ideological) struggle. It involves 
examining the allocation, distribution and relative strength of both hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic values of cultural and symbolic capital, common sense 
and knowledge. 
Poulantzas lays out a helpful schematic that establishes the parameters of 
the class struggle and the balance of class forces in relation to these sub-regions 
of ideology, politics and economics that creates a framework for analysing "those 
cases where a distance arises between the structural determination of classes 
[economic class location] and the class positions [of the social actor] in the 
conjuncture" (Poulantzas, 1978a, p. IS). For journalists as a social grouping their 
economic location may well be that of workers (social labour), but their class 
position (their habitus and their conformity to the norms of doxa) may diverge 
from this because of the relatively important role of ideological and cultural-
political practices in the journalism field. A concrete and immutable location 
in the relations of production cannot, therefore, be automatically ascribed to 
journalists based only on their economic status as wage labour. For instance, 
while Sparks (2006, p. 124) argues that for some news workers their proletarian 
status is obvious-blue collar workers in the manufactUring side of the business, 
particularly printers-it is not so clear cut for some categories of journalists, 
particularly if they are independent producers-freelancers-who have a totally 
different economic relationship to the news industry. 
Sparks (2006, p.ns) asserts that most journalists are "poorly-paid 
wageworkers" who we should regard as "white collar", undertaking "routine 
tasks", or "more junior writers". But it is perhaps not that simple. To understand 
the class location and class position of journalists it is necessary to interrogate 
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the matrix of social relations and dialectical movement (contradictions in 
motion) that create the complex "social and technical" divisions of labour that 
occur in the news production process (Sparks, 2006, p. 123). This can be usefully 
done by reference to Poulantzas' schema of structural determinants that define 
the "social division of labour, social class, fractions, strata and categories" that 
make up "class places". These are relations of ideological domination and 
subordination, relations of political hegemony and the economic relations of 
exploitation and economic alienation (Poulantzas, 1978a, p. IS). 
The division of labour in news production 
The struggle over the rate of exploitation or 'productivity', and the total value 
pool of accumulated economic capital relies on increasing specialisation and the 
division of labour to maintain control and to squeeze surplus value out of the 
production process. The constant separation and reintegration of technical skills 
of production with the craft skills of reporting at various times is an example of 
the division of labour being used to increase productivity in the news-making 
process (Liu, 2006; Ornebring, 2OIO). The last big battle over such divisions 
was in the 1980s, Rupert Murdoch's ruthless smashing of the print unions at 
Wapping in I986 the purest example. 
The shifting technical and social divisions of labour within the newsroom 
and the broad strata of what Poulantzas calls the "new middle class" (NMC) can 
be assessed as one aspect of the "recomposition" of social labour in response to 
the dialetical pressures of accumulation and competition (Fieldes, I996, p. 25). 
This process includes the growth of so-called 'white collar' and 'professional' 
categories, including a journalistic 'middle class'. This is a category of social 
labour which self-identifies with a perceived social status "that cuts across blue-
and white-collar occupational divisions" (Fieldes, 1996, p. 27). This represents 
a class position based on a subjective ideological "ambiguity about class" (Lee 
& Turner, I996, p. 22). The new middle class also appears socially as a series of 
"intermediate positions" defined by "similarities" in lifestyle, income, outlook, 
education and "horizontal mobility" (Burris, 1980, p. 19). But, more than this, in 
terms of class location within the relations of production, the NMC represents 
a "crystalisation of social and political forces" expressed in both the "technical" 
and "social" division of labour (Burris, I980, p. 20). The technical division of 
labour relates to various "occupations" (job descriptions) and the social division 
creates the "structure of class relations" (Burris, 1980, p. 21). 
Dealing with the mental (intellectual) labour of news workers inhabiting the 
contradictory class locations (the technical division oflabour) and class positions 
(the social division of labour) requires us to understand how these divisions 
have impacted historically on the structuration of the cadre of journalists and 
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ancilliary news industry employees. Burris provides a number of key points that 
outline a schematic for analysis of differentiation and the division of labour 
among occupations within the category of social labour described as the new 
middle class: 
the division of labour is driven by the needs of capital accumulation, 
expressed as "greater productivity and efficiency" of labour power 
(p.20); 
social capital continually reorganises both occupations and social 
relations of production to impose strict "work discipline" on labour 
power; 
differentiation of both occupation and social relations is a product of 
"protracted struggle" over "control of the labour process"; 
differentiation is reflected in an "inflation of educational prequisites for 
employment" in the category of mental or intellectual labour (p. 20). 
It is not hard to see how all of these tendencies are apparent in journalism 
and news production. New Zealand examples are also plentiful: 
the dosing, or shrinkage of national news agencies, such as the New 
Zealand Press Association (Chisnall & Beswick, 2011); 
abolition of the cadet system in favour of undergraduate and 
postgraduate training and qualifications (Hirst, 20ro; Pearson, 1994; 
Thomas, 2008); 
new divisions oflabour emerging in the establishment of so-called "sub-
hubs" that centralise pagination and other technical aspects of news 
production in high-tech and high-speed turn-around (Tabakoff, 2008). 
Productivity gain has always been the motive behind such changes and, in 
the case of outsourcing journalism education to the tertiary education system, 
cost-cutting as well. The dialectic in the process is indicated by both a "general 
de qualification" of the social labour of the NMC and the emergence of a "highly 
qualified stratum" to manage the extraction of surplus value and the control 
functions of social capital. For example, locating pagination in a sub-hub creates 
the conditions for a small group of senior managers to control the workflow and 
outputs of a large number of sub-editors and to concentrate their working day 
on repetitive technical tasks that require little more than a grasp of grammar and 
an eye for detail in design. 
These elements together reveal the "mixed and contradictory consequences" 
of the ongoing re-division of labour within the NM C. There are other important 
tendencies at work which also inform the dialectic (the struggle over domination 
and subordination) of the social division of labour. The most obvious of these 
are gender, ethnic, linguistic and various cultural-political divisions across the 
subordinate class locations of social labour (Castells, 1999). These subdivisions 
are particularly important to the division of social labour in the news industry . 
. 57 
SCOOPED: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF JOURNALISM IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
The 'feminisation' of the lower ranks of journalism and a well guarded glass 
ceiling are well documented (Froehlich, 2005; Ross, 200r). Ross points out that 
the professional ethos of the modern newsroom is "practically and ideologically" 
organised around a principle of woman as "interloper" in a male domain (200r, 
p. 535). This may have changed over the last decade as more younger women 
enter the news workforce, but that in itself reflects the ongoing re-division and 
recomposition of the workforce. The feminisation of the newsroom may also 
contribute to the depression of average wages (labour costs) across the industry. 
Feminisation may also be a response to the changing structure of the news 
industry, with a focus on lifestyle journalism, niche magazines in the women's 
market and the pressure on males to work in higher-paid professions such as 
engineering and law (Aldridge & Evetts, 2003). 
On the basis of this analysis it is therefore sensible to conclude that 
journalists and news workers tend to occupy a proletarian class location within 
the matrix of social relations of production - they are indeed working class in 
terms of economic relations. Colin Sparks is in no doubt that ancilliary workers 
in the news industry - printers, set builders and clerical staff, for instance -
are "without question manual proletarians" (2006, p. 124). However, the duality 
of the news commodity (surplus) value and ideological (use) value creates a 
contradictory set of attitudes that form the world view of most news workers. 
The ideological consciousness of journalists is a function of their contradictory 
economic location within the capitalist production process, as well as their 
social conditioning as part of an 'insider' political and cultural elite. In the case 
of journalists, occupying a contradictory class location, the principal economic 
determinant is their 'in between' status. They are not owners of the means 
of production, but wage-labourers who perform some of the ideological and 
political control functions of Capital (Poulantzas, 1978a, p. 209). For this cadre 
of mental labour, the ideological and the cultural-political often appears to 
dominate and determine their outlook and their class position. 
In this schema the intellectual labour of news workers coupled with 
the economic forces of news production mean that journalists occupy "an 
ambiguous position" as "influential actors", but not "full-fledged members" of 
the "political world" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 4).lt is this ambiguous position - or what 
I call a contradictory class location and consciousness - that concerns us here. 
In the political economy schema deployed in this chapter, the contradictions 
in the journalist's class position oscillate around the reporter's political-cultural 
identity as Bourdieu's "day labourers of everyday life" (p. 7). Economically 
attached to the working class through similar wages and conditions clauses 
in contracts, journalists are more inclined to adopt political and cultural ideas 
more closely aligned with those of the ruling class. 
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The class position of the everyday 
intellectuallabourer 
This chapter has demonstrated a schema that shows there exists a matrix 
of culturally and ideologically similar relations of production aligned with 
occupational (technical) divisions of labour within the NMC, of which 
journalists are a major cohort. News workers perform tasks of mental labour in 
a production process structured by the generally operating social divisions of 
labour corresponding to the technical role being performed. A common location 
in the social relations of production is the basis for an organic link common 
to occupational groups of mental labour within the CMP. In the case of news 
workers this aligns them broadly with particular strata of the NMC with which 
they share common characteristics in the "regional structures" (Poulantzas, 
1978a) of cultural-political and ideological class position: "social positions 
adjusted to their properties" defined by their place in the division of labour 
(Bourdieu, 1979, p. I). Bourdieu uses 'taste' as the metaphor for this process; for 
McNair it is "aesthetics and critical judgement" (2006, p. 55!). Both formulations 
address the tendency for cultural-political forces to shape (over-determine) 
the economic relations. In the concluding comments these formulations are 
integrated into a discussion of present conditions. 
In the current climate - in which the political economy of the future of 
journalism and the news industry is not settled - there is even greater insecurity 
for news workers as quotidian intellectuals, the 'day labourers of everyday life', 
in the current period of flux. It is a period defined by the collapse of trust in 
traditional media; the impact of encroaching technologies that lead to non-
professional "produsage" (Bruns, 2005) and failing business models that lead to 
wage freezes and job cuts in newsrooms across the globe. 
It is a process that reflects and reinforces the contradictory class location 
of newsworkers expressed in the commodified form of their changing socio-
economic status, in particular the divisions of labour that lead to loss of status, 
control and income. The proletarianisation of the mental labour and the 
commodification of journalists' cultural aspirations combine to undermine 
'social deference' towards elites and has 'weakened' the hegemonic cultural-
political power of the capitalist news media. McNair sees this as a technogenic 
result of "innovation", the "anarchic impact of [the] information revolution" 
(2003, p. 550). This subtle shift in the relations of subordination and domination 
between a NMC cadre in the news labour process finds a cultural expression 
in the dialectic of the front page; "dissent and intellectual diversity", "Pilger's 
dissident journalism", "dislocation and disorder", a "zone of dynamic ideological 
competition" (McNair, 2003, p. 551). The dynamic conjuncture that McNair is 
documenting is an expression of the "triadic movement" (Merrill, 1989) in the 
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dialectic of journalism - an ongoing shift in the balance of forces between social 
labour and social capital in the struggle over cultural-political subordination and 
domination that corresponds to the battle over the extraction and accumulation 
of value in the news labour process. 
If we look empirically at the ways in which digital production technologies 
are introduced into and impacting upon the news media, it is possible to trace 
the outlines of a classic capitalist response to a periodic crisis in profitability. 
One impact of this economic crisis is that the editorial and gatekeeping function 
of the newsroom is being diminished; instead, control shifts towards a higher 
managerial layer of the NMC, more closely aligned with the core interests of 
Capital. As Nick Davies (2008) and others have demonstrated in recent studies, 
the remaining news hole is increasingly being filled with cheaply generated and 
published PR and wire-generated copy. As news websites become aggregators, 
as newspapers move more into features and lifestyle segmentation, and as 
broadcast outlets continue to reduce the volume of news on air, there is less and 
less original and investigative reporting being done. While this is not a uniform 
or blanket position yet, it is beginning to impact on serious newspapers and 
public service broadcasters. 
The shifting divisions of labour create a situation in which the intellectual 
value of journalistic work is being diminished and it becomes more like the 
process work of car assembly or general manufacturing. This makes the creation 
of a positive intellectual identity increasingly difficult for journalists. Their work 
is becoming more routinised as it is further divided; for example, fact-checking, 
subediting and page make-up in the print industry is being outsourced. In 
many news organisations the first tranche of redundancies has been among 
subeditors. In New Zealand the outsourcing of subediting at both major national 
newspaper chains is almost complete. These responses from media capital 
reflect the strategy adopted in all sectors of the capitalist mode of production 
in response to the classic crisis conditions of late capitalism. The contradictions 
that are pushed to the fore in the current situation play themselves out through 
workplace struggles around the introduction of new technologies and work 
practices, in pay disputes, and in job negotiations between employers and unions. 
A political economy schematic of journalism foregrounds the role of the 
news media as an important site of the struggle over class power in a capitalist 
society. Importantly, 1 situate this struggle in news content (the dialectic of the 
front page) and also in the newsroom, where it is a battle over the division of 
labour and the division of value between wages and profits. There is no doubt 
that such a contest is currently underway and it is expressed in McChesney's 
"critical juncture" and McNair's question about the immediate future of 
"cultural chaos". Will this breakdown of traditional forms of social control in 
the newsroom fuel the "media-led expansion of capitalist modernity across the 
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globe", or challenge the "injustices and excesses of globalisation and cultural 
imperialism"? It will, by necessity, be "all of the above" (McNair, 2006, p. 554). 
It is also worth noting a subtle but continuing power shift in the cultural-
political relations of news production towards alternative journalism and user-
generated news-like content (UGNC) which has (momentarily) weakened the 
hegemonic discourse of the mainstream media (Atton & Hamilton, 2008; Hirst, 
20n). Simultaneously, since 2007 an endemic and global crisis of accumulation 
has affected the fortunes of social capital. Media industries are not immune; 
they are centrally located within the competitive forces of accumulation and 
dispossession that characterise global capitalism in crisis (Harman, 2010; 
Harvey, 2010; McChesney, 2001, 2007; Thussu, 2007). 
In terms of class positions in news work, the confluence of these conditions 
means that there is the possibility of a cultural-political alliance of intellectual 
interests, perhaps between journalists and those outside the relations of production 
that historically shaped the journalistic field - the amateur and 'citizen' reporters. 
At the moment this is a potential, rather than a real tendency, but it is likely to be 
further fueled by the struggle over commercial control over the division oflabour 
in the newsroom. The drive to increase the productivity (and thus profitability) 
of media capital involves bringing in more cheap (or free) user-generated content 
into the commodified 'clickstream'. This is an expression of capital's attempt to 
control the division of labour by harnessing as much social labour as possible 
in the extraction of value; for example, so-called 'content farms' which pay 
freelancers $5 for a 200-word 'article'. It is likely (not inevitable) that this will 
lead to further struggles over economic and political-ideological issues within 
and around journalism. The dispute between Huffington Post founders Ariana 
Huffington, Peter Dauo and James Boyce over intellectual property rights and 
a share of income from the site is one example of the potential disputes. None 
of it seemed to matter when the HuffPo was a gadfly independent blog site, but 
now that it is aligned with the media giant AOL (after a US$315 million deal), 
it has become a hot commercial property and ownership rights have become 
valuable (Cohan, 2OU; Rafi Atal, 2on). 
There is evidence too that media capital is rapidly establishing a presence in 
the space ofUGNC, attempting to subordinate and commodify "the proliferation 
of journalistic reportage and commentary" (McNair, 2006, p. 552). CNN's 
colonisation of 'eyewitness' reporting through the copyrighted format of iReport 
is one example (CNN Digital, 2010). The purpose, shared with Capital as a whole, 
is to harness the competitive process of accumulation and to appropriate the 
labour power of professionals and amateurs alike. The easiest methods present 
themselves on already existing digital platforms and social media (Hirst, 2on). It 
is no surprise then that supporters of alternative journalism (Atton, 2003; Atton 
& Hamilton, 2008) respond with alarm and hostility to this attempted takeover. 
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In line with Atton and Hamilton's formulation, many techno-positive 
accounts locate the practices of alternative and citizen journalism in a field 
structured around principles of cultural-political opposition to orthodoxies of 
capitalist media systems (Bowman & Willis, 2005; Bruns, 2008). In their 2008 
work on alternative news movements, Atton and Hamilton even make the bold 
claim that alternative journalism is a "radical challenge" to the very epistemology 
of professional journalism through "overt advocacy and oppositional practices" 
(p. 135). Situating journalism within the class formation of capitalism is an 
essential aspect of increasing our understanding of both the mainstream and 
the alternative forms of journalism that are contending for the future of the 
field. If we take the social totality of the relations of news production into 
account, it is possible to establish some confidence in the proposition that 
there is an alignment of subjective class position between journalists working 
in the news industry and the growing cadre of non-journalists engaging in 
'news-like' activities across all areas of media, but particularly online. The 
NMC's dissatisfaction with the increasing division of labour and its reaction to 
"proletarianisation" (Braverman, 1974) has the potential to move its cadre in an 
oppositional direction - towards alternative and counter-hegemonic forms in 
world view. 
It is prudent to be cautious because this development of cultural-political 
consciousness is an uneven process and the ideological divisions among the 
NMC and traditional workers are still strong. Any residual power that journalism 
may have in relation to its fourth estate role is being rapidly eroded as editorial 
decision-making is moved from the newsroom into the managerial elites with 
titles like 'publisher' or 'editorial director'. The relations of subordination and 
domination are strong opposing forces that further divide social labour in the 
newsroom. Senior cadre perform the technical and managerial tasks of social 
labour which enforce the rules of accumulation; editorial leadership groups 
effectively police the cultural-political boundaries of common sense and direct 
key messages to appropriate class-differentiated audiences. Class position also 
aligns with some technical divisions - production, managerial, commercial, 
editorial - that correspond to the relations of domination and subordination 
in the labour process. However, despite these economic constraints, it does 
signal that a common class position in opposition to the hegemony of social 
capital is possible among amateur and professional intellectuals of the everyday, 
at least at the cultural-political level of intellect and outlook. Whether such a 
reconfiguration is possible in the New Zealand context is a whole other question, 
which 1 haven't explored in a specific way in this chapter. However, hopefully I 
have at least articulated a theoretical framework for examining these issues that 
will resonate with the readers of this book. 
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CHAPTER 3: REPORTING TE TIRITI: PRODUCING 
AND PERFORMING COLONIAL SOCIETY 
Sue Abel, Tim McCreanor and Angela Moewaka Barnes 
In April 1840, in the very first edition of the first newspaper published in this 
country (Scholefield, 1958), Samuel Revans, editor of the New Zealand Gazette 
and Wellington Spectator (the New Zealand Company paper), commented on the 
drawing up and signing of the Tiriti 0 WaitangijTreaty ofWaitangi3: 
... the Government of England has recognised every petty tribe in New 
Zealand as an independent foreign power, and has by implication asserted 
the right of the chiefs to exercise authority over every person residing within 
their territories, according to the laws, or rather customs, of the tribe. 
Revans, S, (1840). 
This singular statement with its overt incredulity and its undertones of 
injustice, resistance and superiority, presciently prefigures generations of 
hegemonic Pakeha discourse about the Tiriti 0 Waitangi and its place in our 
society. 
In the decades that have followed, most of the press coverage of te Tiriti 
and the issues that surround it and arise from it has been framed from the 
point of view of those Pakeha New Zealanders who see te Tiriti as giving 
Maori unfair privileges, and as taking something away from 'us', While there 
has been more neutral coverage in recent years, much of this still positions 
te Tiriti as something to be 'celebrated' (rather than enacted), with little 
consideration of the social, cultural and political factors involved, It is precisely 
because so much news coverage has been based around anti-Maori themes, 
and/or does not provide the necessary context for any real understanding of 
te Tiriti issues, that current reporting which is deemed neutral, and coded as 
fair and balanced coverage, still has the potential to arouse and reinforce 
hegemonic ideas about 'Maori privilege' and the 'Treaty gravy train' amongst 
many readers. 
It may seem an exaggeration to some to suggest that New Zealand's news 
media are "producing and performing colonial society". But there is a large body 
of research which demonstrates that Pakeha media frames issues and events 
from a Pakeha perspective; omits the perspectives that come from being a 
colonised people; prefers to use Pakeha sources rather than Maori sources even 
l There are two versions of the treaty signed at Waitangi in 1840 - the Treaty (written in 
English) and te Tiriti (written in Maori). Te Tiriti is the version signed by most of the Maori 
chiefs, and also the version that takes precedence in international law. We therefore refer to te 
Tiriti throughout this chapter. 
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in stories that might be called 'Maori stories'; and sees such items as 'Maori 
stories' rather than as stories that concern us a1l4 . 
When the narratives, experiences and perspectives of one of the two parties 
to te Tiriti are shut down and shut out, Pakeha media is indeed continuing the 
role of the coloniser and this is particularly the case in the news coverage of 
te Tiriti and the issues that arise from it. 
In this chapter we examine the complexities of reporting te Tiriti issues, 
focusing on data from a project on news media representations of Maori and the 
implications for health and wellbeing. We collected a prospective representative 
sample of print, radio and television news items about Maori between November 
2007 and April 2008. Data were studied using both quantitative and qualitative 
methods including content, thematic and discursive analyses. We present 
our analyses of print coverage of te Tiriti as a case study of the role of Pakeha 
media5 representations in the constructions and maintenance of MaorijPakeha 
relations in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
The analysis takes two approaches. One is a focus on the discourses within 
the media texts in our sample that are (potentially) counter-hegemonic and 
might contribute to a push for a change in the nation's 'common sense'. We also 
attended to ways in which text in the items anticipated alternative discursive 
resources, following Billig et aI's (1988) idea that the construction of an object 
is ordinarily cast against a competing account; what Edwards (1997) has 
characterised as the "rhetorical, argumentative quality" (p. 8) of discourse. One 
effect of this dual approach is that the chapter has a double-edged character 
that gives credit to any perceived changes in journalistic practice while also 
maintaining a focus on the ideological implications of texts that are easily read 
in hegemonic ways. 
We begin with a brief historical sketch of press performance around the 
topic of te Tiriti, then outline and discuss the categories that te Tiriti stories in 
our data fell within, before looking at one story in depth. Finally, we consider the 
complexities of counter-hegemonic reporting in a climate where such discourses 
may be misread, or rejected by, large numbers of the non-Maori population. 
From their establishment in the 1840s, the settler media in Aotearoa were 
committed to colonial interests in shaping the development of the colony, 
such as controlling the power structures, or owning land and resources. The 
press was a powerful tool and envisaged from the outset, particularly by the 
New Zealand Company and leaders of the agitation for "responsible settler 
4 For an overview of such research up until 2005, see Adds et al (2005). 
5 We use the term 'Pakeha media' in preference to 'mainstream media', which marginalises 
Maori media as 'Other', We do not suggest here that only Pakeha work for Pakeha media -
rather, that the finished news product predominantly reflects a Pakeha perspective under the 
guise of'objectivity'. 
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government" (McLintock, 1958), as a key means of attaining hegemony "on the 
ground" (Scholefield, 1958). Newspapers were recognised by the governors of 
the Crown colony as indispensable to managing the task of establishing and 
maintaining the desired social order (Day, 1990). 
Revans, whose comments opened this chapter, kept up his adversarial 
commentary unabated until his paper folded in 1845, describing te Tiriti variously 
as "ill-ascertained" (1843), "the most serious error" (1844) and deriding Maori as 
best regarded as "tenants for life" rather than sovereign owners. Editorials in 
other papers are less circumspect and their language even more virulent: 
... the Treaty itself is perfectly useless - nothing whatever is ceded by the 
natives to the Crown of England (Daily Southern Cross, August 26 1843) 
The Treaty ofWaitangi in New Zealand is ... an insuperable obstacle to the 
progress of settlement, and a protection to Barbarism (Wellington Spectator 
and Cook Strait Guardian, August 23 1845). 
Ballara (1986) and Thompson (1954a, 1954b) have provided general 
accounts of historic press representations of Maori that are congruent with 
our suggestion that there has been a consistently negative bent to this domain. 
While Thompson looks specifically at a sample from 1950, Ballara's work traces 
racism from 1814 to the early 1980s, giving examples of how this is evidenced in 
the Pakeha media of the time. 
In recent years there has been more detailed scholarly analysis of 
contemporary media coverage of te Tiriti and its associated issues. This has 
revealed that not all media outlets have had a negative attitude towards Tiriti 
issues. For example, Trlin (1990) analysed editorials on aspects of Maori-Pakeha 
relations in what he called "a notably liberal daily newspaper the Dominion" 
in the period 1 July to 30 November 1988 and found that it was at that time 
"unequivocal in its advocacy of Maori interests" (p. 92). The ten relevant 
editorials "championed the legitimacy of Maori claims" and this stance was "well 
supported by sympathetic feature articles" (p. 93).6 
Not all news, however, has been so good. In a chapter called 'Maori news 
is bad news', Walker (2002) documented what he characterised as "journalistic 
licence" and sensationalist reporting of protest action at Waitangi Day 1981, 
where "noisy but peaceful protest has been characterised as a 'full-scale riot'" 
(p. 225). Charges against some of the protestors were later dropped in the Kaikohe 
District Court, as a result of a ruling that nothing that might have constituted a 
6 The fact that The Dominion has not for many years been regarded as "a notably liberal daily 
newspaper" suggests that the argument that one person in a position of power in a media 
organisation can effect change may (at least on this occasion) have some truth in it. It also 
goes against the much more widely held theory that it is the routines and constraints of news 
organisations that play an important role in determining content and 'bias'. 
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riot had actually happened. Nevertheless, as Walker points out, this did little to 
correct the original media distortion in the mind of the public and he argues that 
rather than being depicted as positive, unifying and empowering acts, Maori 
protests have been portrayed by mainstream media as rebellious disruptions to 
social harmony (Walker, 2002). 
This has particularly been the case on Waitangi Day, when protests about 
the lack of progress in Crown redress for breaches of the Treaty have been a 
common occurrence. Abel's (1997) research on news coverage of Waitangi 
Day in 1990 focuses specifically on television news rather than the print news 
examined in this chapter, but her findings are nevertheless relevant because 
they demonstrate that the dominant discourse is not necessarily monolithic. 
She identified four discourses in the news coverage. The first was a dominant 
'common sense' discourse which referred to te Tiriti (if at all) as a symbol of 
unity in the assimilationist context of New Zealanders as 'one people' and 'one 
nation'. A second 'moderate' discourse implicit in the approaches taken by some 
reporters suggested that there had been inadequacies in the way te Tiriti had been 
observed by successive governments. A third discourse was adopted by Pakeha 
representatives of the churches, acknowledging that Maori and Pakeha should 
be equal and that te Tiriti should be honoured. Such a discourse could obviously 
be seen as anti-hegemonic, but it was not constructed as such by television news 
- probably because of the prominent social position of the people concerned. 
The fourth discourse expressed strong dissatisfaction with the failure to honour 
te Tiriti and directly challenged the status quo. This discourse was associated 
with those actively protesting, so was only heard in fragments, and viewers were 
clearly not expected to identify with it (Abel, 1997, p. 39-40). 
Moewaka Barnes et al (2005) found that in a sample of 260 news items from 
print and television during the period August to October 2004, 50 were about 
the Treaty, and 69 percent of these were 'bad news' stories. The group identified 
gaps and silences on Tiriti-related concepts such as tino rangatiratanga and 
biculturalism, and found that references to te Tiriti rarely included what it 
actually says. Very few items that mentioned te Tiriti detailed any of the systematic 
breaches by the Crown or of tangata whenua rights to redress. The group resampled 
media from February and March 2007, and found that the patterns identified 
above still persisted (Rankine et aI, 2008). Many of the patterns established in 
this body of research are also evident in the data analysed for this chapter. 
Data overview 
Of the 858 print articles in our database, 64 mentioned te TiritL Of these, 12 
covered celebrations around Waitangi Day, five were versions of the same story 
about a Tiriti education effort, six covered Tiriti negotiations and seven covered 
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settlements. The remaining stories focused on various forms of conflict: between 
Maori and Crown or local government; between different iwi; or conflict arising 
from te Tiriti and the constitutional arrangements of the country. For reasons of 
space, we focus in this section on the main theme - conflict. 
That so many stories focused on conflict is perhaps not surprising given 
that the news value of conflict features so highly in Western news reporting 
(McGregor, 2002; O'Neill & Harcup, 2009; Stephens, 2007). This is accentuated 
in settler societies when indigenous peoples have started asserting their rights 
in respect of land and other resources taken from them by the colonisers (Alia & 
Bull, 2005; Downing & Husband, 2005). In such situations, many stories report 
claims by indigenous peoples as a threat to the dominant group. 
Most stories about te Tiriti in our sample are cast in terms of conflict between 
Maori and Crown or local government (24), or iwi and iwi, as Crown processes 
pit the latter against each other (six). The inter-iwi items include Ngai Tahu's 
challenge to the boundaries of northern South Island Maori, and dissent among 
claimants for the Kaiangaroa lands and forests. The Treaty vs Crown stories 
cover a range of issues, although seven of them are about actions by Ngai Tahu 
following the Crown engagement with the Treelord' claim for the Kaiangaroa 
forests and related assets. The existence of clauses in Waitangi Tribunal claims 
already settled, which allow for supplementary payments so that iwi are not 
disadvantaged by early settlement, are evoked to maintain parity: 
Ngai Tahu is poised to trigger a top-up clause in its historic Treaty settlement 
as the proposed $400 million 'Treelords' deal threatens to overtake the 
$[ billion fiscal envelope (Dominion Post! 3 April 2008, p. 2). 
This first sentence is typical of the seven articles about Ngai Tahu's relativity 
claims. Here the choice of the words "trigger" and "threatens" have the potential 
to evoke Pakeha anxiety about both an unending Tiriti process, and the further 
accumulation of wealth (and hence power) by Ngai Tahu, already one of the most 
'powerful' iwi. As the largest corporate entity in the South Island, the political 
strength underlying such legal skill may be interpreted as a threat to the unitary 
sovereignty of the country. It is difficult not to read the fact that 'Treelords' will 
breach this line in the sand as further evidence of Crown failure to contain Tiriti 
claims. The implications of the breach are that the Tiriti process is potentially 
unending both in terms of economic cost and social tension, which is a familiar 
theme within Tiriti discourse and commonly seen as a rationale in arguments 
that call for te Tiriti to be 'scrapped' or otherwise abandoned. 
In other stories on this topic, headlines about $30 million in extra monies 
for Ngai Tahu have the potential, because of a historic lack of context, to be read 
as evidence for the pejorative 'gravy train' interpretation ofTiriti settlements. 
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Thematic analysis 
In this section we apply a more intensive form of analysis that relates to 
what Braun and Clarke (2006) refer to as a thematic analysis that has much 
in common with the discourse analytic processes developed for example by 
Potter and Wetherell (I987) and Wetherell and Potter (I992). Here the emphasis 
is upon working inductively from a closely de constructive approach toward a 
more generic thematic description of patterns in data. We focus on two excerpts 
from a single story, one of the more obviously negative in our data, to examine 
the ways in which particular constructions produce the often subtle effects of 
positioning in media meanings around te Tiriti. The story was published on 
page IS of the Dominion Post on I9 February 2008. 
Treaty claims still hold up school sales 
(byline) Tanya Katterns 
Treaty of Waitangi claims are continuing to delay the sale of Masterton's 
abandoned schools. It will be April at the earliest before a decision is made 
on the fate of two of the schools that were closed after a review in 2004 and 
were finally offered for sale last year. 
The halt to the sale of Harley Street and Totara Drive schools, with 
a combined rateable value of $3 million, came after the Office of Treaty 
Settlements received an eleventh-hour application from local iwi claiming 
the sites had historical significance to Maori. 
The headline sets the tone of the rest of the article, setting a context that 
encourages hegemonic readings. Here the claims process is represented as an 
irritant and distraction to ordinary administrative practice, and the use of the 
word "still" suggests protraction. There is an implicit reference here to the length 
of time that the whole process of settling compensation for Tiriti breaches is 
taking. While there are many reasons for this, the tone of this article suggests 
this is to be blamed on Maori. Note that the headline and opening sentence 
work to produce a reading of the Maori actions that are distinct from what are 
described later in the article as "applications" to the Office of Treaty Settlements 
(OTS), rather than formal claims to the Waitangi Tribunal. The OTS is quite 
separate from the Tribunal and has been set up largely to obviate the need for 
the latter by instigating direct negotiations between Crown and iwi (Office of 
Treaty Settlements, 2002). Sentence two (S2) amplifies the headline rendition of 
"Treaty claims", naming the Maori actions as "Treaty ofWaitangi claims" which 
would commonly be read as meaning a submission to the Waitangi Tribunal. 
The Tribunal is one of the frequently named bastions of 'Maori privilege' and, in 
the context that has been set up, is very likely to evoke the associated tropes of 
'grievance industry', 'gravy train' and 'lawyers' trough: 
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In this context, the first sentence elaborates the nUIsance value by 
introducing the notion that the properties are empty and therefore delaying 
their sale is both wasteful and risky given a generic history of vandalism of vacant 
stock. As the detail emerges of a four-year process of closure and disposal of 
these state assets, the frustration at the new delays comes closer to the surface. 
The use of the term "eleventh-hour" to characterise the iwi applications evokes 
a sense of opportunism behind the well-worn trope "historical significance to 
Maori". Along with similar phrases referring to spiritual or cultural values, this 
phrase evokes a set of, in Pakeha terms, intangible/untestable dimensions to 
any claim of significance. This is likely to be regarded with a keen scepticism by 
such audiences. 
After S4 the item changes tack to layout the legitimate interests and 
opportunities represented by the properties, detailing the inconvenience to 
bidders whose efforts in engaging in the tender have been thwarted by the claims 
from the two iwi authorities. The article continues with an Education Ministry 
spokesperson describing the process of disposal in terms that suggest the claims 
are unfair, improper and inconsiderate given the claim terms canvassed and 
rejected among Maori already, via a "first right of refusal" option and an OTS 
"'Maori protection mechanism"'. The latter, with its scare quotes signalling 
ambiguity, is easily read as a euphemism for what is more widely understood as 
Maori privilege - special arrangements that give Maori exclusive or prior rights. 
The article continues at S1O: 
Mr Butler said that new information would be processed by a committee 
made up of relevant government agencies, to decide whether the property was 
to be released or land banked by DTS. That decision was expected in April. 
Lansdowne School, which also closed in 2004 was already land-banked at the 
request of the OTS. It was already part of a multimillion dollar Maori claim. 
Last year, the ministry came under pressure to get on with the abandoned 
school's disposal after a spate of vandalism. 
Lansdowne School was damaged by arson soon after it closed and again 
last year. Harley St School, where a suspicious fire destroyed the disused hall 
in late 2006) has had its windows and doors boarded up, 
The process for disposing of the buildings is supposed to take about two 
years. But Mr Butler said the process for disposal of school property was the 
same as for any crown property and had to be adhered to. 
S10 suggests that the OTS process referred to earlier includes the possibility 
that the properties will be "landbanked", that is, placed in reserve for the 
resolution of Tiriti claims. In the following sentence we are informed that this 
has been the outcome for another school closed at the same time as the two 
under consideration here. The fact of evoking this mechanism will remove it 
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from further possibility of purchase or development except by Maori, thereby 
evoking the privilege framing discussed above. 
Details of the story hint at the value of the property ("rateable value of $3 
million") and the expansiveness of Maori Tiriti "multimillion dollar" claims in 
Sn. The hints of risk from S2. are detailed into specific cases of arson to these 
buildings in Sn and 13 that hang rhetorically within a discourse of Maori youth 
offending. The final sentences are easily read as self-contradictory in the sense 
that the Ministry spokesman is attempting to describe what the article has 
constructed as flawed process, as statutory procedure, and is likely to be read as 
belonging in the category of bureaucratic double-talk. 
There is only a single source in this story and no Maori source canvassed, 
so it is fair to argue that the work and meanings achieved here are almost 
exclusively those of the media producers. The story makes it to press within the 
news frame of the creation of disequilibrium (Fiske, 1987) through the putative 
Maori disruption of Pakeha due process. Such a frame inevitably casts Maori as 
antagonists. It is arguable also that, even within the context of the closure of the 
schools concerned, the "delay" to the disposal process posed by the Rangitanej 
Kahungunu applications amounts to some months out of four years. Against 
the real timetable of dispossession, likely in excess of 100 years, the objections 
seem feeble, leaving the uncomfortable perception that this conflict is about 
opportunity rather than timing. 
School closures are often points of community resistance and protest 
(Kearns" Lewis, McCreanor, & Witten, 2.009; Witten, Kearns, Lewis, Coster, & 
McCreanor, 2003) but representing Maori interest and action over the properties 
in the way it is done here may well achieve an effect of alienating community 
interests opposed to the sales. Our analysis here is intended to shed light on 
the way seemingly unremarkable discursive features of text work together to 
produce such hegemonic effects. 
The complexities of counter-hegemonic reporting 
There were a number of stories in our data which presented Tiriti claims 
and settlements as uncontentious. These can be seen as counter-hegemonic in 
that they work to challenge, consciously or not, a dominant discourse which 
sees the Tiriti as, at best, a site of ongoing tension and, at worse, as an inherently 
disastrous influence on relations between Maori and Pakeha, an unreasonable 
burden upon Pakeha and Tauiwi, and an impediment on appropriate national 
development. To argue that merely by being 'neutral' some news stories can be 
seen as counter-hegemonic seems a very harsh indictment of most of the Pakeha 
media coverage in this area, but the research set out earlier shows this to be an 
accurate assertion. 
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In our data the most positive stories around te Tiriti tended to be regional, 
especially those based in areas of larger Maori populations. Two papers stood 
out; the Daily Post in Rotorua and the Bay of Plenty Times in Tauranga. The Daily 
Post ran a series of articles profiling trustees representing each hapu on the Te 
Pumautanga a Te Arawa Trust as the Te Arawa Treaty of Waitangi settlement 
approached. On 19 February 2008, for example, the Daily Post ran a profile of 
Te Pohawaiki Wiringi Jones who represented Ngati te Roro 0 te Rangi. The 
profile takes 350 words, listing Mr Wiringi Jones' achievements, experience and 
opinions. One of these opinions has been used for the headline to the profile: 
'Unity key to growing tribal health, wealth'. 
A paragraph from this profile reveals how this paper's underlying 
assumptions are different to those of many/most other mainstream media. 
Mr Wiringi Jones is described thus: 
He is an ardent supporter of tina rangatiratanga (self detennination) and 
autonomy, and has been a driving force behind lifting governance and 
management expertise among the affiliate iwi and hapu members (p. IS). 
In most mass media coverage of Maori, to be both an "ardent supporter of 
tina rangatiratanga" and an expert in governance and management would be 
seen as irreconcilable. There has been a long history in New Zealand mainstream 
media of dividing Maori up into '''Good Maori/Tame Maori''' and '''Bad 
Maori'j'Wild Maori'" (Abel, 1997; McCreanor, 1993, 2008). Those who argue 
for tino rangatiratanga have been cast as 'Bad Maori' since the term, closely 
associated with sovereignty, can be seen as a challenge to Crown authority. 
This has come about in large part because mass media reporters have labelled 
those who protest about the handling (or lack of handling) of Tiriti issues as 
'Bad Maori' without adequately contextualising the reasons for the actions or 
exploring the meanings behind terms such as tino rangatiratanga. 
This is an example of what Stuart Hall calls "articulation"7: 
One of the ways in which ideological struggle takes place and ideologies are 
transformed is by articulating the elements differently, thereby prodUcing 
a different meaning: breaking the .chain in which they are currently fixed 
(Hall, I990 [I9SI] p. 9). 
Following Hall, the Daily Post, with its use of the conjunction 'and', 
"articulat[es] the elements differently, thereby producing a different meaning: 
breaking the chain in which they are currently fixed". 
The issue here, of course, is "breaking the chain" for whom? Establishing 
a new articulation, as in this extract, does not necessarily contribute to a new 
commonsense. Many readers may indeed read this description of Mr Wiringi 
7 Here Hall means 'articulation' in the sense of different units joined to each other to produce 
meanings· different from those of the components. 
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Jones that sees Maori activism and Maori capability building as quite congruent. 
While such a reading might come from those who support tina rangatiratanga 
and the rising power of iwi (and it would appear this is the preferred reading), 
it might also come from those who fear both. For these readers, the use of the 
term "tina rangatiratanga", rather than being normalised, may instead invoke 
adversarial discursive reserves - just as the headline highlighting "tribal health, 
wealth" may key into the widespread discourse of 'Maori privilege'. 
The other newspaper in our data that stood out in its reporting of Tiriti 
issues was the Bay of Plenty Times in a story on 27 December 2007 by Graham 
Skellern which was headlined 'Mauao should be returned to Maori by June'. The 
caption, under a photograph of a mountain most New Zealanders would know as 
Mt Mauganui, reads, "Colin Bidois says Mauao will be back in Tauranga Maori's 
guardianship by June". Here a Maori voice, both literally and metaphorically, sets 
the tone of the story. Skellern's opening paragraph reads: 
Legendary Mauao is expected to be returned to Tauranga Maori by the 
middle of next year - more than six years after the transfer of the landmark 
mountain was first negotiated. 
Where other stories reported on the long process of Tiriti claims as getting 
in the way of normal Pakeha business, here it is Maori who are hard done by. 
This tone continues through the story, along with the use of the name 'Mauao' 
rather than 'Mt Maunganui', and the term 'guardianship' rather than 'ownership'. 
Colin Bidois also gets the last words, or the closing utterance, in this story - a 
position of considerable rhetorical power because of its retrospective framing 
of the story. 
Nevertheless, along with all the stories in our database, the actions of the 
Crown which took Mauao away from Tauranga Maori are elided, referred to 
fleetingly in a phrase "after Mauao was acquired by the Crown in the 188 os". News 
scholarship has demonstrated for some time how the lack of historical context 
in news coverage of interaction between the state and indigenous peoples 
works against the indigenous people (Abel, 1997; Downing & Husband, 2005; 
Meadows, 1999; Moewaka Barnes, et aL, 2005; Stuart, 2003). As well as glossing 
over the culpability of the State in its treatment of indigenous peoples (and in 
the case of Aotearoa/New Zealand, breaches of te Tiriti), such talk contributes 
to the discourses of Maori privilege and of the Waitangi Tribunal process as a 
'gravy train'. It also means that stories about protest construct the protestors as 
the antagonists who are destroying an equilibrium, rather than as citizens trying 
to restore an equilibrium. Without appropriate context, protest is easily seen as 
irrational. When the lack of context is combined with the emphasis on conflict, 
protestors are further constructed as stirrers or troublemakers. As one of the 
focus group members in Rankine et al. (zo08) says: 
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They didn't actually ask any of the people that were [at Waitangi] ... what 
is it about the Treaty that you want honoured? [Where do] you think there 
has been injustice? Why is it that you were out here today and what part of 
it can be changed? ... It didn't get a sound bite (Rankine, et al., 2008, p. 34). 
Such absences mean that it is therefore likely that many Pakeha readers will 
'decode' elements of the story about the return of Mauao in less sympathetic 
terms because of the ways that they conflict with hegemonic discourse. For 
example, the use of the word 'return' in the headline is perfectly appropriate 
at one level as a description of the process, and indeed is part of a discourse 
that accepts that land and other resources were taken illegally. But because of 
historical conditioning (in which the media plays a major part), it also has the 
potential to raise the ire of those who have no understanding of the processes 
and aftermath of colonisation. As such, rather than normalising and entrenching 
the justice of Tiriti settlements, the ambiguities may sensitise and condition 
negative Pakeha reactions to the processes. 
While the journalist and the paper are acknowledged for their roles in 
working to redirect standard story practices in this instance, we note the 
polyvocal nature of such texts. As well as providing space for alternative 
discourse, they carry within them the potential to mobilise the conventional 
hegemonic discourse; by articulating the voice of the 'other', they evoke interests 
of undivided sovereignty. 
Another brief story from the Bay of Plenty Times demonstrates once again 
the complex task of reporting Tiriti issues. 
lwi step closer to claim 
Ngai Te Rangi iwi are one step closer to Treaty of Waitangi settlements. 
A recent member survey showed 98 percent are keen for its representatives 
to enter into negotiations with the Crown to settle Treaty grievances, 
primarily in the Tauranga area. The next stage of the mandating process 
is to continue discussions with hapu and consider any issues they may 
have. A deed of mandate is then compiled and forwarded to the Crown for 
consideration. (Bay of Plenty Times, 26 April 2008, p.2) 
On the whole the story presents the processes of Tiriti negotiations in a 
straightforward manner. This is not, it seems, an occasion for non-Maori fear or 
outrage. The choice of the term "Treaty grievances", however, is unfortunate as 
this term is a 'site of struggle'. It is widely used to name the issues that iwi and 
hapu bring to the Waitangi Tribunal for redress. It has also, however, been co-
opted into a discourse of Tiriti settlements as 'the grievance industry'. However 
much the author of the article might have meant the phrase to refer to perfectly 
proper and legitimate Maori claims against the Crown, "'Treaty grievances" 
now carries baggage that has the potential to trigger/invoke an oppositional 
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reading of this text, a reading that relies on dominant discourses rather than the 
emergent counter-hegemonic discourse of the rest of the brief article. 
Indeed, the phrase "Treaty grievances" deserves more deconstruction, as it 
whitewashes the actions of the Crown that have led to the "grievances". Stuart 
(2003) and Abel (I997) have drawn attention to how, in Pakeha news media, 
Fiske's (2000) model of the ideological work involved in naming and defining 
states of equilibrium and disequilibrium in news narratives consistently favours 
versions of stories which place Maori as the antagonists - as the causes of 
disequilibrium. It would seem fairer (and more accurate) to talk about Maori 
bringing Tiriti breaches to the Waitangi Tribunal. 
Summary 
In Rankine et aI's study of television and print news about Maori, a participant 
in one of the focus groups said: 
Waitangi Day ... 1 think of the way the Treaty is represented [in mass media] 
... it's portrayed like this evil thing that hovers over everything ... And it's 
not, but ... it's almost like it's this dark social phenomenon ... (Rankine, et 
al., 2008, p. 30). 
This articulate observation sums up the overwhelmingly negative historic 
coverage by Pakeha media ofWaitangi Day, te Tiriti, and the process of settling 
breaches of te Tiriti by the Crown. It also hints at the effect that such coverage 
has on creating a public perception of te Tiriti. Given the importance of te Tiriti 
as the foundation upon which relations between Maori and Pakeha have been 
built, this has enormous implications for the processes and practices by which 
we attempt to live equitably together. 
The data from this research is a mixed bag of stories about te Tiriti and its 
related issues, demonstrating, as we suggested above, that the media is a key 
arena of struggle for competing ideas and ideologies. Some, such as the story we 
analysed thematically, are clearly colonialist and anti-Maori in their discourse. 
Others carry a more subtle anti-Maori, anti-Tiriti discourse that works to pre-
empt and undermine alternative or competing discourses that seek a more 
prominent and honourable place for te Tiriti in national life. 
There is also a group of stories we see as counter-hegemonic because they 
present details about Tiriti settlements and the accompanying procedures in a 
way that implicitly and sometimes explicitly assumes the equitable nature of the 
settlements, and presents this, not as a 'perspective' on such events and issues, 
but as common sense. They assume that the audience shares this view without 
actually making that statement. The number of such articles is encouraging, and 
represents an increase on earlier research and may suggest a shift toward a more 
just Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
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The analysis offered in this chapter, while in no way exhaustive (due to 
the requirements of space), shows ways in which the discursive and linguistic 
construction of many of the items examined resonate with the hegemonic 
discourses of colonial settler power. On many occasions these discourses are 
hegemonic as much by what is not said as by what is said. In too many cases, 
reporting on Tiriti issues has been either absent or presented as a list of selected 
facts which do not tell the whole story. At worst, stories present or draw upon a 
hegemonic Pakeha/colonial position which sees Tiriti claims as 'holding up' or 
parasitising legitimate Pakeha wealth acquisition and enactment of power, and 
certainly not as any kind of positive development in equitable social relations. 
While acknowledging the increased amount of neutral reporting, we have 
also indicated the impacts that such materials are likely to have among settler 
audiences. Given that most of the population has very little direct contact with 
Maori people, communities and organisations, we argue that the inadequacies 
identified ill-equip or seriously undermine the competence of the settler masses 
to undertake their Tiriti obligations. The mediation (Chamberlain & Hodgetts, 
2008; Nairn et aI, 2on) of biculturalism by mass newspaper coverage is a severe 
impediment to appropriate Pakeha engagement in, and positive contributions 
to, social justice and equity in a bicultural society. 
A question which arises from the double-edged character of our analysis 
is: What is a journalist to do if slhe wants to establish Tiriti settlements as a 
commonsense and necessary consequence of Tiriti breaches in the past? A 
dominant discourse strongly pervaded our data but there were still areas where 
other "moderate" discourses were able to "bubble to the surface" (Scott, 2001, 
p. 136). On the other hand, Allan (2004) has pointed out that, embedded in 
pOSitions and institutions of power as they are, white news workers produce 
racist coverage unconsciously and inevitably. It must be stressed, though, that 
this does not excuse racist practices or the maintenance of those practices 
through inaction. There does not seem to be an easy answer here. News coverage 
of the Tiriti and its associated issues remains an arena of struggle for competing 
ideas and ideologies. McNair refers to such struggles as: 
... an expression and reflection of the ideological 'balance of forces' in a 
given society, a balance which changes over time, owing at least partly 
to the exposure which journalism may give to ideas alternative to, even 
oppositional to, currently dominant ideas (McNair, 1997, p. 7 cited in 
Scott, 2001, p. 135). 
While being aware of economic and commercial imperatives that argue for 
a particular form of reporting, our analysis highlights perpetuating hegemonic 
discourses that cannot be justified by such arguments. Just as the colonial project 
has produced effects that continue to impact disastrously on Maori life and 
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wellbeing, so colonialist discourses in news since r840 work in turn to produce 
colonialist readings of articles about the Tiriti and Tiriti settlements among 
many non-Maori. These discourses are a key factor in maintaining injustice and 
disparity and they must change as part of wider systemic developments needed 
to secure an equitable and sustainable social order in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
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CHAPTER 4: MEDIA POWER, JOURNALISM 
ANDAGENCVS 
Sean Phelan 
This chapter examines the relationship between power, journalism and the 
media. It argues that media representational power is a crucial form of power 
in Aotearoa New Zealand, the significance of which is often obscured by a 
journalistic tendency to see power as something others have, particularly 
politicians. Rather than simply seeing the media "as a conduit for other forms of 
power, much larger than the media", which journalists then hold to "account" on 
"our behalf', this chapter follows Couldry and Curran's (2003) suggestion that 
we need to see how "media power is itself part of what power watchers need to 
watch" (p. 4-5). 
This largely theoretical argument is organised into two broad parts. First, 
I argue that journalists' strong professional identification with the fourth 
estate model (see Introduction) in Aotearoa New Zealand and elsewhere is 
embedded in a simplistic conceptualisation of power, which limits our ability to 
understand the political and social importance of media power. In its simplest 
form, this fourth estate discourse sees power as something 'held' by individuals, 
supplementing this view with a recognition of power as an institutional 
phenomenon that is linked primarily to the multi-dimensional agency of the 
state. John Key's power is not inherent to him as an individual, but a consequence 
of his institutional status as Prime Minister. Hence Key has power, so long as he 
continues to be in power. Recognising the institutional dimensions of power 
takes us beyond narrowly individualistic assumptions. Nonetheless, the fourth 
estate conception of power is too simplistic and narrow, and deflects attention 
from the significance of what can be called structural or discursive forms of 
power,9 including corporate power and - of most importance here - the power 
of media representations. The chapter's opening sections develop this argument 
about media representational power by drawing on the work of Michael Billig, 
Nick Couldry, James Curran and Steven Lukes, and grounding the discussion 
in an analysis of how a single newspaper report represented the foreshore and 
seabed crisis of 2003 and 2004. 
8 Many thanks to Lincoln Dahlberg and Verica Rupar for their comments on an earlier version 
of this chapter. 
;) In linking the concepts of structure and discourse, 1 follow Laclau and Mouffe (see Laclau, 
I990). They define discourse as the structured, yet always precariOUS, totality that emerges 
from the routinised combination of different discursive elements. They also emphaSise the 
materiality of discursive practices, in contrast to positions that define discourse mainly in 
linguistic terms. 
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Of course, in one sense, everybody knows that there is such a 'thing' as media 
power. Indeed, joUrnalists sometimes complain about simplistic discourses 
that overstate media power by casting 'the media' - as if it was a singular agent 
always speaking with one voice - as the source of all social ills. Media power is 
also recognised within the classic liberal democratic assumptions of the fourth 
estate model, which situates journalism's watchdog and informational power 
as an institutional counterweight to the power of government, parliament and 
the judiciary (Curran, 2002; Louw, 2005). The claim here is more precise: that 
the specific form media power takes, namely its banal power to constitute our 
everyday sense of social reality (Broersma, zoro; Couldry and Curran, 2003; 
Couldry, 2000), is typically not acknowledged as a form of power in mainstream 
media spaces, and that this invisibility limits our capacity to understand how 
power works in Aotearoa New Zealand. This is not to suggest that the authority 
of mainstream media representations is never challenged. In some public spaces, 
such as oppositional media and the university lecture hall, media representational 
practices are routinely questioned. Media representations are also sometimes 
interrogated within the internal structures of the Aotearoa New Zealand 
journalistic field: in "backstage" (Louw, 2005) newsroom deliberations, Press 
Council rulings, blogs, or in specific media critique programmes. The argument 
here is that the structuring effects of media representations are typically not 
talked about in banal front-stage media discourse, thus normalising a paradoxical 
scenario where 'the media' 'is recognised as both central to the constitution of 
social reality, yet routinely rendered socially invisible in the media.IO 
The second part of the chapter examines the question of power in a more 
general way, and briefly considers how media power can be conceptualised in 
terms of the power of other social forces over the media. Lukes' (2005) work 
is examined in more detail, as it provides a useful framework for comparing 
different understandings of the concept of power. His insistence on an 
agent-centred view of power is especially important. Despite the difficulties 
of pinning down who has power and where it is located, an agent-centred 
perspective emphasises the importance of attributing responsibHity for particular 
states of affairs to identifiable agents. In that sense, Lukes' position retains 
an affinity with journalism's tendency to understand power in terms of the 
actions of individuals or institutions. However, unlike the more individualistic 
presuppositions of mainstream journalism, Lukes (2005) emphasises how our 
agency - that is, our capacity to act in the world - is always "a function of 
collective forces and social arrangements" (p. 26). In other words, he suggests 
that we shouldn't overstate individuals' capacity to act in autonomous ways 
that break from the intersubjective norms of a particular sodal context. 
W This argument should be distinguished from the narcissistic tendency of people 'in the media' 
to reference each other. 
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This chapter consequently reflects on the banal role of media 
representational practices in constituting the structural and relational context 
in which other social agents act. 1 want to project Lukes' agent-centred view of 
power back on to journalists themselves, because while journalists are often very 
good at attributing causal and moral responsibility to others, they are typically 
much more reluctant to acknowledge the ideological and political implications 
of their own agency. The value of doing so is that it may sharpen our critical 
understanding of the structuring and repressive effects of media power, thereby 
formulating a theoretical analysis of power that goes beyond the mythical 
and often "sensationalized watchdogism" (Louw, 2005, p. 60) of the fourth 
estate modeL 
The banal repression of journalistic power 
and agency 
.... as with most forms of power, media power is not generally made explicit 
by those who benefit from it: the media. No wonder it is rarely the direct 
subject of public debate (Couldry & Curran, 2003, p. 4). 
Media power can be understood as a repressed form of power that typically 
works in unconscious and non-coercive ways, rather than - as is often presupposed 
- in an intentionally manipulative or biased manner. II My understanding 
of repression draws on Billig's (I999) reading of Freud. Contrary to the tendency 
to understand repression as a "mysterious inner process" that treats the 
repressive element as something locked into the individual psyche, Billig 
emphasises how repression works through banal language use, dialogue and 
storytelling. "Language is inherently expressive and repressive" (Billig, I999, p. I), 
argues Billig, and he suggests that the act of remembering something is 
simultaneously an act of forgetting those elements that might disturb the 
coherence of the narrated memory. In Billig's view, repression is something that 
is "socially, rather than biologically, constituted" - or, as he puts it, repression is 
"ideologically constituted, for ideologies concern what people in a particular 
historical epoch do not talk of" (p. IO). 
A journalistic promise to 'get' or 'find' a story, a kind of rhetoric that is 
often articulated in the marketing and enactment of journalistic identities, is 
a good example of banal repression at work. These seemingly innocuous words 
II The tendency to understand media power as manipulative is evident when people explain 
distorted and biased media representations with exclusive reference to the idea of a 
particular reporter or outlet having a conscious 'agenda'. This undoubtedly sometimes 
happens. However, the problem with this generalisation is that it obscures how all media 
representations are inherently political because of their grounding in commonsensical 
assumptions about the social world that can be contested (Laclau, I990). 
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imply a commitment to a set of contestable philosophical assumptions. They 
suggest that news stories have an objective existence that is independent of the 
journalist's discursive construction - as if stories are just waiting there to be 
uncovered. The problem with these widely critiqued shorthands is that they 
de-emphasise the extent to which journalists' discursive practices construct 
the objects of news they report on, through decisions such as the choice 
of sources, language and so on. They also conceal the extent to which news 
stories are the scripted PR products of the agented activity of others, rather 
than something 'found' by the intrepid journalist Banal rhetoric of this kind 
can, if unchallenged, therefore play an important cultural role in reproducing 
professional and popular identification with particular ideological conceptions 
of journalism - in this case the doctrine of journalistic objectivity, which, in its 
most basic form, treats news stories as having an objective existence which is 
independent of the subjectivity of the professional journalist (for an example of 
how a strict version of this doctrine informs the thinking of some high-profile 
New Zealand journalists, see James, 2004). 
Identification with the doctrine of journalistic objectivity also presupposes 
a commitment to a "reflective or mimetic" (O'Shaughnessy & Stadler, 2007: 
63) theory of representation. Contrary to the philosophical assumptions 
underpinning my analysis, this view would understand journalism as literally 
re-presenting, putting a truthful 'mirror' to, or casting a 'light' on, something 
which has an objective existence elsewhere (Rorty, Ig80). The problem with 
these banal metaphors is that they de-emphasise the agented role played by 
journalists in constructing the factual world they report on, and instead imagines 
journalistic representation as a relatively straightforward task of transmitting 
a truthful picture of the world. News journalism may be centrally concerned 
with establishing and reporting social facts (Matheson, 2010); that much is not 
disputed. Yet determining what counts as a newsworthy fact, linking one fact 
to another fact, or giving narrative prominence to particular facts over others, 
are ultimately the products of always contestable decisions taken in socially 
structured contexts. 
In contrast, a "constitutive" view of representation (Thomassen, 20n) 
emphasises how representational practices - that is, rhetorical practices of 
naming, framing and factual ordering (Couldry, 2 00 0) - simultaneously consti tu te 
the objects of news that journalists report on. It understands the process of 
representation as always involving the enactment of two paradoxical modes, 
a referential mode and performative mode, which simultaneously reflect and 
constitute an object (Thomassen, 20U). These abstract theoretical propositions have 
very concrete implications for how we conceptualise the process of journalistic 
representation. For example, while journalists sometimes talk about 'public 
opinion' as if it has a purely objective existence that is independent of their 
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descriptions of public opinion (see, for instance, some of the journalist 
interviewees' comments in the Comrie chapter in this volume), a constitutive 
view of representation would emphasise how journalists contribute to the 
making of public opinion every time they talk about it. In short, if they are 
to be talked about at all, discursive objects like 'public opinion', the 'public 
interest', and the basic category of 'the public', cannot exist independently of 
their rhetorical representation (and this point applies equally to 'opinion polls'). 
Moreover, these representations are always particular representations that can 
be potentially challenged by other constructions of the 'same' event or object. 
Representing the 2003 and 2004 
foreshore and seabed crisis 
I want to develop this argument about the socially repressed nature of media 
power by examining the main front-page story in the Dominion Post of 
November 2, 2009. It reported on how the National party had acceded to the 
Maori Party's request for a review of the Labour government's 2004 Foreshore 
and Seabed Act (Watkins, 2009). The controversial legislation effectively 
overrode a 2003 Court of Appeal ruling which had "departed from the previous 
understanding that the Crown owned the foreshore and seabed under the 
common law" (Waitangi Tribunal, 2004, p. xi) and opened the way for future 
recognition of Maori common law rights in both the High Court and Maori 
Land Court. The media representation of the foreshore and seabed conflict, per 
se, is not the focus of my analysis. What I am interested in exploring instead is 
the banal absence of public recognition, in the mainstream media itself, about 
the specific role of news media practices in constituting and shaping political 
crises such as the foreshore and seabed conflict. 
What is striking about the 2009 Dominion Post article, on first glance, is 
how the headline and sub-headline ('Seabed law set to be dumped: wounds 
reopen as Brash admits error') go against the grain of the Aotearoa New Zealand 
media literature, which tends to cast mainstream media as antagonistic to 
Maori perspectives (See the Abel, McCreanor & Moewaka Barnes chapter in 
this volume). Through the evaluative word choices "dumped" and "error", the 
decision to review the legislation - a key condition of the Maori party's 2008 
coalition arrangement with National - is described in a way that suggests 
sympathy for those opposed to the 2004 Act. 
The key elements of the article, in terms of how it constructs a retrospective 
narrative about the foreshore and seabed crisis, is the citation of Don Brash - the 
former leader of both the National party and Act party - and his concession of a 
previous "error". Brash is pivotal to the story's construction, and its most quoted 
source. He is pictured in an insert photo, accompanied by the caption: "Whipped 
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up a Pakeha backlash". He's also alluded to in the lead: ''The Government is 
poised to overturn the Foreshore and Seabed Act - as its former leader [Brash] 
says National was wrong to oppose Maori having their day in court". 
The public memory of Brash's infamous Orewa speech is reanimated later 
in the article: "National opposed the [foreshore and seabed] legislation when 
in opposition ... Brash whipped up a Pakeha backlash with his 'one law for all' 
speech at Orewa in 2004". After quotes from a contrite Brash, the article ends 
with a quote from Labour MP Shane Jones, who is reported as "blam[ing] Dr 
Brash for much of the 'inflammatory, divisive and extremely hurtful' debate 
around race relations and the Act". 
Now the present author is certainly no fan of Brash's politics, and 1 wouldn't 
want to deny that his interventions on race relations were "inflammatory" 
and "divisive". However, what interests me here is the way in which the story 
basically scapegoats Brash as the individual cause of the foreshore and seabed 
crisis and, consequently, displaces the role of a wider political, cultural and 
media infrastructure. The article represses this more complex representation 
in a number of ways. 
The second paragraph may identify the 2004 Act as "Labour's contentious 
legislation". Yet the dominant impression, particularly through key framing 
devices such as the headline, accompanying picture and lead, is of an earlier 
political atmosphere defined by Brash's stance. This narrative construction 
can be partly explained by the news value of highlighting how National's 
position has shifted since Brash was leader. Nonetheless, the article constructs 
a simplistic historical narrative of what happened in 2003 and 2004, which is 
over-preoccupied with Brash and de-emphasises the direct role of Labour - no 
doubt harried by an opportunistic National - in denying "Maori having their 
day in court". 
The simplistic attribution of political agency is compounded by other 
factual and chronological omissions. Suggesting Brash's Orewa speech "whipped 
up a Pakeha backlash" forgets that the speech wasn't made until January 2004, 
over six months after the Court of Appeal ruling. The article also attributes 
causal responsibility to the equally divisive iwijkiwi advertising campaign of the 
2005 election. The gaps in the paper's historical record beg an obvious question: 
since it would be implausible to hold Brash entirely responsible for the "Pakeha 
backlash", who else acted as a "lighting rod for dissent" in the aftermath of the 
Court's ruling? 
A number of formal political agents, most obviously the pre-Brash National 
party and New Zealand First, could be identified as playing a Significant role 
in constructing the foreshore and seabed crisis. However, rather than trying to 
identify a comprehensive list of responsible agents here, 1 want to widen the 
analytical scope beyond the standard parameters of political discourse and 
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reflect on the role of media representations in constructing a "Pakeha backlash" 
to the Court ruling. 
To focus attention on media representations should not be construed as 
a reverse form of scapegoating, where, instead of Brash, we now simplistically 
blame the messy "social construction" called "the media" (Couldry, 2009, p. 
440) for the foreshore and seabed conflict. Media representations never exist 
in cultural isolation, but are always articulated as part of a wider dialectic of 
political, SOCial, historical and ideological practices. Indeed, this much was 
evident in the comparatively low-key media coverage of the foreshore and 
seabed issue in 2009 and 20IO, which can be partly explained by the articulation 
of an elite political consensus that wasn't there in 2003. 
That said, it is not difficult to cite examples of how mainstream media 
representation of the 2003 Court decision enacted "inflammatory" and "divisive" 
responses, which undermined the capacity of the Aotearoa New Zealand polity 
to understand the complex political and legal issues involved (Waitangi Tribunal, 
2004). In a previous study, I examined how the first editorial on the court ruling 
by the four main daily newspapers - the New Zealand Herald, the Dominion Post, 
the Press, and the Otago Daily Times - all expressed clear support for the Labour-
led government's commitment to introduce legislation that would rescind the 
legal authority of the Court's decision (Phelan, 2009). The editorial rhetoric 
was often emotive. For example, the Dominion Post implied the possibility of 
great civil strife, suggesting that an iwi court "victory ... would have let in a 
wind which might eventually have blown the whole house down". The Otago 
Daily Times, for its part, articulated a rhetoric of unnamed, yet implicitly Pakeha 
"resentment" about "two standards of citizenship", which, in its antagonism to 
Maori perspectives, could have been taken directly from Brash's Orewa speech. 
A similar tone was evident in some of the news reportage at the time. One 
vivid example was the main front-page headline of the Dominion Post the day 
after the government published its initial legislative proposals in August 2003 
(Venter and Thompson, 2003). It read "Beaches for AI!", and was supplemented 
by a sub-headline of "Angry Maori groups warn of protest". The headline 
encapsulated the basic discursive logic of the conflict, juxtaposing defensively 
the rights of "All" New Zealanders against the rights of "Angry Maori". What was 
particularly telling was that the same "Beaches for All" slogan was then being 
used as part of a National party advertising campaign against the foreshore and 
seabed claims. This presumably unconscious professional gaffe (the deliberate 
subeditorial use of a party political slogan seems implausible) offers a good 
example of how mainstream journalists, despite their default insistence on 
their independence from power, often draw on the same discursive resources 
as elite political actors for representing race relations issues and political issues 
more generally. 
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Back to the question of power 
So, how does a single 2009 newspaper article help support the argument about 
media power? Given the kind of discourses circulating in the media culture well 
before Brash's Orewa speech, the idea that Brash "whipped up a Pakeha backlash" 
constructs a simplistic narrative about the foreshore and seabed conflict, which 
- notwithstanding the capacity of news audiences to interpret the story in 
different ways - is anchored in a narrowly individualistic view of power that 
represses how his intervention was made possible by a wider cultural, political 
and media infrastructure. From one perspective there is nothing exceptional 
about this story; it is entirely in keeping with the norms of fact-based journalism. 
Nonetheless, the text offers a good example of how journalistic news reports 
are routinely guided by certain philosophical assumptions about what reality 
is, and what a fact is (Brash gave a speech which caused a Pakeha backlash), 
which presupposes an empirical world of individuals rather than structures.U 
These norms consequently reproduce banal representational practices that 
tend to constitute a more general horizon of news in methodologically 
individualist terms. 
Conceptualised in a more structural way, which positions the agency of 
the media as central to the political reality of the foreshore and seabed 
conflict, we could say that Brash and his well connected team of media-insider 
advisers were simply rearticulating a discourse that was evident in the more 
banal discourses of others. The idea of a "Pakeha backlash" had already been 
established as a legitimate object of media and political discourse. It had also 
become a focal point of the kind of political marketing and opinion-polling 
practices that increasingly shape the public stances taken by political actors (and 
which, as Hager (2006) documents, were central to Brash's period as leader). 
Explaining the political impact of the Orewa speech in terms of the agency 
of Brash alone, or thinking narrowly in terms of a single speech or text, is 
simplistic in another respect, since it obscures the extent to which the speech 
was constructed as an 'event' that was skilfully packaged for media consumption. 
In short, as a social and discursive object, the Orewa speech cannot be separated 
from the media-driven intertextual space in which it was publicly disseminated 
and appropriated, irrespective of what people thought of the speech or, it should 
be said, some media outlets' determination to critically parse it in the aftermath. 
Now one response to this illustration would be to suggest that it is a 
single unrepresentative story, and that, in any case, it merely illustrates lots of 
things already well known about media personalisation, news values, media 
12 These issues could be discussed in a more precise way using concepts like ontology and 
epistemology. 
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dramatisation, media reliance on storytelling archetypes, and the media's role in 
constructing simplistic collective memories. One could also say that my analysis 
is silent about the genre constraints of journalism, ignoring the bureaucratic 
pressures on journalists to construct stories that, by necessity, must sacrifice 
storytelling complexity for convenient shorthands. In a media culture over-
preoccupied with the sensational and the personal, working journalists won't 
need the critical theorist to enlighten them on the often poorly contextualised 
nature of contemporary news and the institutional constraints hindering their 
capacity to produce more structurally sophisticated forms of reporting. 
Such responses are, in one respect, entirely legitimate and valid. However, 
from another perspective, they miss the point of my analysis, because the 
Dominion Post article is cited purposefully as a banal newspaper text - an example 
of the kind of ordinary representational practices, and routine attributions and 
omissions of agency, that are reproduced everyday in mass media spaces. Rather 
than taking mundane social practices for granted, my analysis takes inspiration 
from Billig (1999), Couldry (2000), Norval (2007) and others, who implore us to 
look for the extraordinary in the most commonsensical practices, so as to draw 
attention to the always contestable value-based assumptions underpinning them. 
The argument about media representational power can therefore be restated 
in the following paradoxical terms: while, in one sense, everybody knows that 
mainstream media practices in Aotearoa New Zealand are fundamental to the 
public discussion of political issues like the foreshore and seabed conflict, in 
another sense, the media's precise role in discursively constructing such issues is 
normally not talked about in the front -stage dynamics of mainstream media, or, at 
best, cordoned off as the subject matter of specialist media critique programmes 
like Mediawatch, or discussed in fragmentary ways in the occasional newspaper 
or blogosphere column. Formulated in Lukes' terms, it's as if the agented role of 
the media routinely disappears in the banal workings of our media democracies 
- either treated as such an obvious and straightforward role that it is deemed to 
be hardly worth talking about at all, or positioned as something which is quite 
distinct from the 'real' issues which journalists report on. 
What is consequently normalised is an everyday representation of the 
social world where mainstream media assumes, and is widely conferred with, 
a naturalised authority in determining what is constituted and disseminated as 
a social fact (Couldry, 2003). This produces a social reality that paradoxically 
downplays the significance of media representations as important social facts in 
their own right (Rabinow, 1986). This authority is perhaps more easily assumed in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, because the regional and quasi-monopolistic character 
of the newspaper market normally precludes the kind of representational 
struggles that you see elsewhere between more conservative and left/liberal 
media identities. This can perhaps even give credence to the perverse notion 
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that the lack of media plurality in Aotearoa New Zealand might in some respects 
be a good thing, as it means that the local journalism culture, which is generally 
averse to the idea of politicising its practice (Matheson, 2007), is more inclined 
to represent the social world in an 'objective' and 'non-ideological' manner. 
What is normalised are situations where objects of news like the Orewa 
speech and the foreshore and seabed crisis are routinely talked about as if media 
practices had little to do with their discursive construction; or, when these 
issues are critically discussed, the discussion usually remains locked within the 
individualist assumptions of the fourth estate discourse, while the question of 
discursive construction is typically treated as a secondary matter of style and 
presentation that is quite separate from the 'substance' of the news object itself. 
In other words, rhetoric is separated from realityI 3 in a way that points to an 
enduring professional and popular identification with - despite their extensive 
critique - a mimetic theory of representation and a traditional conception of 
journalistic objectivity (Broersma, 2010)14. This is why I am suggesting that 
media power can be usefully understood as a repressed form of power, because 
it captures a mode of power that is routinely not considered as such or easily 
construed as the product of conscious, agented construction. 
Lukes' three-dimensional view of power 
The question of power now needs to be discussed in a more general way, as 
it would be simplistic to suggest that there is only one way of understanding 
media power, or that it is a form of power which journalists simply 'have'. My 
discussion is organised around a closer examination of Lukes' work (2005), 
because his influential analysis of power, which was first published in book form 
in 1974, and later reworked in an expanded 2005 edition, examines how power 
can be understood in different ways. 
Lukes' (2005) analysis schematised power in terms of three dimensions, and 
13 The popular tendency, one particularly evident among journalists, to narrowly define 
rhetoric as 'exaggerated' speech obscures its richness as a scholarly discipline. Theorists like 
Burke (I969) would emphasise how rhetoric ~ understood in terms of subtle processes of 
identification and persuasion ~ is inherent to all social practices. 
14 Broersma (2010) characterises this endUring belief as paradoxical given the persuasive 
philosophical critique of "journalism's claim to truth and authenticity" (p. 2.2). One sometimes 
encounters similar paradoxes in students' engagement with the idea of news as a social 
construction ~ "but that's a construction", they observe, implying that constructed objects are 
simply products of manipulation and deception. Thus, on the one hand, they exhibit a "savvy 
cynicism" about the constructed nature of media representations (Andrejevic, WIO). Yet, on 
the other, they affirm a residual identification with the idea that the truth can be accessed in a 
non-constructed and naively objective way. The danger with this default cynicism, as Andrejevic 
suggests, is that it potentially nonnalises a corrosive cultural sensibility that regards all pragmatic 
truth claims as 'merely' the self-serving constructions of those asserting them. 
89 
SCOOPED: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF JOURNALISM IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
was initially informed by different theories of power circulating in the social 
science literature of the 1970s. He defined the first dimensional view in terms 
of the overt actions of individuals formally conferred with power - that is, the 
formal power of a Prime Minister, or a newspaper editor. The second dimension 
explores how power works through "conscious or unconscious" (Lukes, 2005, 
p. 20) attempts to control political agendas, thus suggesting analogies with the 
view of power underpinning the influential agenda-setting paradigm in media 
and communication studies (see Street, 2001).15 
Most importantly here, Lukes' assessment of the first two dimensions 
prefaces the discussion of his own third-dimensional view of power. This 
perspective rejects what it sees as two key assumptions shared by the first and 
second dimensional views: first, the "behaviourist" assumption that power 
can be adequately understood in terms of "observable conflicts"; and, second, 
the "methodologically individualist" assumption that conceptualises conflict 
as taking place between pre-defined and autonomous individuals and groups 
(Lukes, 2005, p. 25-29). Contrary to these assumptions, Lukes' third dimension 
offers a more structural perspective on power, emphasising how individual 
wants, desires and identities have been "socially structured" and "culturally 
patterned" (p. 24), thus preventing disagreements that might otherwise occur, or 
maybe rendering such disagreements unimaginable in the first place. We need 
to think of power broadly rather than narrowly, he argues, and "attend to those 
aspects of power that are least accessible to observation: that, indeed, power is 
at its most effective when least observable" (p. I). Power cannot be adequately 
analysed until we recognise how the "bias of the [social] system can be mobilised, 
recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the 
intended result of particular individuals' choices" (p. 25). 
So, where might a journalistic view of power be positioned in terms of 
Lukes' three dimensions? The first thing to say is that there isn't a singular 
journalistic conception of power. There are multiple journalisms, and one 
could identify a radical journalism tradition in Aotearoa New Zealand and 
elsewhere (see Hope chapter in this volume; Curran, 2002) that might align 
itself with Lukes' conception of power as the capacity to structurally mould and 
condition identities. However, mainstream journalistic practices in Aotearoa 
New Zealand, as exemplified by local journalists' strong identification with the 
fourth estate model (Matheson, 2007), are much more obviously aligned with 
Lukes' first and second dimensions - in other words, a view of power that is 
focused primarily on concrete behaviour, explicit or implicit decision-making, 
and conflict between identities that are assumed to be given and autonomous. 
15 Street (2001) draws on Lukes to conceptualise media power in terms of a three-part distinction 
between resource power, access power and discursive power. 
90 
SCOOPED: THE POLlTICS AND POWER OF JOURNALlSM IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
Lukes argues that one of the advantages of a behaviourist and methodologically 
individualist view of power is that by defining the concept in a parsimonious 
way it becomes easier to apply in academic research. One can likewise suggest 
that this view of power will be easier to operationalise in journalistic stories like 
our earlier Brash example. Moreover, individuals like Brash are often very keen 
to claim personal responsibility for policies, thus ensuring that individualistic 
presuppositions are routinely built into journalists' source material - indeed, 
the point extends to a more general recognition of how individualism, in its 
different articulations, is a key ideological feature of Western cultures (Lukes, 
1973). Mainstream journalism's affinity with a more individualistic view of power 
is also reinforced by Lukes' suggestion that the first- and second-dimensional 
views underpin the traditional pluralist theories of mainstream political science 
- in other words, the same set of ideological and normative presuppositions that 
centre the "liberal narrative" (Curran, 2002, p. 4) of fourth estate journalism. 
Framed in terms of a basic distinction between a more structural and 
agented view of power, mainstream journalistic practice can therefore be 
described as normalising an agent-centric view of power that gives insufficient 
attention to how agents' identities are constituted by structural dynamics, and 
which simultaneously de-emphasises the role of journalistic field practices 
in structurally shaping how other social identities are publicly articulated in 
the media. This much is implicit in Lukes' third dimension, and echoes long-
standing observations in the media and communication studies literature 
about the individualistic orientation (see Matheson chapter in this volume) of 
mainstream journalism practices. However, the implications of Lukes' position 
need to be teased out further, because characterising the third dimension as 
'structural', in opposition to the other two dimensions, would be simplistic. 
Despite his critique of narrow individualistic discourses, Lukes nonetheless 
insists on an "agent-centred" notion of power, which he understands in terms 
of the actions, including the action in not acting, of particular human or 
institutional agents (Hayward and Lukes, 2008). In the revised 2005 edition of 
his book on power, this position is asserted in opposition to the "ultra-radical" 
account of power formulated by post-structuralist theorists like Foucault, 
who, in Lukes' view, obfuscate the question of power by tending to see it as 
"everywhere" and "inescapable" (Lukes, 2005, p. 88-I07). In fact, in recognition 
of how things had changed since 1974, Lukes (2005) jests that he considered 
Ie-titling the book's second edition as Power: A Not-So-Radical View (p. 159), so 
that its argument wouldn't be confused with post-structuralist theories that 
might regard the concept of agency as illegitimate. 
This chapter is not the place for a discussion of the rights and wrongs of 
Lukes' critique of Foucault, or of how Lukes' position simplifies (while also 
appropriating insights from) post-structuralist perspectives. I want to emphasise 
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instead the difference between Lukes' conception of agency and the narrow 
individualistic conception of agency underpinning banal journalistic practices. 
The key point is Lukes' clear rejection of a conception of power that remains 
lodged in a simplistic belief in the notion of individual free will, or, conversely, 
a contrary view that sees human practices as totally determined by structures. 
As he puts it in an essay with Clarissa Hayward: 
We both reject strongly determinist positions, which deny the existence andj 
or the importance of human agency. At the same time, we both reject naively 
voluntaristic views, which reduce power to the conscious and intentional 
actions of agents (Hayward & Lukes, 2008, p. 5). 
In terms of the structure/agency metaphor, Lukes wants to distance himself 
from any attempt to analytically privilege one term at the expense of the other. 
Instead, he emphasises, as many others have done, how agency is constituted 
within a particular structural context. Lukes' analysis of power can be usefully 
supplemented by two additional theoretical insights. First, we can emphasise how 
the dialectically coupled identity of structure and agent is never fixed, but vulnerable 
to what Laclau (1990) calls social dislocations. Second, following Bourdieu, we 
can underline how the structural context is never singular, but inscribed in the 
power relations between different social 'fields' - the journalistic field, economic 
field, political field, cultural field and so on - each of which is marked by its own 
particular structural dynamics and practices (Benson & Neveu, 2.005). 
Structural perspectives on media 
and journalistic power 
Lukes' conception of the relationship between structure and agency has 
important implications for how we might understand the structural character 
of media and journalistic power. It suggests we should be cautious of theoretical 
perspectives that overemphasise the determining effects of structure - however 
those structures might be conceived - and which see the internal structures of 
the journalistic field as having little autonomy from wider social structures. 
Herman and Chomsky's (1988) propaganda model is one well known 
theoretical approach that highlights how media systems are governed by wider 
social forces. Their model is a particular articulation of a more general tradition 
of political economy analysis that focuses on the interplay between market-
driven media systems and economically constrained political structures. Political 
economy research facilitates a rich critical analysis of how the organisation of 
media systems is determined by corporate-state agendas. It also highlights how 
the possibility of a vibrant public sphere is undermined by the market orientation 
of most media institutions (see the Hirst, Hope and Thompson chapters in this 
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volume). Yet a more abstract theoretical focus on the determining effects of 
capitalist power structures can lose sight of the capacity for some journalistic 
agency, or contrary political views, within the journalistic field itself (Benson 
& Neveu, 2005, p. ro). By focusing on how the media is governed by the power 
of forces outside the media, this kind of structural analysis articulates the view 
of media power which has historically dominated social analysis, where media 
power becomes primarily "a term we use to point to how other powerful forces 
use the intermediate mechanism of media ... to wage their battles" (Couldry & 
Curran, 2003, p. 3). The ongoing relevance of this conception of media power 
can hardly be denied, particularly if we want to sustain a coherent analytical 
focus on how media practices in Aotearoa New Zealand are structurally determined 
by a wider range of social, political, and economic practices. Yet one of the limitations 
of this perspective, Couldry and Curran suggest, is that "from this direction, 
media power disappears; it is merely the door through which the contestants 
for power pass en route to battle"; in other words, it neglects how "media's 
representational power is one of society's main forces in its own right" (p. 4-5). 
Couldry's (2003) conception of media power as a regulative social force 
in which what happens "in the media" is assumed to represent the mythical 
"centre" of society offers a good summary of this chapter's earlier discussion 
of media representational power. 1 argued that one of the paradoxes of our 
media-driven social reality is the relative absence of public discussion, in the 
mainstream media itself, about the significance of journalistic and media 
practices as agent-centred forms of power. 
That said, my argument would be seriously misconstrued if it were 
interpreted as suggesting that media representational power is something that 
journalists and media institutions simply have. Couldry and Curran (2003) make 
an obvious, yet crucial, point when they note how media power is of a "curious 
sort" because "media are unable to bargain over the basic rule of their existence, 
which is that they depend on 'content' [in other words, representations of the 
world] generated by others" (p. 3). This point has important implications for our 
understanding of media power. It highlights how other social agents assert a 
claim to media representational power; it is not simply the preserve of journalists 
and traditional media institutions, particularly in the new digital environment. 
In focusing critical attention on the question of journalistic agency, it is therefore 
vital that we don't lapse back into a simplistic individualistic understanding of 
power - that is, a mythical world where journalists simply do things, with no 
recognition of how their doing is always partly determined and constrained by 
the actions of others. It may also suggest the need to distinguish journalistic 
power from media power, two categories that have been discussed here in a 
largely interchangeable way. For one thing, doing so may enable us to understand 
how many journalists in Aotearoa New Zealand are likely to feel frustrated by 
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their relative lack of agency in a journalistic field context that - with the support 
of a passive regulatory infrastructure - is dominat,ed by market logics. 
Conclusion 
This chapter was organised around two key objectives. First, I proposed that 
media's representational power, namely its performative power and capacity to 
construct an authoritative everyday representation of social reality (Broersma, 
20IO), is an important form of social and political power in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
I argued that serious discussion of media power is typically invisible in a fourth 
estate discourse that defines journalism's role as one of holding the power of 
others to account. My argument was framed from a theoretical perspective that 
challenged the tendency of journalists to treat rhetorical practices as entirely 
different 'things' from social reality, and presupposed instead a constitutive view 
of representation that emphasises how representational practices paradoxically 
constitute the objects which they reference. 
The second part of the chapter focused on the question of power in a more 
general way, and examined Lukes' attempt to distinguish between different 
understandings of the concept. I argued that Lukes' analysis of power enables 
us to better see some of the limits of mainstream journalistic discourses, though 
I also suggested that Lukes' fidelity to an agent-centred conception of power 
retains some important affinities with journalistic perspectives. I also briefly 
considered different approaches to understanding the structural character of 
media power. 
Much more could be said about the relationship between media power, 
journalism and agency. I should end by acknowledging the commonplace 
tendency to understand power in negative terms, as a coercive force, something 
perhaps reinforced by this chapter's suggestion that there needs to be more 
recognition of the repressive effects of media power. Contrary to discourses that 
understand power simply in terms of domination or constraint, Lukes would 
also acknowledge the productive nature of power - that is, the recognition that 
power not only constrains, it also enables. This point articulates an important 
caveat to the drift of the argument presented here. It suggests that it would be 
foolish to assume that media power is an inherently negative thing, or deny that 
journalistic power is often articulated in democratically empowering ways that 
meet the best ideals of the fourth estate tradition. This chapter has nonetheless 
argued that we need to move beyond the default assumptions of the hegemonic 
fourth estate discourse, if we want to develop a critically robust understanding 
of how power works, and the forms it takes, in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
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CHAPTERS: 
LAST CHANCE TO SEE? PUBLIC BROADCASTING 
POLICY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
Peter A Thompson 
This chapter provides an overview of some of the themes and issues linking 
theoretical and policy debates on media, democracy and public sphere. The 
first section will compare and contrast normative models of media with a 
particular focus on their implicit conceptions of citizenship and civil society. 
This will lead into a discussion of the changing trajectories of media policy, 
particularly in relation to public broadcasting. These processes will be illustrated 
by an examination of reforms in public broadcasting policy in New Zealand, 
specifically the attempt to impose a public service charter on Television New 
Zealand (TVNZ), which had been restructured as a commercially-driven state-
owned enterprise in 1989 as part of the neoliberal reforms. The conclusions will 
highlight the continuing policy salience of the conceptions of public service 
and public sphere in policy debates and argue that even if these models need 
to be adapted to the digital multimedia environment, it would be premature to 
dispense with them altogether. 
Normative Models of Media 
Academic and policy debates about media systems are perennially contentious. 
Even after over half a century of empirical research, the implications of that 
evidence are subject to different normative interpretations and implementations. 
Arguments concerning how mass media function in contemporary society 
depend not only on knowledge about their potential to influence the public 
in ostensibly desirable or undesirable ways, but on the assumptions about the 
public interest and the legitimate forms society could or should take. lohan 
Galtung's (1999) model of media and society is a useful starting point for the 
discussion here (see fig. 1 below). He characterises different social systems in 
terms of the relative priority afforded to three key subsystems, Le. state, capital 
and civil society. The institutions comprising these different spheres operate 
according to distinctive and potentially conflicting 'logics': state logic exhibits 
a preference for centralisation and control using coercive power; capital logic 
has a predilection for deregulation and profit-seeking and the expansion of 
economic power; and civil society's 'people logic' reflects humanistic, life world 
values and can mobilise moral power. Galtung then places the media system in 
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the centre of these three subsystems and argues that this constitutes a critical 
nexus through which their relations are shaped: "Tell me how State, Capital and 
civil society dialogue with each other and 1 shall tell you what kind of society 
you have" (1999, p. 21). The model is evidently simplistic, and one might contend 
that it overstates the homogeneity and discreteness of the respective spheres 
and overlooks the potential for internal contradictions or alignments within and 
between them. For example, the state is not an homogeneous set of interests 
and different agencies within it may pursue agendas aligned to the logic of other 
spheres (thus policy drives for market deregulation have often entailed state 
agencies acting in the interests of capital). Although the model does not provide 
an explanatory framework for specific social conditions, it nevertheless has two 
redeeming virtues: on an heuristic level, it invites important questions about 
the balance of relations among these spheres, and foregrounds the role of media 
systems in any analysis. Insofar as macroeconomic changes since the I970S have 
involved a prioritisation of deregulated market forces over national politics 
and a subordination of public services and welfare provisions to economic 
imperatives, this is a key starting point for critical social analysis. Moreover, on 
an analytic level, Galtung's model recognises that there is a two-way relation 
between media systems and other spheres of society. The extent to which media 
systems are subject to the logics and norms of state, capital and civil society 
not only shapes the way the media operate but also the shape of the relations 
among these respective spheres - there is a reflexive relationship between them. 
One important implication of this is that the evolving regulatory, financial and 
institutional arrangements underpinning the media can be regarded as an index 
of structural reconfigurations of the social totality. 
Another approach to normative models of media system stems from 
Siebert, Peterson and Schramm's (1956) seminal "four theories of the press". This 
proposed a four-part typology of national media system: the authoritarian (state-
controlled), the libertarian (free market), the social responsibility (watchdog/ 
public servicel6) and the Soviet (state communist). The limitations of these 
classifications have been rightly critiqued. For example, they cannot be applied 
with satisfactory validity to many empirical cases (particularly since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union) and the typology does not differentiate clearly between 
different media types within any national media system. Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) have explicitly rejected the four theories model and propose a far more 
nuanced set of empirically validated classifications for media systems. 
rG Siebert et al. did not include a public service model. Although their conception of social 
responsibility media may not imply the same institutional arrangements as European PSBs, 
they are suggested as analogous here insofar as they contrast commercially motivated media 
with those motivated by civic obligations. 
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Fig 1. Galtung's (1999) model of media and social system 
Fig. 2 MeQuail's extended normative typology mapped onto Galtung's model 
(Me Quail's extension of Siebert et al. in grey boxes) 
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The improvement in empirical accuracy is indisputable if the aim of the 
model is descriptive classification. However, consigning Siebert et al.'s typology 
to the academic dustbin may be premature. McQuail (2000) has suggested 
extending the four theories further to include a developmental model (state-led 
media in developing countries) and a democratic-participatory model (grass-
roots/public access media). McQuail's rationale is not to compound the analytic 
incongruity of the four theories but to deploy the extended classifications as 
normative ideal-types rather than empirical descriptors. 
An important issue arising from McQuail's extension is the differentiation 
of the social responsibility (and public service) model from the participatory 
model. As will become clear, this demarcates an important "fault-line" (see 
Goode, 2005) in the conception of the public and the arrangements through 
which the media supposedly facilitate the formation of a public sphere. Mapping 
McQuail's typology onto Galtung's model can help to highlight the contours 
of tension among these normative models (see Fig. 2). Leaving aside the Soviet 
and development model in regard to Western capitalist industrial societies, 
contemporary media policy trajectories can be mapped in respect to the prevailing 
discourses on the legitimate scope of state intervention, market liberalisation 
and civic engagement. At the same time, the configuration of relations among 
state, capital and civil society underpin the particular form of "policy settlement" 
(see Flew, 2006) realistically available at any particular historical conjunction. 
These will naturally vary across societies, but the macroeconomic shifts away 
from the Keynesian social democratic paradigm towards the Friedmanite 
neoliberaljmonetarist paradigm in many countries has entailed a redefinition of 
the relations between state and capital, the social contract between civil society 
and the state and the relation of the citizen to capital (particularly in respect to 
trade regimes developed in supranational forums operating beyond the confines 
of democratic representation). 
The shift in macroeconomic policy paradigm valorised free market 
principles in the public sector, with significant implications for broadcasting 
arrangements in countries where a public service/social responsibility model 
had predominated. The de/reregulation of broadcasting markets, coupled with 
new delivery platforms, increased competition for audiences and revenue. Even 
among fully funded public service providers, the continued legitimation of their 
status and revenue streams has required increasing attention to audience-share 
(see Graham & Davies, 1997; Thompson, 2004). In the US, PBS has become 
increasingly reliant on private sponsors as its government funding has been 
eroded (see Littleton, 1997). In the EU, the scope of public service provisions 
have been subject to restrictions (e.g. the TVWF and AMS directives) to ensure 
these do not 'distort' commercial media markets (see Williams, 2007). In the 
UK, the BBC licence fee has been subject to much debate, including calls for 
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top-slicing and contestable redistribution. In a recent round of spending cuts, 
the government effectively removed the hypothecated status of the licence fee 
by obliging the BBC to help fund its digital infrastructure policies and the Welsh 
S4C channel (see Thompson, 20n). In New Zealand, neoliberal reforms saw the 
redirection of the licence fee to a contestable fund and the commercialisation 
(and near privatisation) of the public television service (see Atkinson, 1994; 
Cocker, 1996; Hope, 1996; Thompson, 2000; Lealand, 2008). 
The overall policy trajectory one would discern here entails a shift away 
from the prioritisation of civil society towards the imperatives of markets and 
capital. That said, it would be overly simplistic to characterise the changes 
in broadcasting ecology in terms of a one-dimensional shift from the social 
responsibility to the libertarian model. Political and economic forces are always 
articulated through institutional agencies responding to particular regulatory 
and financial arrangements in the context of their respective ecologies. 
Although the moves to reduce the funding of PBS in the US are suggestive of a 
neoliberal drive to excise any vestige of state involvement in the market, in other 
cases, the trend has been towards a co-option of public media revenue streams 
and its diversion toward market functions (Jakubowicz, 2004; Freedman, 2008; 
Thompson, forthcoming). This entails not so much a simple prioritisation of 
capital over civil society but an ideological shift in the conception of civil society 
and the public interest. 
Public service media, the public sphere 
and the public 
As the combined McQuailjGaltung model indicates, there are different ways 
in which news media might claim to serve the interests of civil society. Social 
responsibility or public service norms implicitly assume media functions that are 
not reducible to the imperatives of state or capital but adhere to the promotion 
or protection of the public interest as an end in its own right. However, insofar 
as such provisions are facilitated through professional institutions, the media 
are not coterminous with civil society. In contrast with the participatory model 
where direct grass-roots civic engagement in the operation of the media is 
espoused, the social responsibility/public service model's civic function is 
ultimately a representative one whereby broadcasting professionals, possibly 
informed by a statutory remit or charter, act in what they understand to be 
the public interest. This is one reason why the traditional Reithian approach 
to public service provision (the early BBC model) is frequently dismissed as a 
condescending, elitist imposition of middle-class tastes and values upon the 
ignorant masses who require improvement by the educational and informative 
virtues of public service. Such objections continue to inflect the rhetoric of the 
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political right, which is opposed to public service as a form of state intervention 
in a commercial market. 
Habermas' (1974, 1989) formulation of the bourgeois public sphere has 
engendered a comparable line of critique (see Fraser, 1992; McKee, 2005). 
Insofar as Habermas overstated the intrinsically progressive nature of the 18th-
century coffee house and the role of the (male) merchant class in the formation 
of civil society, much of this criticism is valid and largely acknowledged by 
Habermas (see Garnham, 2007). However, it is important not to disregard the 
historical context of this argument: for all its inequalities, the formation of 
the bourgeois public sphere nevertheless marked a significant structural shift 
away from feudalism toward democracy. Moreover, it is important to note that 
the structural transformation of the public sphere that Habermas (1974, 1989) 
delineates is an historical process in which the public's collective subjectivity as 
citizens comprising civil society is continuously renegotiated and rediscovered 
(hence Habermas' contrast of the nascent bourgeois public sphere with the 
liberal model and the social welfare state/mass democracy model). As Habermas 
comments: 
By 'the public sphere' we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which 
something approaching public opinion can be formed '" Today newspapers and 
magazines, radio and television are the media of the public sphere ... The public 
sphere as a sphere which mediates between society and state, in which the 
public organises itself as the bearer or public opinion, accords with the principle 
of the public sphere (1974, p. 49-50). 
The conception of the public sphere as the nexus between SOciety and state 
bears some similarity to the role of the media system in Galtung's model. Given 
that Habermas recognised that mediating nexus evolves with society (hence 
the structural transformation argument), it is clear that the notion of the public 
sphere never assumed a static or homogeneous historical accomplishment (see 
Gitlin, 1998). As with the Siebert et al./McQuail normative typologies, the analytic 
utility of the public sphere as a concept lies not in its empirical specificity but as 
an ideal type. As such, Habermas was right to signal the threat posed by private/ 
commercial interests to the realisation of these ideals. The concerns about the 
refeudalisation of the public sphere as democratic deliberation and transparency 
become occluded by public relations are analogous to many contemporary 
concerns about the erosion of public service by media commercialisation 
(see Graham & Davies, 1997; Tracey, 1998; Curran, 2000; Davis, 2002, 20ra; 
Jakubowicz, 2004; Mayhew, 1997). There is certainly scope to draw parallels 
between the principles of the public sphere and those of public service (see 
Fig. 3 following). 
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Fig. 3 Table comparing public sphere and public service principles 
P.RI NClP.~ES 
Access guaranteed to all citizens 
Freedom to communicate opinions on 
public interest issues 
Civic engagement distinct from state 
and market 
Unrestricted domain of critical-
rational debate 
Transparency of political process/ 
deliberation 
Universality of reception and audience 
appeal 
Diversity of content and voices 
(including minorities) 
Independent governance and public 
funding; citizen-focused 
Educate, inform, entertain; 
impartiality and comprehensiveness 
Watchdog functions - checks on those 
in power 
The notions of public sphere and public service are certainly related, but they 
are not coterminous. As noted earlier, an important fault-line that emerges here 
concerns the conception of the public, the relation between civil society and 
the media and by extension, the nature of representation between civil society 
and the state. Habermas' emphasis on the facilitation of active engagement of 
citizens in political life through rational dialogue among themselves is closer to 
the participatory model than the professionally-driven public service model; in 
this sense the formation of the public sphere must be accomplished by, not only 
for, civil society. However, there is a difficulty here if a precondition of the public 
sphere is the very engaged rational citizenry that the public sphere is required 
to facilitate (see Fraser, 1992). Moreover, as Goode (2005) and Garnham (2007) 
suggest, Habermas' notion of the public sphere is not intended as a programme 
for radical civic direct action but as a means for discovering the socio-political 
conditions under which 'solidarity among strangers' might be guaranteed 
without resorting to political violence. In that regard, the notion of the public 
sphere is not incompatible with mediated forms of civic representation in the 
political sphere. 
These points need not be interpreted as internal contradictions, however; in 
line with Galtung's model, the implication is that the form civil society takes is 
shaped by its positioning in relation to state and capital, the articulation of which 
in turn is shaped by the media nexus. Thus the form and function of the media 
'7 This is not intended as a definitive set of public service values. Although the ones listed are 
not contentious, the criteria of public service have been subject to historical evolution and 
ideolOgical contestation, not least in New Zealand where it has been conflated at different 
times with public ownership of commercial media and local content provision (Thompson, 
2.0 0 4). 
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system helps to extend or circumscribe the possibilities for civic engagement 
and the modality of political representation. Importantly, this suggests a 
need to distinguish between different conceptions of the public beyond the 
standard citizen-consumer dichotomy. The conception of 'the public' or 'the 
citizen' as a unitary category can be problematic because there are inevitably 
multiple (and possibly conflicting) interests within civil society that often elude 
representative political processes. Moreover, since the I970s, the relations 
among state, capital and civil society have been reconfigured by macroeconomic 
shifts, new communication technologies, and other processes associated with 
'globalisation'. The nature of citizenship and the social contract between state 
and civil society therefore cannot assumed to be stable (see Hindess, 1989; 
Mayhew, 1997; Sassen, 2006; Davis, 2OW). A further complication emerges here 
between claims of a shift in the empirical, substantive nature of the public in 
relation to government and market and claims of a shift in the conception of ' the 
public' as a formal, analytical category around which the discourses and models 
of policy-makers are formed. As Miller (1998) argues, policy may be articulated 
through 'virtual' constructs of actors and interests that have no external referent 
or relation to social conditions. In this regard, although notions of 'the public' or 
'the public interest' are always abstractions, the potential for virtual constructs 
assumed by policy-makers to have real consequences is an important reason for 
interrogating them. 
Indeed, 'democracy' itself falls into just such a virtual category. As Winseck 
and Cuthbert (1997) have suggested, different institutional and technological 
arrangements simultaneously engender and delimit the scope of democratic 
possibility. Forms of civic representation within a 'limited' or 'pragmatic' 
democratic polity are entirely compatible with a heavily commercialised 
(libertarian) media system: the formal procedures of periodic elections often 
offer minimal opportunity for progressive social change and fall well short of 
any idealistic vision of a 'communicative' democracy providing for more direct 
forms of civic participation. Although the potential for new digital media and 
the internet to enhance political participation in line with communicative/ 
participatory models or facilitate progressive social movements should not 
be discounted, it is often overstated (for a critique see Hoar & Hope, 2002; 
Davis, 20W; Hirst 2OU). On the contrary, as Davis (20W) points out, the mass 
mediation of political processes has altered the forms of political practices and 
representation and reconstrued 'the public' as an homogenous electorate whose 
collective assent must be maintained through political media performances. 
The evolving digital media ecology has led some academic commentators to 
argue that traditional notions of public service broadcasting are either outmoded 
or no longer politically meaningful (see Jacka, 2003; Flew, 2006). Although there 
is certainly reason to interrogate how public service outcomes are delivered in 
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the digital age, there are compelling arguments that the propensity for market 
failure and consequent need for intervention increases in the digital media 
environment (see Graham & Davies, 1997; Davies, 2005). The democratic 
potential of digital media developments need to be understood in the broader 
context of the prevailing neoliberal policy trajectory. Crucially, this has not 
been fundamentally diverted by the re-emergence of centre-left governments 
espousing a return to social-democratic principles. In many cases, these 
administrations have adopted a 'third way' paradigm in which progressive civic 
values such as public service are openly celebrated but in practice, implemented 
in whatever policy spaces remain after neoliberal market imperatives have been 
accommodated (Thompson, 2000; see also Comrie & Fountaine, 2006). The 
broadcasting reforms of the three Labour-led governments in New Zealand 
between 1999-2008 provide an apposite demonstration of this tendency and 
also serve to show how public service broadcasting and the public sphere have 
been compromised by efforts to pursue social democratic policy outcomes 
through market mechanisms. 
Shifts in New Zealand broadcasting policy over the last two decades make 
an interesting case study for considering the issues discussed in the preceding 
sections. Few other countries have either gone so far in embracing free market 
policies in the broadcasting sector or subsequently attempted to reverse such 
reforms after commercial de/regulation. In 1989, the public broadcaster, the 
Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand (BCNZ), was split into two state-
owned enterprises, Television New Zealand (TVNZ) and Radio New Zealand 
(RNZ), whose primary function was to operate commercially and return the 
profits to the Treasury as a Crown dividend. In recognition of the opportunity 
costs of maintaining local content levels in a small, commercialised English-
speaking market, the public licence fee that (partially) supported BeNZ was 
diverted to NZ On Air, a new institution established to distribute this funding 
on a contestable basis for local productions. Importantly, this made public funds 
available to private sector producers and broadcasters. In some respects this 
was an important neoliberal acknowledgement of the propensity for the under-
delivery oflocal content in a free market. However, it set the precedent of making 
private sector media eligible for public broadcasting subsidy and also had the 
ideological consequence of conflating the provision of local programming with 
public service, circumscribing the scope of policy intervention. Nevertheless, the 
early 1990S also saw the privatisation of the commercial subsidiaries of Radio 
New Zealand, leaving RNZ as a dedicated public service under a charter operating 
two commercial-free channels (National and Concert), fully funded through 
government. Interestingly, this indicates how specinc institutional outcomes 
of policy may contradict the broader trajectory. Meanwhile, regulations 
on foreign media ownership and media content imports were removed to 
104 
SCOOPED: THE POLlTICS AND POWER OF JOURNALlSM IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
encourage competition and to comply with free-trade agreements (notably 
GATS). By 1999, the commercially successful TVNZ was being positioned for 
privatisation by the National-led government. However, the election of the first 
of three Labour-led governments introduced a new policy trajectory. Noting 
the market failures of the heavily commercialised and deregulated broadcasting 
ecology, Labour explicitly recognised the market failures of a heavily liberalised 
commercial media sector, but its third way philosophy precluded any radical 
reregulation. Instead, it focused primarily on reforming the state broadcasting 
sector, leaving the commercial operators largely alone (see Thompson, 2000; 
Comrie & Fountaine, 2005). This did not prevent important policy tensions 
emerging among the Ministry for Culture and Heritage (MCH), the Treasury, 
and the Ministry for Economic Development (MED) which all had rather 
different priorities for the sector, reflecting rather different conceptions of the 
public interest. 
The centrepiece of Labour's broadcasting reforms was the 2003 restructuring 
of TVNZ as a Crown company with a dual remit comprising of a wide-ranging 
public service Charter and a continuing expectation of commercial dividends. 
This was accompanied by a government commitment to providing an extremely 
modest direct subsidy to TVNZ (up to NZ$15 million per year, representing 
roughly five percent of its operational expenses). Significantly, the range of 
public service functions covered by the Charter extended beyond the local 
content genres subsidised by NZ On Air, and this was made explicit in MCH 
advice on the Charter funding to the Minister (Thompson, 2004). 
The revalorisation of a broader conception of public service and the 
reintroduction of a non-contestable funding mechanism was opposed by the 
political right and private sector broadcasters as well as NZ On AirIB. However, 
a more significant challenge to the Charter arrangements came from the 
insistence from Treasury that TVNZ maintain its commercial performance and 
continue paying an annual dividend. As Thompson (2004,2007) has shown, this 
effectively resulted in the MCH giving TVNZ money with one hand, only for 
Treasury to take it back with the other, leaving the broadcaster with a net subsidy 
,8 It is interesting to note that while these political tensions were unfolding, the legitimacy of 
two other public sector broadcasters was left largely unquestioned. Radio New Zealand's 
direct subsidy (administered by NZ On Air, and at over NZ$30 million, twice the level of the 
TVNZ Charter subsidy) was not (then) perceived to be distorting the market because RNZ did 
not compete for substitutable audience share and commercial revenue. Meanwhile, the Maori 
Television Service (established in 2003) receives funding from both the Ministry for Maori 
Affairs and Te Mangai Paho (the Maori equivalent of NZ On Air), each worth approximately 
NZ$16-17 million per annum. Although MTS does carry a small amount of advertiSing, 
this represents less than five percent of its revenue (almost the inverse of the TVNZ ratio). 
However, because MTS' primary function is the promotion ofTe Reo (the indigenous 
language), it is likewise not generally regarded as competing for substitutable audience share 
and revenue. 
105 
SCOOPED: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF JOURNALISM IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
that was actually negative: between zo03 and zo08, NZ$95 million was devoted 
to the Charter, while NZ$I42 million was paid out in dividends. Thus TVNZ 
was left in the invidious position of balancing commercial/libertarian and public 
service responsibilities in a context of high political expectations and no funding. 
Although some efforts to implement the Charter were made, any slippage in the 
ratings or dividend payments was met with criticism from the political right 
that shareholder value was not being maintained or that charter money was not 
delivering value. Conversely, when TVNZ agreed to pay a record salary to its 
top news anchor (whose departure would have been far more costly in ratings), 
the government itself criticised its commercial extravagance. In effect, TVNZ 
was also obliged to play its part in maintaining the legitimacy of government 
policy in addition to a contradictory and controversial remit. By the end of zoos, 
chief executive Ian Fraser had publicly criticised the "money-go-round" funding 
and resigned, issuing the indictment that continuing commercial pressures had 
resulted in a schedule "profoundly incompatible with any recognisable model of 
public broadcasting" (see Thompson, 2007). 
In regard to the Galtung-McQuail model, taken at face value, Labour's 
broadcasting policies might be understood as an attempt to reverse the policy 
trajectory of the 1990S from a predominant commercial/libertarian model 
back to a public service/social responsibility modeL However, it is important 
to recognise that the model of broadcasting prior to the neoliberal reforms 
was unlike the fully-funded dedicated public service model that characterised 
early broadcasting arrangements in the UK and elsewhere in Europe. BCNZ's 
pre-1989 licence fee had always been supplemented by commercial revenue, 
and this had been steadily dwindling in value since the 1970S (see Dunleavy, 
ZOOS). Indeed, this partly reflected the New Zealand government's historical 
predilection for exerting political influence on the national broadcaster (see 
Day, zooo). As such, there were authoritarian and libertarian inflections in 
the social responsibility model of the pre-1989 period. Labour's post-I999 
reforms were also circumscribed by the third-way philosophy that attempted to 
pursue social-democratic policy objectives within the confines of a continuing 
commitment to a neoliberal macroeconomic framework. Meanwhile, the 
libertarian model remained in touch in other respects. The reluctance of the 
government to intervene in the private broadcasting sector partly reflected the 
Treasury and the Ministry of Economic Development (MED)'s prioritisation of 
fiscal conservatism and perception of the media sector as a driver of economic 
growth. The contradictory pressures to which TVNZ was subject reflected these 
inter-ministerial agendas as they played out in cabinet. They also correspond 
to rather different conceptions of the public as the implicit object of policy 
outcomes. MCH's emphasis on broadcasting's social responsibility role (i.e. the 
Charter) conceives of the public as citizen. Treasury's insistence on continued 
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dividend payments and generic reluctance to fund public broadcasting measures 
conceives of the public as taxpayer. The MED's emphasis on broadcasting 
services as a key sector of industry and potential driver of economic growth 
conceives of the public as worker and consumer. Meanwhile, the government's 
own disposition in criticising TVNZ for not fulfilling the expectations of the 
dual mandate (which in many respects stemmed from its own ambivalent 
policies) suggests a conception of the public as electorate whose confidence 
must be maintained. These tensions are mapped onto the Galtung-McQuail 
model in Fig. 4 below: 
Fig. 4 TVNZ Charter tensions mapped onto the Galtung-McQuail model and 
showing different policy conceptions of the public across different political 
institutions 
AUTHORITARV\j 
Iiv] PERATIVES 
Charter Delivery: 
Public as Citizen 
SOOAL RESPONSIBILITY 
l.\rIPERATIVES 
LIBERTARIAN 
IMPERATIVES 
The normative policy tensions outlined above were again played out in 
regard to the development of digital television. Rick Ellis had resumed his former 
role as CEO of TVNZ and began refocusing operations on the development of 
new digital platforms under the mission statement 'inspiring on every screen'. 
Although the dual Charter/commercial remit remained, this approach inflected 
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the conception of public service (specifically the universal service principle) 
with a more technical bent (Thompson, 2007). This may have been politically 
expedient: the government regarded the establishment of the Freeview digital 
television platform as an important initiative to encourage household take-up 
of digital reception technology in preparation for digital switchover. To this 
end, it agreed to invest NZ$25 million in supporting the technical infrastructure 
developments and provide free spectrum licences to operators. However, there 
was political disagreement and further resentment from the private broadcasting 
sector behind the government's decision to allocate NZ$79 million over six years 
to fund two new commercial-free digital channels, TVNZ 6 and TVNZ 7, to help 
drive the uptake of Freeview. 
Despite the fact that this funding largely comprised the drip-fed return of 
a special NZ$70 million dividend TVNZ paid to the Treasury as part of a 2006 
capital restructuring exercise, different ministerial imperatives threatened 
to derail the initiative. As Thompson (2007) points out, the MCH supported 
the subsidy because the commercial-free TVNZ 6 and 7 would enable the 
development of distinctive schedules to enhance Charter provisions (although 
the funding streams were to be kept separate). The MED also supported the 
subsidy, but this was premised on an independent report showing that an 
early analogue switch off by 2015 would help stimulate the digital media 
sector representing over NZ$200 million in economic growth. The Treasury, 
however, initially refused to approve the funding, arguing that it did not regard 
the investment as good value for money. High level cabinet negotiations and 
recognition that the TVNZ dividend would decline if it was obliged to subsidise 
both channels from its commercial revenue eventually pushed the decision in 
TVNZ's favour. This is indicative of how the complex institutional tensions 
underpin policy, but also how different normative imperatives underpinned by 
different conceptions of the public are articulated within the polity. 
Public broadcasting under National: 
Back to the future? 
By 2008, in the wake of widespread criticism of TVNZ's opaque or injudicious 
deployment of its public subsidies, the Labour-led government moved to give 
NZ On Air jurisdiction over the funding. However, the subsequent election 
result again took broadcasting policy off on another trajectory. 
In November 2008, a new National-led government came into office. It 
moved quickly to redirect the $15 million Charter funding (which had never 
been hypothecated in the 2003 TVNZ Act) to NZ On Air, establishing a 
second contestable 'Platinum Fund' to enable commissioning of more specific 
public service broadcasting (PSB) type content (NZ On Air, 2010). This was 
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welcomed by NZ On Air as well the independent production sector and TVNZ's 
commercial rivals. Importantly, the new fund maintained the Charter principle 
that public service extended beyond local content provision, but it implicitly 
rejected the notion that this required specific institutional arrangements. The 
Minister of Broadcasting argued that in the digital broadcasting environment, 
'platform neutrality' means there is no need for a dedicated public service media 
(PSM) provider so long as high-quality content is made available (Media 7,2009). 
The new fund, however, remains subject to many of the structural limitations 
of the local content fund in that proposals require an agreement to broadcast 
and cannot ensure content decisions are insulated from the imperatives of 
commercial scheduling. 
Meanwhile, the government's Television New Zealand Amendment Act 
abolished the Charter in July 2011. However, the amendment act did not return 
TVNZ to SOE status, and retains some generic PSB requirements including 
universal service and content range and quality. The Minister of Broadcasting 
had indicated he wished to retain TVNZ 6 and/or 7 in some form (see TVNZ, 
20na, 2OIIb). TVNZ replaced TVNZ 6 with a commercial youth-oriented channel 
('U') and incorporated the best of TVNZ 6 on TVNZ 7 as a combined public 
service channel, which commenced in March 2011 (TVNZ, 20llb, 2OIIC). It is 
apparent that TVNZ had been led to expect government support for this single 
public service channeL However, in April 2011, the government announced 
that TVNZ is funding would not be continued beyond 2012 because of budget 
constraints. The channel is not currently eligible for the NZ On Air funds and 
if it were moved to a commercial funding base, the distinctive character of its 
schedule will be compromised. 
Coupled with the abolition of the TVNZ Charter, these developments 
certainly represent a serious normative shift and a further dilution of the 
media's civic accountability. Interestingly, in contrast to the EU scenario 
where the public service was quarantined by increasingly specific definitions of 
legitimate functions (Jakubowicz, 2004), National's strategy appears to involve 
circumscription of public service through strategic ambiguity, leaving TVNZ 
accountable to nothing except the government's transitory policy priorities. 
There is therefore substantial normative confusion underpinning these policy 
developments, in part reflecting the same ministerial tensions that underpinned 
the policy compromises that led to the contradictions of the TVNZ Charter. 
National's predilection for a market-driven approach to broadcasting is 
nevertheless becoming clear in other ways. The government's decision to 
abandon a major planned review of regulations for digital broadcasting and 
content appears to reflect an active aversion to investigating policy issues which 
might demand regulatory intervention in the market, particularly in regard to 
Sky (Thompson, 2009). TVNZ was encouraged to abandon its longstanding 
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refusal to allow TVNZ 6 and 7 to be carried on Sky's platform. Although this 
ostensibly increases public value by reaching a wider audience, it also weakens 
the distinctiveness of the Freeview platform TVNZ had championed as the 
FTA alternative to Sky. Moreover, TVNZ's recent decision to launch its new 
archived content channel 'Heartland' exclusively on Sky's platform effectively 
means that half the households in New Zealand will be disenfranchised from 
their own televisual heritage unless they subscribe to a foreign pay-TV provider. 
As John Fellett, chief executive of Sky TV, succinctly commented, "This vault 
of content which includes some of New Zealand's most beloved shows is the 
biggest untapped resource since the Maui oil fields" (Sky, 2010). TVNZ has also 
agreed to commence a commercial-free version ofTVNZ 6's children's schedule, 
Kidzone, on Sky's network. The Heartland and Kidzone decisions will maintain 
some public service elements, but their position on a pay-TV platform abandons 
the universal service principle and effectively transforms a public good into a 
private one. 
Conclusions: Last chance to see? 
The chapter has outlined several normative tensions underpinning media 
arrangements and argued that despite its typological limitations, a combined 
Galtung-McQuail model may still have an analytical value in mapping 
out tensions and shifts in the trajectory of public broadcasting policy. It is 
important, however, to recognise that those tensions are articulated through 
specific institutional arrangements. Recognition of the broad policy trajectories 
shaping any specific media ecology remains vital, since this will shape the basic 
political-economic contours to which institutional actors respond. However, 
the regulatory, financial and ideological conditions are themselves shaped by 
the aggregate engagements of institutions as they respond to each other. In the 
case of New Zealand, it is clear that the overall policy trajectory is articulated 
through the interplay of normative tensions within the polity itself, coupled 
with shifting sets of interest among media institutions (for example, at times the 
private free-to-air and pay-TV sector have been united in opposition to TVNZ's 
Charter funding; at other times the free-t~-air sector and Freeview group have 
been united in opposition to Sky's creeping market share). 
Certainly in the New Zealand context, the new National government has 
moved public broadcasting policy back onto a broad libertarian trajectory. 
However, this has arisen less from any decisive ideological vision than from a 
series of expedient inter-ministerial compromises in which Treasury has thus 
far had the final word. The uncertainty surrounding the future funding of 
TVNZ 6 and 7 were suggestive of continuing tensions between the ministers 
of broadcasting and finance, rather than any decisive move to abolish the 
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channels. Thus the emergent trajectory is characterised not by a neoliberal drive 
to completely excise every remaining vestige of state intervention in the media 
market but a desire to allow public revenue streams to be co-opted by capital 
and redirected to the private sector. That is confirmed by the government's 
decision to make the TVNZ Charter money contestable (accompanied now by 
speculation that subscription channels may be made eligible for such funds) 
and the shift of public service provisions to subscription platforms. These 
privatisations of public goods would seem to confirm the Habermasian account 
of refeudalisation as the system imperatives colonise the life world, but this 
must be understood firstly as an outcome of specific institutional agencies and 
only secondly as the unfolding of any ineluctable historical dialectic. 
Indeed, one of the factors permitting such policies to develop is not the 
outright denial of public service principles and discourses, but their cooption by, 
and harnessing to, commercial and technological imperatives. The conflation 
of public service with 'platform neutral' provisions of local content (even on 
pay-TV providers), and the public interest with the technological expansion of 
digital platforms help to iegitimate this policy trajectory and divert attention 
from the erosion of the institutional arrangements required to serve a broader 
range of public service content and public interests on an equitable basis. To 
abandon the discourses valorising public service and public sphere as the central 
normative principles of a democratic policy at a time when they are under threat 
(by indifferent neglect by policy-makers as much as by deliberate ideological 
attack) is to risk complicity with their final demise. Certainly in the case of New 
Zealand, it may be our last chance to see ... 
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CHAPTER 6: 
POLITICS, POWER AND POLITICAL 
JOURNALISTS 
Margie Comrie 
"It's an amazing job. Politics is every element of a good story, you've got the 
policies that affect people all the time every day, the drama and the theatre 
of it, you've got the tradition and the ceremony of it, and you've got the good 
and the bad of it." TVNZ political reporter Jessica Mutch. 
"Media view politicians with as much hostility and suspicion as politicians 
view the media. That's not to say there isn't respect and genuine human 
relationships. But the media impose increasingly their own opinions and 
view-points and analysis and take on things. JJ Clare Curran, Labour MP for 
Dunedin South. 
Introduction 
It's Tuesday in parliament and a posse of journalists waits outside the Labour 
Party caucus for MP Chris Carter to answer questions about his credit card 
spending. Belatedly, Carter emerges, gives a statement and promptly sets off, 
pursued down stairs and along corridors by disappointed television crews 
breaching parliamentary trespass rules. The consequent mocking coverage (a 
YouTube hit) set off a storm. In the Dominion Post Jane Clifton, press gallery 
life member, dubbed it the "daggiest television spectacle of the week", adding, 
"a refusal to comment and a fast-disappearing back can tell us more than an 
hour-long interview"(2oIO, p. A8). Brian Edwards, former television interviewer 
and Labour Party media consultant, vented his spleen in a blog posting. Calling 
the journalists a "lynch mob", he said television reporters were "increasingly 
required by their networks to behave like paparazzi". TVNZ and TV3 lost their 
free parking rights at parliament as a result, although the political editors of both 
channels robustly defended their crews' actions. 
TVNZ's Jessica Mutch comments: "Television needs pictures so television 
reporters are much more likely to follow a politician down a corridor ... with the 
Chris Carter case I was one of those journalists who was [sic] following him and 
we followed him because he refused to front up. Our job is to hold politicians to 
account and we felt it was important for him to answer questions." 
Whether the Carter pack hunt was the nadir of political journalism and a 
symptom of all that's wrong with television news is debatable, but it throws the 
spotlight on tensions between politicians and the media. Political journalists 
are the most visible element of the news media's fourth estate watchdog role 
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informing the public and holding the powerful to account. The list of press 
gallery journalists runs to several pages: 46 full members, II life members and 77 
associates. Most come from Radio New Zealand, TVNZ, TV3, Maori Television, 
the New Zealand Herald and the Dominion Post, with individual members from 
other papers, magazines and international press agencies. 
Despite the prestige, traditional privileges and apparent strength of the 
gallery, many feel increasingly outnumbered by parliamentary advisors and 
press officers. Political blogger Russell Brown estimated in May 2008 that the 
Labour-led government had 45 communicators and 35 political advisors. While 
new Prime Minister John Key told parliament in February 2009 he had fewer 
communicators, there's been considerable criticism about the leap in pay for 
ministerial staff and the appointment of six high-level advisors. 
It can't help that those working for politicians frequently come from the 
press gallery, using their contacts and knowhow for 'the dark side'. Two New 
Zealand Herald journalists and a commercial radio gallery reporter joined Key's 
staff as press secretaries soon after the 2008 election, followed by an experienced 
Herald feature writer as speech writer. At the beginning of election year 201l, a 
TVNZ political reporter became press secretary to Labour leader Phil Goff. A 
number move back and forth: Dick Griffin (once mistaken by foreign reporters 
as the Prime Minister) has shifted from political broadcaster to press secretary, 
TVNZ lobbyist, political commentator and public affairs advisor. Perhaps 
nothing brings home more the co-dependent relationship of politicians, political 
advisors and the press as this revolving door phenomenon. 
Entering the second decade of the 21st century, it is hard to imagine the 
nightly television joust of MPs and reporters still matters. But, though the 
internet has meant an explosion of communication choices, Craig, Hayward 
and Rudd (2009) argue that political changes make politicians more dependent 
on mass media. New Zealanders still get most of their political information from 
television and TVNZ's One News often tops the ten most-watched programmes 
list. Thirty years of research confirms that news can set the agenda for what we 
think are important public issues. In New Zealand, political scientist Jack Vowles 
(2004) makes a case that a 2002 television leaders' debate significantly affected 
the election results, while American researcher Robert Entman (20ro) used 
Barack Obama's election to demonstrate that journalistic biases and resulting 
news frames affect only a few people, but can swing elections. 
This chapter examines the power of political journalists in New Zealand by 
looking at pressures shaping political reporting and how the 'power struggle' 
between politicians and journalists has played out. Politicians and journalists 
need each other but have different goals, and both sides are enmeshed in ritualised 
conflict on our screens that arguably does little to serve democracy. The chapter 
begins by looking at the historical roots of the cynicism characterising much 
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reporting, including consequences of the change to MMP. It then looks at the 
'tug of war' from the perspective of journalists and politicians. First, journalists 
discuss political manipulation and their counter strategies which impact on the 
news and political agendas. The discussion then turns to political responses; 
seeking redress or side-stepping traditional news media. Some concluding 
thoughts centre on the 20ll election (still forthcoming at time of writing). 
From meekness to mockery 
Although press gallery journalists have near unparalleled access to New 
Zealand's politicians, commercial news pressures and increasingly sophisticated 
political communication have engendered a cynical style of reporting. As well 
as these global trends, local events have further encouraged the approach. The 
small size of New Zealand and the relatively late development of independent 
broadcasting news media have left their mark. Journalists, politicians and 
officials have long lived and worked in the confines of Wellington, resulting 
in direct access to politicians of the day. Because politicians set up the first 
newspapers and there were no scandal sheets, Kiwi journalists historically also 
had higher professional and social standing than their British, Australian and 
American counterparts (Thomas, 2008). 
However, much of the cosy relationship between journalists and politicians 
vanished when the first 'real' broadcasting journalists appeared in the 1960s and 
television upped the ante for politicians' media performance. In 1962, when 
television was finally introduced to New Zealand, the government set up the 
NZBC, based loosely on the BBC and designed to give broadcasters independence 
from direct parliamentary control. Before then, radio news was written by 
staff in the Department of Tourism and Publicity. It was a long time, though, 
before politicians became less obviously interfering in the day-to-clay running 
of broadcasting. To this day, TVNZ's programming and funding provides fodder 
for parliamentary posturing, and governments of all persuasions, by constantly 
tinkering with broadcasting structures and funding, continue to exert pressure 
on its boards and management. 
Television brought in overseas models of journalism and a rapid growth in 
the number of young journalists influenced by investigative programmes like 
BBC's Panorama. Politicians were generally uncomfortable on camera and wary 
of television, as some showed in the first current affairs interview series in 1963. 
However, one rising MP, the populist Robert Muldoon, enjoyed confronting 
television journalists and their bosses. His years in power were marked by high 
level resignations from TVNZ in protest against interference. 
The new broadcasting performers, generally baby boomers and often from 
the United Kingdom, rose rapidly through the ranks, surviving restructuring 
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moves and dictating newsroom culture. A fair percentage remains influential 
as editors, broadcasters, film company owners, public relations consultants and 
media commentators. Their stories of the 'glory days' of journalism are still 
handed down, contributing to current attitudes of politicians and journalists. 
In the 1970S too, journalists were inspired by the unfolding saga of Watergate, 
as Washington Post investigators tracked responsibility for the 1972 burglary ever 
closer to the White House, culminating in the 1974 resignation of President 
Nixon. Watergate set political journalism upon a powerful, highly ethical pedestal. 
But it was the constant clash between Robert Muldoon and TVNZ, as he 
progressed from deputy prime minister in 1971, to opposition leader in 1972, and 
finally prime minister from 1975 to 1984, which arguably left the strongest legacy. 
Not only was Muldoon actively bullying at management level, but he made no 
secret of his disdain for journalists, intimidating some reporters and rousing others 
to death or glory moments. Muldoon's infamous confrontation in 1975 with the 
boyish Simon Walker (fresh from Balliol and presidency of the Oxford Union), 
can be found in the NZ On Screen online archive. However unimpressive the 
confrontation might appear to modern eyes, there is no doubting Muldoon's 
impact at ground level, whether ejecting satirist Tom Scott from a press 
conference, or taunting TV One and Two news crews that their 'wasteful' job 
duplication would soon be stopped. More significant must have been his impact 
on the upper echelons of the constantly restructured BeNZ. He had no 
compunction in interfering, demanding certain programmes be shelved, publicly 
lambasting expenditure, threatening to restructure and freezing the licence fee. 
While local journalists tussled with Robert Muldoon, media across the 
world were feeling pressured as politicians, responding to the importance of 
televised politics, and invested in increasingly clever news management. In 1981, 
Mark Levy coined the phrase "disdaining the news" to describe how journalists 
cope with reporting "tainted" stories such as photo opportunities or political 
announcements directing attention away from bad news. Levy observed 
reporters shifting from an objective style into sometimes highly critical, scornful 
or derisive commentary to distance themselves from the event or person they 
covered. Inviting the audience to share in their insights by using mockery and 
cynicism allows journalists to "meet their fundamental obligation to create 
news, while minimising threats to their professional autonomy" (p. 31). 
Less reverential political reporting came later to New Zealand, but, perhaps 
in reaction to Muldoon's departure, rapidly became the norm, transforming 
coverage of the Ig87 election campaign. The jocular tone in part reflected the 
relationship that new PM David Lange - renowned for laid-back repartee -
had built with journalists. At the same time, however, the approach also suited 
TVNZ's evolving commercial news style, as it prepared for competition from 
the planned private television channel. During 1987, primetime news shifted 
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to duo presenters, more emphasis on crime, and the pacy style we recognise 
today. One News also gave political reporters freer rein to gently mock the PM as 
"the new Mr Nice Guy", or make the most of a media conference slip-up by the 
leader of the opposition. Irony and irreverence helped position reporters in the 
ascendency while covering the political 'game'. 
However, Auckland University's Joe Atkinson (2006) believes our political 
reporters' habitual stance of disdain merely engenders public distrust of politics 
without strengthening the media's watchdog role. He says the theatre of confrontation 
belies the reality of a triangular and co-dependent relationship between journalists, 
spin doctors and politicians, with the accompanying irony that 'scandals' unearthed 
by under-resourced journalists are frequently fed by opposition politicians. 
The personal focus, 'horserace' coverage and emphasis on scandals are partly 
a result of the MMP system adopted in 1996. MMP's party vote focuses attention 
on leaders at the expense of local politicians, increasing the 'presidentialisation' 
of political campaigning and of resulting stories. More parties vying for the 
media limelight mean less time for issues, according to Radio New Zealand's 
Kathryn Ryan (2007). MMP also brought political polling to the fore and, Ryan 
says, "No matter how irritating the polls may become, under MMP they provide 
crucial information to the electorate and to tactical voters" (p. 177). Additionally, 
extensive negotiations about every decision under MMP make journalism 
harder. TVNZ's Mutch says even reporting on future legislation means "a lot 
of ringing around to find out whether people are supporting bills, or a lot more 
calculations around what's going to pass and what isn't". 
According to Speaker Lockwood Smith, MMP also changed how politicians 
relate to the media: "Parliamentarians have to be even more careful with 
MMP because of the all-pervasive power of the party vote. Parties have to be 
scrupulously careful to appear to be united on everything ... Rarely now will the 
media find members of parliament talking too openly about issues. The party 
line tends to be emphasised now." 
As politicians become more reluctant to speak openly and political reporting 
becomes more complex, journalists rely more on their unnamed sources, 
filling the information vacuum with on-camera speculation and prediction. 
Shenanigans among the minor parties since MMP, however, have proved a 
rich source of stories. Anna Kominik (personal communication, 2004) press 
secretary to two National Prime Ministers, was in the press gallery following 
the first MMP election and its messy coalition formation. She feels journalists 
never recovered from getting sucked into a cycle of 'waiting in the corridor' 
style coverage during the protracted coalition talks which then led to regular 
feeding frenzies as various disaffected coalition MPs fired off salvos. Focusing on 
combatants meant real simmering issues were ignored. Another former press 
secretary, Eileen O'Leary (2002), says MMP leaves reporters vulnerable to tactics 
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of minor party leaders who keep their profiles strong by feeding 'mini-scandals'. 
O'Leary calls ACT leader Rodney Hide and New Zealand First's Winston Peters 
"undisputed masters" of this technique which "plays into the hands of politicians 
who want to discredit opponents" (p. 191). 
Political journalism, then, has moved from meekness to mockery as reporters 
struggle to cover complex coalition politics that underlie the photo opportunities 
and press conferences, while providing the excitement, snappy soundbites and 
personal touch demanded by commercial television formats. Australian-based 
academic Louw (2005) argues that cynicism is bred when reporters realise that, "Far 
from being fourth estate watchdogs, journalists are accomplices in the impression 
management game" (p. 29). Gallery journalists are clearly aware of the symbiotic 
nature of their relationship with politicians, however, and the next section looks at 
their perceptions of media manipulation and the effectiveness of reporters' responses. 
Manipulation and counter-manipulation 
According to former press secretary Kominik, "It is easy to manipulate what is going 
on." The right practitioner, with real knowledge of political and media processes 
"would know where to plant to information and a storm would be created or the 
storm would be abated". But Jessica Mutch argues that it's simplistic to talk about 
political manipulation. Both sides recognise they use each other and journalists 
don't "gobble up" spin. "You take information and you process it because you 
are involved in politics and you know how politics works and you know where 
the politicians are coming from." She outlines one tool she uses to convey to the 
audience that what a politician says should be questioned: "1 have a line and then 
use the politician coming up and speaking for themself and just in the way you use 
your voice, or if you are asking a question, you let audiences judge for themselves 
if the politician is answering the question, or telling the truth, or whether the 
politician really believes what they are saying." This approach is most effective on 
television, she says, because a politician's body language is also eloquent. 
TV3 political reporter Patrick Gower is less philosophical, though. He does 
feel manipulated and frustrated. "For instance I'm on a day off today and I've just 
seen a report that 1 was really, really keen to cover." Gower had rung weekly 
for several months only to be told the potentially embarrassing report about a 
high-level military appointment was not yet available. "Now they've dumped the 
report on a Friday, when there are other big stories and the political journalists 
aren't around. And it's dated September last year." This Friday dump of potentially 
embarrassing material is, Gower adds, "classic Manipulation IOI. You do get 
frustrated. In fact, it happens so much, you probably don't get frustrated enough." 
However, Gower says there are victories, too: one the result of "basic source 
work". When in 2010, after public protests, the government was reconsidering 
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its plan to mine in national parks, the Prime Minister aimed to delay the 
announcement until a media conference fronted by the minister, Gerry 
Brownlee: "It was a backdown and leaders don't like to be associated with things 
like that. So everyone was going to have to wait until the next day to find out 
whether they were going to mine national parks or not." Through a source, Gower 
obtained details of the next day's announcement and reported it on the news 
that night. "1 was able to get in ahead of them. I didn't have to play their game." 
Newspaper journalists have suggested the Key team's media management 
is excessive. Tracy Watkins speaks of "paranoia pervading" Key's office: "Media 
requests are treated like live grenades" (WID, p. AS). But Gower believes there's 
been little change in media management practices: "Same tactics, the same 
idea, the same positions. It's all out of the same textbook. It doesn't matter what 
colour the political party is." Also, he says, politicians do play the media and will 
prioritise television when they really want to get something out. "But ... print 
journalists get advantages too. You notice they can get backgrounders they can 
use in their columns." 
There are a number of ways of telling political stories, according to Gower, 
and mockery has a legitimate place. "It's always been part of coverage of 
parliament, like cartooning. If a party or a politician gets a bit ridiculous, you 
can't hide that anyway ... To make something light-hearted makes it accessible to 
the public." While there's doubtless been more journalistic mockery since stories 
about MPs' expenses surfaced, Gower contends he's a deeply serious journalist 
who would hate to be remembered chiefly for pursuing Chris Carter. "I spend 
far, far more time working on and writing stories about issues or policy." 
Speaker Lockwood Smith is less concerned about cynicism than about the 
expression of "quite strong opinion" where the media have almost a policy-
making influence: "A government today can only afford to run a very small 
number of policies that the media don't agree with ... You can run some policies 
where you think you are on side with the public but, if the media are not on 
side with too many policy issues that a party or government is pushing, it's very 
dangerous these days." European research indicates the power of the media 
agenda over political parliamentary agendas has recently increased (van Noije, 
Kleinnijenhuis & Oegema, 2008). ln New Zealand, media frenzies or moral 
panics put home invasion on the parliamentary agenda and resulted in legislation 
requiring microchip ping for dogs. Nonetheless, apart from such reactive policy, 
Gower sees no evidence of the media driving policy. "At the end of the day it's 
the public's action and reaction that has more impact on policy than anything 
else. If a large enough section of the public really doesn't like it, that is what 
shifts things. For instance, with the mining on conservation land there was no 
media campaign. There was robust reporting on what it would mean. But the 
backdown was caused by the government's fears of a public reaction." 
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Gower acknowledges that it's a chicken and egg situation with the media 
and public opinion both influencing each other. Like most journalists, though, 
he believes they accurately reflect and are in touch with public opinion. 
Lockwood Smith doesn't doubt their sincerity, but says, "I don't see too many 
media people in my office listening to the people 1 listen to and dealing with the 
day-to-day issues that ordinary people are having to deal with ... Believe me, as a 
constituency member you are dealing at a much more grassroots level with what 
people are feeling and coping with." 
The question of the influence of media coverage is, of course, more crucial 
during election campaigns. There is much debate, but relatively little hard evidence, 
about the power of the media to change election results. During the 2002 election, 
Atkinson (2004) reported complex interactions between attention to various 
media and shifting intentions to vote. For instance, attention to One News made 
respondents more likely to shift to vote National (unless they were issue-oriented). 
Attention to Radio New Zealand made people more likely to vote Labour. Attention 
to 3 News made issue-oriented people less likely to change preference and vote 
Labour, but made leadership-oriented people much more likely to vote Labour. 
However, Atkinson was more concerned about media negativity eventually 
putting people off politics. He says television attempted to enliven the 2002 
campaign by focusing on 'horse race' and strategy over issues, and indulging in 
episodes of attack journalism. Atkinson was particularly scathing of the leaders' 
debates on both channels. He details John Campbell's rude and patronising 
manner to politicians of all hues; slates TV One's Sunday Election Conference 
where journalists confronted the two main leaders; and condemns the use of 
celebrity commentator panels. From the journalist's perspective, though, former 
Radio New Zealand political editor Al Morrison argues the campaign "produced 
little material for in-depth reportage. The leaders were whizzed from place to 
place for quick-fire meetings often made up of ticket-only party faithful. Even 
the walkabouts ... were rapid and carefully managed" (2003, p. 214). 
Morrison's judgements on two key campaign events in 2002 - 'Paintergate' 
and 'Corngate' - are revealing about news management. 'Paintergate' came 
to light months earlier when it was revealed Prime Minister Helen Clark had 
signed a painting done by an artist to sell for charity. Morrison describes this 
as "essentially trivial", but points out the release of the major police report 
on the issue was timed for the early stages of the campaign. Moreover, the 
announcement was accompanied by "an unprecedented release of supporting 
evidence and inquiry notes" presented by "none other than the police 
commissioner himself" (p. 210). 'Corngate', covered in more detail in the next 
section, was more decisive for Clark, and Morrison's Morning Report coverage 
hit Labour Party flak. While admitting he could have taken more care, he judged 
the political counter-attack on the media as deliberate rather than spontaneous: 
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"Labour deflected the issue, first to news media behaviour and then onto the 
Greens' behaviour over the saga" (2003, p. 2IO). 
Studies of the last, 2008, campaign showed National Party contender John 
Key received more, and generally better, coverage than Labour incumbent Helen 
Clark. For instance, on One News, Clark appeared in considerably fewer stories, 
and on 3 News, while she appeared in slightly more stories, Clark was given 
considerably less on-air speaking time than Key (Comrie, 2009). Bahador (2008, 
as cited in Rosenberg, 2009) studied both newspapers and television, finding an 
even wider discrepancy. He also found that, when journalists were providing 
analysis and opinions, Clark had more negative coverage than Key. 
Mutch says, as Prime Minister, Key continues to relate well to the media, 
using downtime while cameras are being set up to chat and sometimes joke. 
He likes the media side of the job when the questions aren't tough. "He wants 
journalists to like him, I guess, in a way that is unusual in politics." Mutch, well 
aware of the self-fulfilling prophecy aspect of polls, says Key is a "big believer" in 
them, more concerned about results than Clark, who had of course seen them 
fluctuate across her career. 
An under-examined aspect of the 2008 election campaign is the media's 
part in the downfall of New Zealand First's combative Winston Peters and 
the consequences for Labour. Peters' former chief of staff, Damian Edwards 
(2010), asserts there was a media campaign against Peters and the party, citing 
the timing and intensity of negative media scrutiny. Apparent funding issues 
justified investigation, but Peters was also the target of a self-serving campaign 
by ACT's Rodney Hide. Television campaign coverage was overwhelmingly 
negative and voice-over commentary undermined potentially positive stories 
when Peters was cleared of some charges (Comrie, 2009). Patrick Gower says at 
times the gallery does take on politicians almost en masse and that Peters was 
a target of "the pack mentality". However, he argues attacks are not gratuitous 
and journalists only turn on those who make a major error or are exposed for 
hypocrisy. A year later, the same reporters relished ousting 'perk-buster' Rodney 
Hide for taking his girlfriend on a taxpayer-funded trip. 
Entman (2010) says journalists' sources attack when they sense weakness in 
leaders (inside or outside their parties); this changes the distribution of opinion 
available to reporters and feeds a downward spiral of coverage and poll results. 
The relentless media fusillade against British Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 
his final weeks is a prime example. According to Simon Lewis (2010), Brown's 
director of communications, "There comes a 'tipping point' when reportage 
becomes so personalised that politicians cannot do what they are supposed to do." 
It is hard to accurately evaluate results of coverage because they interact 
with other political messages and social and economic conditions, and because 
media judgements and poll results have a reverberating effect on each other. 
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Nevertheless, the media agenda does influence opinion polls, parliamentary 
debate and legislation. Furthermore, during elections there are critical times 
where the amount and tone of coverage influences political fortunes, and this 
influence has grown as numbers of undecided and swinging voters has risen. 
Politicians therefore try to counteract media power with a variety of tactics. 
Political redress 
There are legal and quasi-judicial avenues for political redress, although former 
Press Council member Alan Samson says politicians are generally reluctant 
to use them. Instead, he says, they work on threat, for instance, Helen Clark's 
unsuccessful 2001 attempt to bring in an Electoral Amendment Bill making it an 
offence to make untrue statements with the intent to influence votes. The Press 
Council has rarely been used by politicians, but there have been a few cases. 
Controversially, Helen Clark took TV3 to the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority (BSA) over John Campbell's 'Corngate' interview during the 2002 
campaign. The interview centred on revelations in a yet-to-be-released book 
describingthecover-upofinadvertentplantingandharvestingofGE-contaminated 
maize. Armed with a pre-launch copy of the book, Campbell interviewed Clark for 
a special programme to be played the following evening. Clark began confidently, 
but became angry when faced with detailed accusations about memos and reports. 
The next night the interview was plugged on3 News in coverage that emphasised 
political damage control and prime ministerial "fury". In the special, Clark 
appeared bad-tempered and arrogant. She accused TV3 of'ambush' interviewing. 
At the time media opinion was split. Jane Clifton (2002 p. Bn) called it 
"TV gold - and not half bad for democracy either", while others argued that 
Clark had been unfairly treated. It was a year before the BSA ruling. This did 
not uphold complaints the story was incorrect, or that TV3 had unethically 
ambushed Clark, but said the item lacked balance and was neither impartial nor 
objective (Campbell, 2003). The furore reduced votes for both Labour and the 
Greens. But, perhaps most tellingly, Clark's ambush accusation directed media 
attention away from the evidence in Hager's book. 
The high stakes surrounding television leaders' debates encourage political 
haggling for greater control over the rules. In an unusual move, however, United 
Future leader Peter Dunne and Progressive leader Jim Anderton took TV3 to 
court when excluded from the line-up of a planned debate in 2005. Because of 
tight timing, TV3 had decided to have just six minor party leaders on its show, 
basing the selection on its political poll. In his ruling, Justice Young questioned 
the reliability of the poll, called the decision arbitrary and said, if excluded, 
Dunne and Anderton could suffer "irretrievable electoral damage". He said it 
was a comparatively rare case "where a private company is performing a public 
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function with such important public consequences that it should be susceptible 
to judicial review" (TV3 to fight, 2005). Media leaders spoke out against the 
precedent at the time and arguably it had a chilling effect on debate host John 
Campbell, who was considerably more civil than in the 2002 debates. 
Political side steps 
MP Clare Curran, a former journalist and communications advisor, believes the 
media use their position as "a weapon". In the absence of "a vibrant, modern, 
properly funded public service media" she says politicians need to cultivate more 
direct relationships with constituents. For some time, politicians have sought to 
bypass traditional, sceptical news gatekeepers by turning to the growing 'soft' 
news outlets and the internet. 
During New Zealand's 1993 election campaign political leaders spent 
73 hours on Radio Pacific's talkback alone. While a desire to evade persistent 
journalistic questioning was important, McGregor (I996) says, ease of access 
and the feeling of authentic contact with the 'real' electorate were part of the 
attraction. Politicians also hope that softer media formats reach those who don't 
listen to National Radio, or watch the news and leaders' debates. We now take 
for granted MPs running their own radio talk shows, or having a weekly talk 
radio slot. O'Leary (2002) describes how the then Prime Minister Helen Clark set 
the news agenda for Monday by being horne to take journalists' calls on Sunday 
and appearing on Monday morning's Holmes radio show and TVNZ's Breakfast. 
Breakfast television generally offers a relaxed space where politicians show 
their human side. It suits Prime Minister John Key's style and he developed a 
chummy on-air relationship with larrikin Breakfast host Paul Henry. Despite 
weekly chats on Breakfast, Key turned down an but three requests to appear 
on Morning Report for five months in 20IO (Watkins, lOIO). Key fell into a trap, 
however, when towards the end of one jovial Breakfast interview, Henry asked if 
the then Governor-General Anand Satyanand was "even a New Zealander" and 
said, "Are you going to choose a New Zealander who looks and sounds like a 
New Zealander this timer' Apart from saying every Governor-General for many 
years had been a New Zealander, Key overlooked the comment and later jokingly 
referred to Henry as "Sir Paul ... the people's choice". Following immediate public 
outrage, the Prime Minister moved to damage control mode, saying he had been 
"taken aback" by Henry's comments and that the TV "shock jock" was "plain wrong". 
Other venues suit both the media's desire for personal detail and politicians' 
desire for the common touch. Helen Clark featured in women's magazines, 
while John Key wowed Kiwi males on TV3's Gone Fishin' in the 2008 campaign 
and returns to bait his hook at regular intervals. Key also benefited from two 
major New Zealand Herald profile features in 2008, portraying his progress from 
124 
SCOOPED: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF JOURNALISM IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
goal-driven state house child to National Party leader'9. Don Brash, however, 
was less lucky with revelations that he had subsisted on corned beef after 
separating from his first wife. Indeed allegations of an extra-marital affair played 
a prominent part in his downfall. There are drawbacks, too, in obligatory pre-
election television documentaries on leaders that frequently provide fodder 
for witty critique of everything from home decor and food choices to family 
members. Paul Holmes' 2005 Prime documentary, At Home with Clark and Brash, 
was particularly testing for Clark, always dogged by rumours about her sexuality. 
Holmes lingered in Clark's bedroom and at one stage asked her husband Peter 
Davis, "You found Helen sexy!''' and "Are you very physical with each other?" 
The internet, however, cuts out media gatekeepers completely and political 
parties are using websites, YouTube, Facebook and other social networks with 
increasing sophistication. In the 2008 American presidential campaign, Obama's 
capture of the youth vote through cyberspace, and his phenomenal fundraising 
through Facebook, made headlines. At home, John Key became the most popular 
politician on Facebook. Analyst Nicola Kean says while the internet made the 
election more vibrant, "it was unlikely to have had a substantial impact on the 
overall outcome" because it required significant effort from voters (2010, p. 
205). However, Labour's Clare Curran argues the internet is rapidly growing in 
importance and is "critical when you are in opposition and can't get cut-through 
with the main media". 
The internet has also transformed political reporting, as web pages of media 
sites now provide huge back-up detail to stories, the full interview or political 
speech, additional backgrounders and links to journalists' personal blogs. Jessica 
Mutch says that social networking can reduce the layers between journalists 
and politicians. "Using Twitter you often get politicians writing back on your 
Twitter page or you'll have a blog that they'll comment on." 
Conclusion: Election year 20 II 
At the time of writing, New Zealand is in another election year. For the first six 
weeks, politics and reporting were normal. John Key and National looked set to 
win with polls in the mid 50 percent range, while Labour, despite dismal ratings 
for leader Phil Goff, had maintained its 33 percent figure and could expect 
an upward shift. Media organisations and political parties were fine-tuning 
campaign plans. According to Mutch, some politicians, nervous about making 
mistakes, had begun to close their doors. "Everyone's being cautious, especially 
after a big scandaL" Meanwhile, political journalists were concentrating on a 
conflict within the Maori Party and its potential electoral outcomes. 
I9 Two of the three authors, Carroll du Chateau and Paula Oliver, later joined Key's staff after he 
won the ele~tion. 
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The destructive February 22 Christchurch earthquake, however, shifted 
political and media agendas at a crucial time. Both Mutch and Gower have 
been reporting from the Christchurch ruins on personal tragedies as well as 
politicians' visits. The government declared a state of national emergency, giving 
Civil Defence personnel freedom to carry out crucial tasks but also to publish 
statements and obtain information. At initial stages of disaster, the goals of 
media and authorities generally run parallel, but the truce ends as victims and 
media begin to question causes and responses. 
In terms of political process, legislation will be delayed and chunks of the 
pre-election budget will presumably be slashed to meet reconstruction costs. 
Ongoing earthquake issues are likely to dominate the election campaign and 
public judgement of the political response will shape the results. That judgement 
in turn will be influenced by political journalists running on campaign-fuelled 
adrenalin and sustained by the 'boys on the bus' media team spirit. Television 
journalists need one eye on the clock and the other on the ratings. Confident, 
sometimes aggressive on-air performances belie the day-to-day grind of trying 
to transform the photo opportunities and rituals of modern campaigning into 
incisive, scintillating, yet thoughtful, stories. 
While the electoral course may change, the relationship between politicians 
and journalists remains locked in stalemate. The key most likely lies in the 
opportunities provided by the internet for politicians to forge new relationships 
with their constituents. The internet, however, will not make the media irrelevant 
to the political process, but will force them to reconsider the way they go about 
their job. Meanwhile, it is worthwhile remembering that it is journalists' sense 
of mission that informs both their highest and lowest moments, and to leave the 
final word to TV3'S Patrick Gower: 
You've just got to keep reminding yourself that that's really what your job is. 
That's just to tell people what's really going on. Not what you think should 
be going on. Or what one side says is going on and what another side says 
is going on and try to find something somewhere in the middle. But if you 
have the experience and knowledge and the contacts to keep breaking 
stories and analysing them properly, it's very satisfying and it's what all 
journalists aspire to. 
Personal Interviews 
Clare Curran, January 19, 20n. By telephone. 
Patrick Gower, January 28,2011. By telephone. 
Anna Kominik, June 30, 2004. In person: Wellington. 
Jessica Mutch, January 26, 2011. By telephone. 
Alan Samson, January 14, 20n. By email. 
Hon. Lockwood Smith, January 27, 20rr. By telephone. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
PEOPLE LIKE US: THE CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 
OF NEW ZEALAND'S INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
Donald Matheson 
What do we learn from newspapers and from broadcast news bulletins about 
the rest of the world? Aotearoa New Zealand, as a small and peripheral country 
in the world, does not neglect news about the rest of the world. In fact, the two 
main television channels, TVr and TV3, have run promotions in recent years 
using dramatic images of their correspondents and news presenters bringing 
the news to us from the world's danger spots. But the pictures and the ways 
of making sense of those pictures that the news makes available to the public 
here are limited in scope. As this chapter details, Aotearoa New Zealand is 
taking part in the contemporary globalised world through what I describe as a 
highly skewed cultural geography. That is, rather than broadening the imagined 
worlds of the publics they convene, newspapers and television news bulletins 
appear to be focusing ever more heavily on what the Dutch journalist loris 
Luyendijk (2009) calls "people like us". The chapter sets out to detail this narrow 
scope, to explore some of its consequences and to suggest, in its concluding 
paragraphs, how journalism might begin to rethink some of its assumptions 
about international news. 
The overall picture is quite clear from looking at the headline figures of 
a content analysis on which this chapter is based (the study was done for the 
development education NGO, Global Focus, on the reporting of development 
issues in Aotearoa New Zealand20). Three quarters (74 percent) of all newspaper 
and television stories on international topics that the study recorded in late 
2009 were about the more developed and richer 'minority world', with nearly 
30 percent about the US alone. This is a very significant skew towards the 
world's richest countries. Only II percent of stories were, even on a generous 
interpretation, about issues related to development, and major global issues 
such as health, education and poverty were near invisible. When events or 
issues in countries of the 'majority world' (what are sometimes called the 
countries of the south or developing countries2I) were reported, it was often in 
W The team was Donald Matheson, Rebecca Harris and Alice Beban, with further help from 
Karin Brown. 
2I Terms to describe the very real economic and political divisions in the world are difficult, as 
they can easily reinforce dichotomies of a civilised 'West' and of some peoples being more 
'developed' than others largely because they are richer (see Hall, 1992). The term, 'the South', 
is difficult to use from an Aotearoa New Zealand perspective. Global Focus, the partner in the 
research project discussed here, prefers the terms 'majority' and 'minority' worlds as these call 
attention to rather than naturalise injustices. 
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terms of a quite narrow range of topics: political violence, terrorism or disaster. 
Television was narrower than newspapers here: two-fifths of TV items on the 
majority world fell into violence and disaster categories, leaving vast amounts 
of life in these places unrecorded. The range of topics for the minority world, 
by contrast, was much broader. The type of international news that Aotearoa 
New Zealand receives is also significant. Stories about individuals were more 
common than any other kind of news, and there the preference for the minority 
world was most clear - a quarter of all international stories were about people 
from minority world countries, with only one in 20 about people from majority 
world countries. 
Imagined geography and global justice 
This kind of skew isn't new and isn't distinctive to Aotearoa New Zealand 
news journalism. In Annabelle Sreberny's words (as cited in Philo, zoor), 
most journalism that originates from the minority world contains "continual 
coverage" of a few global centres and "intermittent images of the south in crisis". 
There are large-scale forces at work here, from the unequal global distribution 
of power under global capitalism, to the economic crisis that journalism across 
the minority world is facing, to a general retreat from public service journalism 
towards more consumer-oriented forms. It is, nevertheless, important to see 
how these forces come to bear on Aotearoa New Zealand so that they may be 
better tackled, and a case can also be made that the problems are particularly 
acute here. Given that Aotearoa New Zealand news organisations do produce 
a steady flow of international news reporting (Phelan and Owen [20IO] put the 
proportion of news with some transnational component as high as 38 percentll), 
the fact that they can regard the heavy skews in their coverage as forming an 
adequate or even a quality news picture points to a major problem. The chapter 
argues that some deep-seated cultural assumptions about the world are implicit 
in the reporting and need to be constantly challenged. ln particular, a news diet 
in which the US, Britain and Australia are made to matter much more than 
other places suggests that journalism practice is stuck in a colonial heritage and 
in an insular Anglo-Americanism. That is to say, this "imagined geography"(Said, 
1978) of the world, by which editors, producers, subeditors and others involved 
in the selection and production of international news operate, isn't just narrow. 
It leads New Zealand to participate in the world in ways that neglect (among 
other places) the South Pacific and Asia, and misrepresent important issues in 
global society and trade. 
2l Based on a sample of 1,740 newspaper, television and radio stories, Phelan and Owen's study 
coded 61.9 percent of stories as "national", 22.9 percent as "international", 12.6 percent as 
"New Zealand and the world" and 2.6 percent as "global". 
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Put into such a cultural political frame, the concerns about news media's 
representations of the world are about global justice. News, fundamentally, 
provides us as members of the public with horizons wider than those of our own 
experience. It has the potential to extend us. The news also reminds us where 
the boundaries of what concerns us as a community and as a nation lie. It has an 
ideological role in reinforcing dominant ideas of what matters. Its informative 
power, then, is also moral power to mark the extent of public life, signalling who 
and what we should care about. As Judith Butler writes: 
The public sphere is constituted in part by what can appear, and the 
regulation of the sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will 
count as reality, and what will not. It is also a way of establishing whose 
lives can be marked as lives, and whose deaths will count as deaths. Our 
capacity to feel and to apprehend hangs in the balance. But so, too, does the 
fate of the reality of certain lives and deaths as well as the ability to think 
critically and publicly (Butler, 2004, p. xx-ix). 
Couldry (2006, p. 86) uses this quotation as an epigraph to an argument that 
media organisations and their publics alike are party to 'global injustices' when 
they inhabit the narrowed versions of the world that this chapter is describing. 
This sense of international reporting as a matter of social justice runs 
through the academic literature on international news. News reports provide 
people with resources with which to think about cultural diversity. Hence, a 
largely homogenous diet of news centred on people 'like us' in which people 
'not like us' are rarely represented, and then mostly as problems, feeds racial 
prejudice (van Dijk, 1991). News provides cultural reference points, likely to 
reinforce colonial relationships and the unequal distribution of symbolic power 
if it consistently treats the likes of London, Paris and New York as the centre of 
global public life and the likes of Africa as an unstable periphery (Bauzon, 1992, 
p. 275). A constricted global flow of news narrows the space for people to reflect 
on their position in an increasingly interconnected world, including both their 
ability to gain some symbolic distance from their own lives and or think in new 
ways (Thompson, 2000, pp. 255-7) and their ability to participate in the political 
lives of nation states that are today highly interdependent (Sutcliffe et aI., 2009). 
A news system that allows elites in richer countries much greater access to the 
space of global debate denies most of the world's people the right to define 
themselves in their own terms. It takes away the right to communicate and to 
be recognised (Cottle, 2006, p. 182). So a skewed and constricted view of much 
of the world is only part of what is at stake in the international news distributed 
by Aotearoa New Zealand. At the centre of the concern of this chapter is the 
way the country's public space becomes complicit in the unequal distribution of 
symbolic and material power in the world. 
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Evidence of highly skewed coverage 
The case for a neo-colonial cultural geography in Aotearoa New Zealand 
international news is built on three findings from the studyZ3. These are: the 
enormous skew of coverage towards the US and UK; the relatively narrow range 
of topics in which the poorer, majority world is covered; and the rise of a very 
strong focus on news about individuals, often in human interest terms. The 
chapter will pause in places below to give some of the numbers behind these 
findings, but the main emphasis is on exploring the consequences. 
The very large amount of news about a handful of countries suggests that 
the term 'international news' is perhaps a bit of a misnomer. Three countries -
the US, the UK and Australia - are reported in Aotearoa New Zealand almost 
as if they are domestic news. Political disputes within Washington or the lives 
of British pop stars can be covered without them having to reach the high bar 
that all other international news must reach. Their relevance to the public, the 
knowledge needed to make sense of them and audience members' concern 
for these people can all be assumed by Aotearoa New Zealand journalists. The 
study shows this clearly: these three countries account for just under half of the 
international news in the study (USA at 23 percent, UK at II percent and Australia 
at 9 percent). Far behind these, at 3 percent of coverage each, come France and 
China. Most countries (I37 out of 250 countries or territories in the world24) fail 
to reach the bar at all to merit coverage over the IO weeks we studied, including 
quite large ones, e.g. Ethiopia (population 65 million) and quite close ones (the 
Cook Islands). As Table I on the country data gathered together by continent 
shows, South and Central America, the Middle East and Africa only made the 
news occasionally, while Asia and South Pacific fared better, and Europe and 
North America the best. 
"The data reported on here come from a sample of 2,378 items collected from three of the 
country's largest newspapers and three of its main television news bulletins over a IO-week 
period in 2009. Radio news was not studied, because Radio New Zealand in particular 
would require a broader form of content analysis than just news bulletins in order to study 
its coverage. In addition, only international stories in the sampled media were recorded, so 
that the proportions oflocal versus international coverage are not available. Three weeks 
of reporting was selected arbitrarily from each outlet across a ro-week period, from the 
last week of September 2009 to the first week of December 2009. In total, 1>999 newspaper 
articles were collected from the New Zealand Herald, Press and Herald on Sunday and 379 news 
items collected from One News, 3 News and Te Kaea (Maori Television Service). 
24 Based on the United Nations Statistics Division list of countries and areas. An alternative 
measure of the number of countries, the number of UN member states, was not used as it 
does not distinguish territories and disputed states (e.g. American Samoa, Hong Kong, the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory). 
131 
SCOOPED: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF JOURNALISM IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
' . 
. ' 
-
. , , 
" . ,"" -., . ";r •. 
. ' 
, MAIN COUNTRY Newspaper Television Total 
: 
" 
" , 
North America 457 23% 89 23% 546 23% 
USA 449 22% 87 23% 536 23% 
Europe 483 24% 73 I9% 556 23% 
UK 214 n% 45 I2% 259 n% 
France 61 3% 1 0% 62 3% 
South and Central America 61 3% 8 2% 69 3% 
Middle East 85 4% 6 2% 91 4% 
South Pacific (excl NZ) 256 13% 68 r8% 324 14% 
Australia I94 10% 27 7% 221 9% 
Pacific Islands 78 4% 4I II% II9 5% 
Asia 234 I2% 41 II% 275 I2% 
China 47 2% 10 3% 57 2% 
Africa 63 3% 7 2% 70 3% 
New Zealand 3II I6% 84 22% 395 I7% 
Total 1,999 100% 379 100% 2,378 100% 
About half the news items were about more than one country. Often this 
was a matter of relating other places either to Aotearoa New Zealand or to one 
of the other dominant ones, further reinforcing the emphasis on a neo-colonial 
axis to the reporting. This use of dominant societies as reference points for 
news was particularly marked in television news. The study counted the first 
and second countries in each news item and found Aotearoa New Zealand 
to be either the primary or secondary focus of 23 percent of the coverage of 
other places, and the US to be the primary or secondary focus of 30 percent. 
This is consistent with studies in other countries (see, for example, Putnis et 
al., 2000) and fits within a well-researched picture of a few global political and 
media centres (New York, London, Paris) sending news out to peripheries that 
send little news back in. Aotearoa New Zealand news clearly and uncritically 
works within these structures, and while it is not insular it certainly looks rather 
colonial {also see Phelan & Owen, 20W). 
There appeared to us to be three main and overlapping ways that other 
countries, those culturally distant from the dominant culture in Aotearoa 
New Zealand, could become news: in terms of the interests of the highly-
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reported countries; when very big news happens there; and as exotic places 
and people. Examples from the coverage of Asia will be used to briefly explore 
these. Overall, the coverage of the Asian continent was steady and respectable 
at 40 to 50 pieces a week across the 6 outlets. However, it quickly became 
apparent that much of this reporting was in a very few categories. Pakistan 
and Afghanistan were almost always newsworthy in relation to the geopolitical 
concerns of the US and its allies. Timor Leste was only covered as a recipient 
of development assistance from New Zealand. Firstly, then, much of the time 
Asia is newsworthy in relation to the interests of Aotearoa New Zealand and 
the most covered countries discussed above. Secondly, and in contrast, there 
are some occasions when a country such as the Philippines may be reported 
beyond its relevance to 'our' interests. The Philippines was reported on 27 
times over the study's 10 weeks in relation to two stories: typhoon damage and 
a flurry of stories about a large election massacre in Mindanao. Thus, 
when events or issues from these countries reach a very high bar of 
newsworthiness, they may be reported. Television, in particular, shows us 
these 'distant' places rarely, and then, when it does, most often in terms 
of the high newsworthiness categories of disaster, terrorism and political 
violence. Thirdly, some countrks, and India in particular, could make it 
into the news in short newspaper items of a particular kind. Among the 
39 reports on India, a third were quirky filler stories for the international page, 
such as: 'Lovers kill family with chapatis out of fear of honour killing' (sourced 
from the British Daily Telegraph). A sizeable proportion of international news, 
then, saw other places in terms of their otherness, either constructed as 
exotic or bizarre. They were newsworthy because of their extreme distance 
from an implicit 'us' and 'our' Anglo-American cultural norms. The picture 
of China, European countries, Japan and Canada is more diverse in terms of 
topics and begins to look like the coverage of the dominant countries, although 
on a much smaller scale. As a result, there was a 'long tail' to the newspaper coverage 
of the richer, minority world, that is, a few stories in each of a large number of 
news categories. Indeed, the only story about poverty in the sample related 
to France. 
Overall, there looks to be a redoubled distortion at work. The further away a 
country is from a few culturally 'near' countries, the less likely it is to be covered. 
At the same time, the further away it is, the more likely it will become news 
in relation to the political and cultural frameworks of those 'near' countries. 
As a result, the rest of the world is produced in the news as more or less 
already known in all but the latest details. There is little coverage that extends 
or contradicts existing dominant frameworks of knowledge of the world. As 
Thussu (2000, p. 329) argues, it appears that, "With scant space to cover news 
from developing countries, these are often stereotyped into shorthand media 
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cliches - Thailand is known for child prostitution, Columbia for cocaine, 
Ethiopia for famine." 
Analysing coverage by countries is only part of the story. By far the most 
common single topic we found in international news was coverage of the 
actions of individuals. This is part of a longer term shift noted in other studies 
and which contrasts strongly with a previous generation of studies in this 
country (e.g. Taira, 2003). Coverage of interstate political relations is 
reducing, while coverage of 'softer' news topics, including everyday life, 
crime, sex, celebrity and scandal, is rising. More than a third of stories in our 
study were about individuals, and on top of that the vast majority of items 
that we categorised as politics, health or crime stories were focused on the 
actions of individuals, rather than on social or political issues. So stories on 
scandals surrounding Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi accounted 
for nearly half the news about Italy. Nearly all the health stories (I3 percent 
of items) were stories involving individuals' medical issues, such as the 
separation of Bangladeshi conjoint twins by Australian surgeons. Stories 
that we categorised as 'cultural' because their news value lay in (purportedly) 
telling the reader or viewer something about the way of life or values in that 
country, were common and usually focused on individuals, such as: 'Girl Tasered 
with mum's consent' from the US or 'Wealthy Russian buys Hitler's car'. 
The implications of this shift to a more people-focused news have been 
debated widely, with some scholars seeing a dumbing down of the news as it 
drifts away from topics of high politics, and others a widening of news in ways 
that make it more relevant to news audiences' life worlds. There are certainly 
more 'ordinary people' in Aotearoa New Zealand's international news, while 
politicians and the famous are turned into celebrities through the focus on their 
personal character and private activities. However, the result of this shift in news 
values seems a long way from the 'cosmopolitan' journalism that sociologists of 
the globe describe as one of the virtues of an increasingly interconnected world. 
In our data, about half the news from the richer, minority world was about 
individuals. By contrast, only a third of the already restricted coverage of the 
majority world focused on individuals. Overall, news about individuals was five 
times more likely to be about people from the minority world. News consumers 
are much more likely to encounter individuals from those countries already 
constructed as like 'us', further reinforcing the cultural geography discussed 
above. In addition, a news diet of individualised and events-based reporting is 
likely to do little to help news audiences place the news in context in order to 
understand it in any depth. 
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A neo-colonial news system 
At the start of the chapter, I noted that international news adds prestige 
to the larger newspapers and broadcasters in Aotearoa New Zealand. That 
prestige, though, does not translate into a strong cosmopolitan outlook from 
those news outlets. That is, the news does not call us to participate in a global 
humanity or civil society, that is, into a space of ideas where the quality of life 
of people beyond this nation state would concern us and in which transnational 
collective identities would be formed. There is certainly a considerable amount 
of international news, particularly in larger newspapers. However, as detailed 
above, nearly half of that news is about a very small number of countries. If 
Aotearoa New Zealand is inserted into the global through its news, it is often 
as an extension of the US, the UK and, to an extent, Australia. These countries' 
internal politics, particularly those of the US, are reported almost like domestic 
political news. This is a dependent relationship that one might have expected 
to have diminished as New Zealand asserted itself as a sovereign state with 
an independent position in the world. It differs markedly from Australian 
international news, which Putnis et al (2000) found gave Asia proportionally 
twice as much coverage as in our study, and the UK and US correspondingly less. 
The South Pacific in particular appears grossly under-reported in Aotearoa New 
Zealand25• Excluding coverage of the 2009 Samoan tsunami (discussed below), 
only four percent of the coverage in the study focused on the region. There were 
no reports from the Solomon Islands, where New Zealand police workers are 
retraining the local police, and two stories on the Cook Islands. There were 
more stories about Fiji (a total of 13), but on a closer look, most were about 
New Zealand's diplomatic, business and sporting interests. 
This constricted world of reporting can be partly explained in practical 
terms. Aotearoa New Zealand journalism relies heavily on the US and the UK for 
its news. News organisations here have very few foreign correspondents and the 
vast majority of international news comes from the big international agencies 
(such as Reuters or AFP) and overseas news organisations (such as the NBC or 
British Times), whose reporting inevitably targets Anglo-American audiences 
and therefore sees the world in terms of their understandings and interests. This 
dependence is also, however, a matter of outlook and values. International page 
editors and news producers in Aotearoa New Zealand disproportionately choose 
stories about the US and the UK in selecting what international news they will 
reproduce. In fact, when those editors and producers, on rare occasions, send 
journalists overseas, we found that they overwhelmingly send them to the UK, 
US and Australia. 
2S As noted above, Radio New Zealand's reporting of the South Pacific was not included in this 
study, and its. inclusion would likely have softened this finding. 
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These patterns suggest that a set of news values is broadly shared across 
the Anglo-American tradition of journalism - in which Aotearoa New Zealand 
journalism takes part. Philo (2002, p. I74) has termed these values as neo-colonial, 
because they reproduce an understanding of the minority world as the centre of 
global life - the ones who do the action, the ones who are individualised, and the 
ones who make sense of the rest. Critical perspectives that see minority world 
states as part of problems elsewhere - as purchasers of the 'blood diamonds' 
that perpetuate civil wars, for example - almost never arose in our sample. We 
actively looked for evidence of the minority world being identified as in some 
way the source of problems, but found only one such story, used in two outlets, 
on the 25th anniversary of the Bhopal accident. Whether or not one would hold 
the minority world to blame for the gross imbalances of wealth, resource use 
and quality of life in the world, the news provides almost no space in which to 
have that debate. In the imagined geography of Aotearoa New Zealand news, 
problems in the majority world are almost always linked to natural causes, 
internal political problems or the actions of individuals. 
Alongside such cultural accounts, a key explanation for the international 
coverage is the treatment of nearly all news in contemporary news organisations 
as a commodity. That is, it is selected and produced with an eye to ratings and 
an editorial anxiety that people are fickle consumers with short attention spans. 
As Thussu (2000) argues in relation to British journalism, international news is 
particularly vulnerable when editors apply such consumer rather than public 
interest criteria. The choice of news by Aotearoa New Zealand news editors fits 
this picture. The selection of news rarely challenges audiences with news about 
places that the majority will not know well, and when it covers those places, it 
often does so from within pre-existing expectations. It emphasises individuals, 
crime and softer news topics. The coverage of crime is typical in this regard. 
Among the 299 crime stories were items on Peruvian bandits selling human 
fat for the beauty trade, pirates in the Persian Gulf, drugs gangs in Mexico, a 
British man who strangled his wife during a bad dream and celebrity crimes 
(a pretty female student from the US on sex-murder charges in Italy, a Rolling 
Stones guitarist, Australian sports stars). In the intense competition between 
the three main television companies, TVNZ, MediaWorks (TV3) and Sky (Sky 
and Prime News), national news is more likely to be a ratings winner. Regionally 
based newspapers, for their part, are likely to prioritise their local patches. 
International issues fit only weakly into the current news business model, and 
perhaps are reported without a strong sense of how the audience is served by 
hearing about them, how they might be made interesting to those audiences, or 
what Aotearoa New Zealand's place in the world is. 
The partial exception to this skewed picture was the reporting of an 
earthquake and tsunami in Samoa on and after 29 September 2009. The 
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reporting here was so significant that it affected the overall sample, with no 
items on the topic and a large number of television stories in particular (Samoa 
was the fourth-most reported country in the television sample, and all its 
coverage related to this event). Reporters were sent to Samoa from Aotearoa 
New Zealand - usually something only done when reporting on the UK, US and 
Australia - and a third of the instances when international news made the top 
of the bulletin were about the Samoan disaster and its aftermath. Unlike much 
of the reporting of the majority world, in these stories individuals were highly 
prominent (38 out of SI television reports focused on individuals) and appeared 
to work to link the reader or viewer emotionally to the scene. Rather than the 
decontextualised images of misery common in this genre of news (Tallon, 2008), 
reports such as the following were common: "David Tua is mourning the loss 
of his aunty, Terina Anakailo Adindale, who died in today's tsunami" (Te Kaea 
News, Maori TV, 30 September 2009). Individuals are named and connections of 
shared knowledge and value with them established. Television and newspapers 
told us that this was a disaster very close to home. 
Nonetheless, the relationship was more complex than one of just close 
neighbours. While a content analysis can only tell so much, the numbers suggest 
a frame of 'people like us' was still involved in reporting Samoa's tragedy. Half of 
the television reports on this event were about New Zealanders affected by the 
disaster or helping Samoans (although it should be noted that individuals such 
as David Tua were often difficult to code as either Samoan or New Zealander). 
Only a fifth of the television reports (II items) focused on Samoans helping 
themselves. In this, the data reflected wider Anglo-American practices that more 
often focus on people from the minority world helping those less fortunate. As 
Cottle and Nolan (2007, p. 871) note, "We are invited to see the world of disasters 
and human need through a mediated national prism that splinters the category 
of global humanity into 'us' and 'them', 'active saviours' and 'passive victims'." The 
photos and camera shots used reinforced this picture. Half of the people visually 
represented were New Zealanders going to help or in the act of helping. When 
we looked at all reporting on development-related topics (including disaster 
relief such as in Samoa), we found (contrary to expectations) that as many stories 
about the majority world focused on solutions as focused on problems. Yet more 
than two-thirds of these solutions stories were framed in terms of the minority 
. world helping in development. Samoa fitted neatly into this picture. Thus, while 
the Samoan tragedy was reported by Aotearoa New Zealand news media more 
broadly and deeply than any other international event or issue, it appeared 
still to slip towards quite conventional understandings that distinguish 'us' 
from 'them', and place 'us' in the role of solving 'their' problems. Outside of the 
tsunami coverage, Samoa was not reported on at all in our sample. 
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Final thoughts 
The picture here may look different at different times, as major international 
news ebbs and flows, and the critical focus therefore needs to be on the underlying 
trends. In that regard, perhaps what is most concerning is that the imagined 
geography discussed here might seem in any wayan adequate description of the 
world. It is likely that reporting which repeats what has been done in the past will 
appear objective and professional within the newsroom, as scholars of news have 
long observed (e.g. Tuchman, 1972). In addition, coverage that reinforces what is 
already known about other people - Cambodia, for example, is newsworthy in 
the sample for prosecutions relating to the 1970S genocide - may easily appear 
as commonsensically valid and adequate. On one level, we could argue that the 
paucity within public knowledge of other ways of representing the world allows 
these pictures of the world to persist. Yet the accelerating movements of people, 
goods, money and information around the world, including the large and 
vibrant Pacific and Asian communities in this country, suggest major Aotearoa 
New Zealand news organisations inhabit a worldview that is not responding to 
the changing world around them. In fact, our data suggest that this worldview 
may be becoming still more entrenched, as the news gives ever greater emphasis 
to stories of individuals, devoid of context, and to quirky stories designed to 
attract interest rather than prompt thinking. The stories about the Bangladeshi 
conjoined twins in an Australian hospital or the depredations of Somali pirates 
do nothing to disrupt a sense of 'their' deviance and the need for 'our' help to 
sort out problems. This is 'news you can use', or 'people stories', the journalism 
emphasised by marketing consultants brought into newsrooms on the grounds 
that audiences can connect with it (Edwards, 2010), yet which relies on people's 
existing frameworks of understanding to make pleasurable consumption. 
This kind of reporting can only, then, be interpreted as a retreat from 
critical, analytical journalism about the world around us into a set of ideological 
certainties which are clearly inadequate. In Butler's (2004) terms, this journalism 
fails on a moral level because it fails to adequately express a global humanity. 
Seen in this way as a moral and a cultural problem, its solution is not simply 
greater newsroom resources spent on international news, for as Phelan and 
Owen (2010) note - in a study whose empirical results were thematically 
consistent with the data presented here - nearly 40 percent of news items have 
some transnational dimension. 
Cultural change within the journalism community is a necessary part of any 
change, then, so as to place Aotearoa New Zealand journalism as a more active 
element of global civil society. 1 have three thoughts here. Firstly, such change 
would need to begin with a greater value on journalists in Aotearoa New Zealand 
who are more internationally oriented. On occasion, their efforts are recognised 
138 
SCOOPED: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF JOURNALISM IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
within the industry, as witnessed by industry awards given to Janet Mclntyre and 
Joanne Mitchell's interview with Fiji leader Frank Bainimarama on TVI, 'Discourse 
with a Dictator', or Press reporter Rebecca Todd's coverage of Bhutanese refugees 
in New Zealand. Yet these are few and far between (there is no dedicated 
category in the Canon Media Awards for international reporting). There is more 
evidence of news decision-makers devaluing the reporting of these individuals. 
The award-winning Asia correspondent for TVNZ, Charlotte Glennie, shifted 
to the Australian ABC after TVNZ closed down her bureau. Freelancer Jon 
Stephenson, who paid for his own trips to central Asia, found it difficult to find a 
publisher for his critical coverage of New Zealand troops in Afghanistan. 
Secondly, the dominant cultural group within journalism - largely white, 
male and Anglo-Saxon - needs to reflect upon its audience, for it is speaking to a 
population that is increasingly less like it. The proportion of people of Asian and 
Pacific ethnicities is predicted to grow to a quarter of New Zealanders by 2026 
(MSD, 2010), making any sense of an 'us' group that consumes international 
news difficult to imagine. Addressing international news to this diverse public 
is of course part of a wider problem for the country's dominant news media. 
Few commentators find anything to praise in the reporting of ethnic diversity 
at a domestic level, and indeed audiences for Maori and ethnic minority 
media are growing steadily as new outlets spring up to speak to a changing 
Aotearoa New Zealand (see Ross, 2on). There are rich opportunities for the 
larger news organisations to broaden their coverage through draWing in voices 
from these media and through taking on aspects of their news agendas. A 
reconceptualisation of the public by both journalists and their managers would 
not be easy, but a first step would be a recognition of how multicultural the 
category of 'us' has become. 
Thirdly, cultural change within journalism requires reflective practice, and 
in particular re-engaging both with ideals of what international journalism is for 
and ways to achieve those goals. The drift towards safe topics perhaps indicates 
a weak conviction about the role this reporting plays for its audiences among 
the gatekeepers of international news. In the Dutch context, Luyendijk (2009) 
argued that the only way to escape stereotypical news values is to find other 
ways of telling stories than the ostensibly objective, fact-based, event-based 
story. In particular, he argued for news forms which provide context to events 
and which give people space to tell their own stories. The key point here is not, 
however, which among the myriad of ways of reporting the world might be 
drawn into Aotearoa New Zealand news practice, but the need for journalism 
practitioners here to ask those questions. Only when the distorted worldview of 
the news makes journalists here feel sufficiently uncomfortable that they begin 
to question international news selection processes will the wider issues of how 
to report the world be able to be raised within the newsroom. 
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CHAPTER 8: 
FRAMING A TRAITOR IN FIVE KEY WORDS: 
NEW ZEALAND NEWSPAPERS, RUSSELL COUTTS 
AND THE AMERICA'S CUP 2003 
Slavko Gajevic 
Russell Coutts was at the helm of the Team New Zealand yacht during the first 
four races against Prada in the America's Cup 2000. But, in the fifth race, Coutts 
gave the helm to his understudy, Dean Barker, and Barker led the boat to the fifth 
Team New Zealand victory. Wellington's Evening Post newspaper praised Coutts' 
act as "a gesture not only of supreme confidence, but of supreme selflessness" 
(4 March 2000). In the Sunday Star-Times Coutts' willingness to give the helm 
of the yacht to another team member was described as "the most honourable 
thing" (Johnstone, 2000), with "its attitude, honesty, integrity and humility" 
(Taylor, 2000). After Team New Zealand won the America's Cup in March 2000, 
Russell Coutts was praised as a national hero by the New Zealand media. 
Just two months later the New Zealand media bluntly labelled Russell Coutts 
as a traitor to his own country, because he, along with his team colleague Brad 
Butterworth, signed a contract with Swiss yachting team Alinghi. The Sunday 
Star-Times' editorial assessed Coutts' decision under the headline "A Nation 
Betrayed" (21 May 2000). The editorial concluded that Coutts' and Butterworth's 
"departure to sail as mercenaries for a land-locked country" resulted in 
"the massive feeling of betrayal experienced this weekend by thousands of 
New Zealanders" (ibid.). The same negative reaction came from TV and radio 
talkback shows. In addition, ad hoc groups and celebrity-led campaigns (Teach 
The Traitors a Lesson', 'Loyal', 'Black Heart') were organised to target Coutts' 
lack of loyalty. 
Framing the story of the fallen hero 
The New Zealand media reports about Russell Coutts' role in the America's 
Cup 2003 could be taken as an exemplary case of how media can discursively 
construct individuals' loyalty to the nation as a compUlsory and commonsensical 
duty. The way New Zealand media constructed and converted Russell Coutts' 
identity from a heroic to a treacherous Kiwi, a defector from a sporting team 
transfigured into a traitor to his country, demonstrates the power of media 
discourse to construct an individual identity and social reality. This chapter 
discusses the discursive capacity of media to reaffirm a society's dominant values 
and to represent the nation as an ideal and transcendental collective identity. 
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The New Zealand sporting hero is framed as an exemplar of that ideal and 
a loyal leader - someone who should not challenge society's rules. This chapter 
illustrates that even the figure of the sporting hero whose status is firmly 
established within the New Zealand society can, through the discursive work 
of media, be radically redefined if the hero is perceived as departing from the 
expectations of the media-driven social rules. 
The power of media and journalism as a profession to discursively frame 
issues in the public domain is closely related to journalism practices and the 
wider social context. Consequently, media presentation of an issue in the public 
domain should be analysed not by discussing a particular frame as an isolated 
aspect of a news story, but as a continuous interaction between the language 
employed in the making of a particular news story and the wider social context. 
These two-way processes influence the news story's narratives and the way a 
story is framed and reported to the public. 
The intersection of journalism practice, a news story's language and the 
social context continuously reproduce existing and new meanings associated 
with a particular sOciety. Because of these continuous "in" and "out" 
relationships and exchanges between text and context, the framing of issues in 
the public domain is moulded by common sense ideological assumptions that 
come from the wider social context. In practice, the way a news story is narrated 
and reported will influence the wider social context, which, in turn, will reflect 
back on subsequent news stories. These continuous exchanges of influence 
highlight the importance of news narratives and framing in the standardisation 
of discursive constructions of social processes and events, and the roles of actors 
involved in these events. 
One of the main theoretical approaches used in this chapter is framing 
analysis. From the work of Goffman (1974) who defines frames in relation to the 
organisation of experience, many authors tried to "systematise the fragmented 
approaches to framing" (Scheufele, 1999, p. I03). D'Angelo (2002, p. 871) argues 
thai "there is not, nor should there be, a single paradigm of framing", This is in 
line with Van Gorp's (2007, p. 60) argument that framing is used in a variety of 
scientific disciplines because of "a strong belief in the research potential of the 
framing concept", 
Framing research can give us some important answers in relation to the 
crucial points of the communication dynamic between the communicator, the 
text, the receiver and the culture (Entman, 1993, p. 52), D'Angelo (2002, p. 873) 
takes these four points of the communication process as four conjectures that 
should be explored as "the hard core of framing research": first, the content of 
frames or themes; second, the way reality is presented to the public; third, the 
interaction between frames and an already framed body of knowledge; and 
fourth, the influence that frames have on the public and on political life. 
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In his seminal work on relating the concept of framing to news media 
analysis, Gitlin (1980, p. 6) defines frames as the organisation of discourse 
through "a persistent pattern of cognition, interpretation and presentation, 
of selection, emphasis and exclusion". Gitlin also emphasises a point that is 
frequently missed out in framing research: frames are closely tied to journalism 
practice. Frames help journalists 'to process large amount ofinformation quickly 
and routinely: to recognise it as information, to assign it to cognitive categories, 
and to package it for efficient relay to their audiences' (p. 7). Frames are used 
and produced by media and by journalists. But at the same time, as cognitive 
categories and social products, they are deeply rooted in a wider social context. 
By framing issues in the public domain, media acquire the power to 
potentially influence the public by commonsensical cultural categories borrowed 
from a wider social context (Bourdieu, 2Oo5a; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). One 
approach in communication and media studies views this capacity of frames as 
an intentionally organised influence targeting the public (Tankard, 2001). The 
framing of issues in the public domain is also seen in terms of the hegemonic 
influence that lives through the work of "primary definers" - elite members who 
"set the limit for all subsequent discussion by framing what the problem is" (Hall et 
al., 1980, p. 59). On the level of a particular news story, a frame is the "organising 
idea of storyline that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events" (Gamson 
& Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). 
But framing could be approached from a different perspective - as a product 
of journalism practices imbued with layers of meanings that are not deliberately 
organised. Relationships between a news story narrative and the public could 
be analysed as a relationship that Bourdieu (2005a, p. 73), while explaining 
habitus, describes as "the source of these series of moves which are objectively 
organised as strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic 
intention". Framing heavily depends on the employment of a commonsensical 
"feeling of obviousness" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 131) shared by journalists and the 
public. Hence the framing of a particular news story is a product of journalism 
practice, rather than the product of conscious propaganda work. The field 
where we can find and analyse traces and purposes of either deliberate or 
unintentional framing within a news story is news discourse - understood as 
the "language above the [level of the] sentence" (Stubbs, 1983, p. I) that gives 
coherence to a particular text. 
Critical discourse analysis sees discourse in a similar way. As Fairclough 
and Wodak (1997, p. 258) write, "Discourse is both socially constitutive as well 
as socially shaped." Critical discourse analysis can help us not only to identifY 
the "framing devices" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) used in a construction of 
a particular news story, but also to understand how "a particular (domain of) 
social practice" (Fairclough, 1995, p. 5) is constructed in a particular news story. 
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Therefore news discourse can be understood in terms of dialogical 
interactions between the social environment, the public (a newspaper's readers) 
and the writer (journalist). In this sense, framing is a description and an 
explanation of a particular event within a wider social context. "The description 
and explanation presented in a particular story can always be challenged. News 
discourse therefore become a major and a constant field of struggle" (Bourdieu, 
2005b), because "access to or control over public discourse and communication 
is an important 'symbolic' resource" for any social group that wants to influence 
the public or society (van Dijk ZOOI, p. 355). These processes of framing a nation 
and an individual's loyalty to the nation will be further discussed through a 
thematic analysis of New Zealand newspapers' articles covering Russell Coutts' 
role in the America's Cup 2003. 
Team New Zealand as a paradigm of the ideal nation 
The America's Cup is regarded as "an event that stands as the world's oldest" 
sporting competition (Becht, 2002, p. 10). The New Zealand yachting team 
Black Magic won the Cup in 1995 and defended it in 2000 under the name 
of Team New Zealand. Russell Coutts skippered the New Zealand yacht to 
victory in 1995 and again in 2000. As a country, New Zealand benefited greatly 
from the victories in the America's Cup. The 2000 America's Cup promoted 
New Zealand's image and contributed almost $NZ640 million dollars to the 
New Zealand economy (McDermott Fairgray & Ernst & Young, 2000). 
Russell Coutts' decision to leave Team New Zealand to sail for the opposite 
side was received by New Zealand newspapers as an act that could have a 
negative impact not only on Team New Zealand's possible victory in the 
America's Cup 2003, but on the whole country. The Waikato Times reported that 
Coutts' decision to leave Team New Zealand and sail for the opponent was seen 
as a betrayal because the America's Cup "has put this country in a position to 
pursue a whole range of commercial options that simply wouldn't materialise 
otherwise" (Laidlaw, 2003). 
Russell Coutts was not the only New Zealand yachtsman to sign for rival 
teams in the 2003 America's Cup. Brad Butterworth, Simon Daubney, Murray 
Jones, Warwick Fleury and Dean Phipps also left Team New Zealand together 
with Coutts to sign contracts with Alinghi. Becht (2003, p. 17) counted that 
apart from those who signed for Alinghi, there were also New Zealand sailors 
in other syndicates: one in BR Challenge, eleven in One World Challenge, 
nine in Oracle BMW Racing, three in Prada, and three in Victory Challenge. 
But all accusations of defection and betrayal were thrown at the singular figure 
of Coutts. 
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Without Coutts and the other sailors who signed for Alinghi and other 
syndicates, Team New Zealand was not able to defend the Cup a second time. 
In 2003 Alinghi beat Team New Zealand in every race, scoring a result of 5:0. 
To understand why Coutts' decision to sail for an overseas team provoked 
such a strong reaction, we need to consider the influence of sp()rt, especially 
",;. rugby, on New Zealand national identity. Belich (2001, p. 368) writes that there 
are "two spheres in which New Zealand has been a world superpower. One is 
the export of protein. The other is sport." Some authors even argue that "the 
New Zealand rugby nation predated, and in part facilitated, the emergence of 
the New Zealand nation itself" (Fougere 1989, p. III). It could be argued that the 
same tension between "collectivism and individualism [which] is at the heart of 
New Zealand's struggles over national identity formation" (MacLean 1998, p. 24) 
is the tension that is reinforced in the New Zealand newspapers' construction of 
Russell Coutts' identity during the America's Cup 2003. 
The relative importance of sport in New Zealand is worth putting in a 
comparative context. in the international Social Survey Program conducted in 
33 countries around the world during the time of the America's Cup 2003, New 
Zealand ranked second in its national pride in the country's achievement in 
sports (Smith, 2006). New Zealand newspapers' writing on Russell Coutts' role 
in the America's Cup 2003 sounded like an echo of 1851 when James Alexander 
Hamilton. one of the yacht America's owners, was warned by the editor of The 
New York Tribune: "Well, if you ... are beaten, you had better not return to your 
country" (Brooks, 1958, p. 17). 
My analysis of the Coutts' story focuses on 20-21 May 2000, the first and 
second day in the cycle of reporting about Coutts' decision to sail against Team 
New Zealand. Previous framing research confirms the importance of setting up 
frames in the initial reporting of a news story, because when "an image and set 
of terms is established ... [it] provides a basic model which can be deployed again 
and again as the organising theme in a cumulative shaping of social perception" 
(Trew 1979, p. 42; also Hall et al., 1980). Articles have been analysed from three 
New Zealand daily newspapers and one New Zealand Sunday newspaper: the 
New Zealand Herald (NZH), the Evening Post (EP), the Dominion, and the Sunday 
Star-Times (SST). The LexisNexis database has 16 articles related to this news 
story for these two dates. The number of articles covering this news is itself 
an indicator that the analysed newspapers saw this story as an event of great 
importance. However, while analysing how New Zealand newspapers reported 
Coutts' role in the America's Cup 2003 it is also necessary to underline that "the 
newspaper itself is not a self-contained institution, but a site at which the views 
of various combinations of social forces and practices are articulated" (Trew 
1979, p. 140). 
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Sport as national service 
(and the inverse theme of betrayal) 
The news that Russell Coutts signed a contract with the yachting team Alinghi 
was published by New Zealand newspapers on 20 May 2000. During the first 
and the second day of reporting the news, the analysed newspapers immediately 
introduced the main frames and narratives for Russell Coutts' story. New 
Zealand newspapers depicted the news as an act of treachery against the country 
and narrated it as the story of a fallen national hero. The following analysis will 
discuss how New Zealand newspapers developed frames and narratives for this 
news story. 
Narrative schema that people use in everyday life to make and share stories 
(Labov, 1972, 1972a) suggest some similarities to the news schema newspapers 
use to organise news reports. But there is a difference: in a newspaper report, 
first comes the top of the macrostructure: that is the headline, followed by the 
lead. "For the reader it means that in principle the beginning of the text always 
contains the most important information" (van Dijk, 1985, p. 14). The structure 
of the newspaper text also follows the rules of the particular journalistic 
genre and accordingly differs in news reports, editorials or feature articles. 
But despite the potentially different journalistic genres and organisations of a 
newspaper's articles on the lexical level, different kinds of newspaper articles 
can be summarised in terms of their global meaning or themes (van Dijk, 
1980). The discourse of a newspaper article is 'organised around a semantic 
"core'" (p. 41) or the article's central theme. Because news themes "represent 
how the text is understood, what is found important, and how relevancies are 
stored in memory" (van Dijk, 1985, p. 76), summarisation of the theme is not 
just a mechanical action of 'leaving out details', but also includes a process of 
generalisation (where different situations with the same action are generalised) 
and abstraction (where concepts replace the sequence of a sentence). These 
concepts are further communicated by narratives organised around specific 
semantic fields of key words. The key words employed in a newspaper article 
summarise the relationships between a wider socia-cultural context and the 
particular issue subjected to public judgement through employed frames and 
their meanings. Once established, these key words will serve as "a basic model 
which can be deployed again and again as the organising theme in a cumulative 
shaping of social perception" (Trew, 1979, p. 142). 
The analysis of the themes of the 16 articles published on 20-21 May 2000 
confirms that the articles' themes are actually variations of one theme - the 
theme of betrayal, which re-appears as the central and unifying theme in all 
16 articles. The theme of betrayal is articulated differently in the 16 articles, 
varying in their explicit or implicit expression of Coutts' apparent treachery. 
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Where Coutts' betrayal is stated explicitly, it is also followed by the employment 
of the key words 'traitor', 'betrayal', 'treachery' ("Coutts and Butterworth sold 
themselves for lots of cash and became traitors"; "Coutts betrayed New Zealand 
and New Zealanders"; "Two-faced Coutts sold out for money and betrayed 
New Zealand"). Where the articles switched to an implicit suggestion of 
Coutts' treachery, corresponding synonyms, phrases or idioms are employed: 
"Team New Zealand's ship is sinking because of the defection by Coutts and 
Butterworth, making people angry"; 'The crew is more loyal than Coutts and 
Butterworth; the crew will stay with the Team New Zealand". These themes 
are encapsulated in headlines such as 'Sail of the century becomes a sell-out' 
(Morrison, 2000, p. I), or 'A nation betrayed' (SST, 21 May 2000). The opening 
sentences in the articles' leading paragraphs also emphasise the key themes: 
"Traitor is a hard word, but if the sailing cap fits ... " (Morrison 2000, p. I); or 
"The massive feeling of betrayal experienced this weekend by thousands of New 
Zealanders should come as no surprise to Russell Coutts and Brad Butterworth" 
(SST, 21 May 2000). 
The articles' themes - as variations of the unifying theme of betrayal - are 
crucial for both journalists and readers. Journalists are able to quickly process 
the news story inside a firmly defined frame by their constant exposure to 
the same theme. For readers, a theme is important because the majority of 
readers "usually only remember the main tropes, that is the higher levels of the 
macrostructure [Le. headlines and leads] of a news report" (van Dijk 1988, p. 
14). In relation to framing, themes and news story schema playa crucial part 
in journalistic practice: a journalist must answer, among others, the 'sWs & H' 
questions, always focusing on the same central theme. These answers give a 
commonsensical power to frames by directly relating the news story's theme 
to the wider cultural and social environment. It is in the linguistic dimensions 
of a newspaper story and its narrative cues that the potentially open dialogical 
relationships "between the author and his characters" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 320), or 
between a newspaper and its readers, can turn into a closed monologue where 
both parties affirm the rightness of each other's views. 
It is important to underline that the main theme of a news story is not only 
signalled in the beginning of the news story (the headline and the lead) but 
re-appears later in the news story, at lower levels of the news schema. We also 
need to keep in mind that news text can be presented in different forms - it can 
be a straight news report, an editorial, an interview or a feature, and the lead 
part of a newspaper article is usually written in a different style. But, irrespective 
of the textual genre, the semantic macrostructure "makes explicit the overall 
themes of a text" (van Dijk, 1988, p. 13) and enhances the reader's ability to link 
a theme in a newspaper article to their existing knowledge of the world. Here 
journalism practice plays a crucial framing role by answering "What categories 
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of people count as a 'who', what kinds of things pass for facts or 'whats', what 
geography and sense of time is inscribed as 'where' and 'when', and what counts 
as an explanation of 'why' " (Schudson, 2003, p. 190). The answers are offered to 
the public not only in the semantics of the article's themes, but in the context 
of Coutts' story are further elaborated and developed through the different 
narratives that overlap each other. The narrative of betrayal was therefore 
continuously intertwined with, and amplified by, the narratives of mateship, 
loyalty, nation and money. 
From the very beginning of the reporting of the Russell Coutts story, New 
Zealand newspapers equated the identification of the sporting team - Team 
New Zealand - with the country of New Zealand. By doing so, the newspapers 
became advocates of the crucial New Zealand social values of 'mateship' and 
'loyalty'. The themes of the analysed articles emphasise that Coutts betrayed his 
teammates and friends and abandoned the principles of mateship, which is one 
of the most important enduring aspects of New Zealand tradition and culture 
(Fougere, I989). Sport as a social practice and New Zealand national identity 
are closely interconnected and their relationships reveal many "unspoken 
conventions of New Zealand male culture in the 20th and 21st century" (King, 
2003, p. 230-231). To be a mate means to satisfy expectations of loyalty and 
protection (Phillips, 1997, p. 27). These cultural patterns emerge in the identified 
themes and narratives of the analysed articles as reminders to Coutts and to 
the New Zealand public that mateship and loyalty to the country should not 
be abandoned for big overseas money. For the readers, these narrative and 
cultural patterns function as a form of "guided doing" (Coffman, 1974, p. 23) 
that will result in an expected reading that matches the reader's own social 
and cultural environment. 
The inclusive 'We' of New Zealand 
nationhood, and rebellious Kiwis 
A look at the lexical background of the r6 articles' themes reveals that the word 
choices employed in constructing Russell Coutts' role in the America's Cup 
2003 are closely related to a narrow set of semantic fields that clearly define 
the submissive position of individuals in relation to the supremacy of the New 
Zealand nation. The identified themes (and corresponding articles) are made 
coherent by the employment of specific lexical choices as semantic devices, 
including phrases, metaphors, allegories, synonyms, idioms, and so on - which 
support the dominance of the inclusive 'We' of New Zealand over its potentially 
rebellious individuals. The employed word choices constitute the lexical context 
of the articles' themes and cohere with a semantic environment saturated with 
meanings related to New Zealand nationhood and its members' responsibilities. 
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This lexical context provides the public with the necessary thematic links - or 
scripts (van Dijk, 1985) - that work as an orienteering guide to the world of the 
America's Cup 2003 and Russell Coutts' role within it. As a semantic background 
for the news frame of Russell Coutts' role in the America's Cup, the themes' 
lexical context is firmly organised around the semantic fields embodied in the 
five key words: 'traitor', 'Russell Coutts', 'New Zealand', 'money', 'America's Cup'. 
These five key words are consistently employed by the newspapers as the main 
semantic devices to narrate and frame the Russell Coutts' story, functioning 
as the borderlines of the normative perspective that loyal New Zealanders are 
expected to take on the story. In this analysis, the relationship between the lexical 
context and the key words of the 16 articles is comparable to the relationship 
between the whole vocabulary of a language and the core vocabulary that 
regulates that language (Stubbs, 2002). I use the following criteria to identify 
the core vocabulary of the sixteen analysed articles. First, the word - or the 
variations, phrases, metaphors or idioms associated with that word - from the 
lexical context must relate to and identify the article's theme. Second, the word 
from the lexical context must relate to and identify the direct reaction, or the 
consequence of the state or the action, revealed in the article's theme. 
For example, for the theme 'Coutts betrayed the nation', the word 'defection' 
and the idiom 'jumped ship' belong to the core vocabulary used to identify the 
article's theme. Likewise, the word 'anger', and the metaphor 'the same man 
broke a nation's heart' will be also included in the core vocabulary because they 
identify a direct reaction or a consequence of the action identified by the article's 
theme. The lexical choices employed by the 16 articles when organised together 
represent the lexical context of the articles' themes, and form the articles' and 
themes' core vocabulary (Table I). 
Further analysis of the articles' and themes' core vocabulary reveals the 
possibility of another summarisation into key words, routinely used and 
continuously and consistently repeated, as the main semantic devices in the r6 
articles. I define these words as key words because all words from the articles' or 
themes' core vocabulary are associated with these key words either as variations, 
synonyms and partial synonyms, or through phrases or idioms. Table 1 shows 
the key words in the left column and the core vocabulary in the right column. 
Table I also shows that the entire core vocabulary of the 16 articles and their 
themes is actually related to the semantic fields of only five key words: 'Russell 
Coutts', 'traitor', 'money', 'New Zealand' and 'America's Cup'. The richest core 
vocabulary is behind the key words 'traitor', 'money' and 'Russell Coutts', which 
also reveals the New Zealand newspapers' focus on framing Russell Coutts' role 
in the America's Cup 2003. The newspapers' extensive use and repetition of 
terms related to the semantic field of 'traitor' is a narrative strategy of "over-
lexicalisation" (Fowler, 1991) which reveals how New Zealand newspapers were 
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predisposed to ideologically frame Coutts' decision to sail for the rival team as 
an act against the country. 
Table 1 The key words and the core vocabulary of the 16 articles/themes 
KeyWords Core Vocabulary 
Russell Coutts Russell Coutts; hero; America's Cup hero; No I man in the 
2003 defence; played major role in New Zealand America's 
Cup success; admiral; team head; syndicate head; legend; 
mentor; Team New Zealand leader; Team New Zealand star; 
professional; helmsman of the yachts that won and defended 
the Cup; mentor; yachting star; teacher; leader; key man; key 
player; Coutts' arrogance; too important; Black Boat's biggest 
hero; one that everyone had faith in; Coutts' input has been 
huge; hero lured by zeros. 
Traitor Traitor; sell out; team members stunned and betrayed; the 
B-word; the sense of betrayal; jumped ship; most traitorous 
moves in New Zealand sporting history; New Zealanders will 
consider him a traitor; defection; walked out; ignored pleas; 
bailed out; turned his back on New Zealand; resignation; sail 
away; greed; decamp; broke nation's heart; the nation may not 
be so forgiving; mercenary; succumb to hard cash; cash against 
loyalty and national pride; commitment circumvented; shame; 
devastated; mockery; shock departure; Kiwis will be angry 
with Russell; stunned the nation; disappointment; bombshell; 
regrettable; sadness; staggered; disbelief; every man has his 
price; bitter taste; blow; ire of the nation; shambolic; left 
plugging holes; took money and ran; took the inside knowledge 
of Team New Zealand's secret of success and done a runner; 
untenable; nation lost limb; our arm chopped off; kick their 
arse; country reels; annoyed; upset; anxious; sever ties with 
the team; haemorrhage; worry; it's worse than widowhood; 
loss without the sympathy; departure would turn the Team to 
custard. 
Money Money; lots of cash; millions; lots of folding stuff; millions 
of the little blighters; zeros; multimillion dollars; billionaire; 
overseas offers; lucrative offers; offer too good to refuse; 
lucrative offers; big-buck offers; big money; big budgets; foreign 
chequebooks; greenback; Swiss franc; hard cash; poached; done 
well financially; tycoon; world's rich list; piggy banks; cash-rich; 
mega-rich magnate; big offer; awful lot of money. 
New Zealand New Zealand; Team New Zealand, New Zealanders; we; the 
country; the government; the team; the people; loyalty; the 
nation; national pride; our defence; children and parents; the 
public; us; countrymen; Kiwis; nationality; patriotism. 
America's Cup America's Cup; quest for that wonderful Auld Mug; the Cup; 
supreme prize; dog-eat-dog world of the America's Cup; the 
event; the campaign. 
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The newspapers at the beginning of the reporting of this story described 
Coutts and Butterworth's 'betrayal' or 'defection' as a double act, a dual or 
collective decision, but then quickly turned their attention to Coutts as the 
leader and therefore the person solely responsible for the 'betrayal'. This linguistic 
technique is persistent, repetitive and routine in the narrative structures of all 
the analysed articles. It constructs the crucial part of the narrative's frame that 
will guide readers' understanding and lead them to a conclusion that supports 
the paper's ideological stance towards apparent treachery. By the juxtaposition 
of words like 'defection' and 'New Zealand', or 'defection' and 'Russell Coutts', 
or 'betrayed' and 'the country', or 'heroes' and 'zeros', newspapers were helping 
readers to form an opinion based on a moral choice. 
The selection of the key words had already been done after the first two days 
of reporting this story. For example, the word 'resignation' and 'walkout' as a 
description of Russell Coutts' decision to leave Team New Zealand was used in 
articles published on 20 May 2000. The words 'resignation' and 'walkout' were 
later replaced in the newspapers by the word 'defection'. The words 'defection' and 
'defector' (a near synonym for apostate, deserter, recreant, renegade and traitor) 
were later used regularly by the newspapers. The words 'defection' and 'defector', 
which newspapers consistently repeated in their articles on 20 and 21 May 2000, 
were also repeated three years later in reports on the events of the America's Cup 
2003. But, apparently even the word 'defection' was not evaluative enough, and 
the newspapers introduced the key word 'traitor'. The core vocabulary and the 
lexical context of the r6 articles and their themes bear connotative meanings 
associated with the semantic fields of the five key words. These lexical choices, 
employed by the New Zealand newspapers in their articles on Russell Coutts' role 
in the America's Cup 2003, reveal the intention of the analysed newspaper not 
only to report the news story, but to "construct readers" (Fowler, I99I, p. 232) in 
line with the nationalist ideological position of the newspaper. 
'Russ versus Us': 
New Zealand media and a national imaginary 
The five key words - 'Russell Coutts', 'traitor', 'money', 'New Zealand' and 
'America's Cup' and their variations - were routinely and regularly repeated in 
all analysed newspapers articles covering this story because they have a powerful 
"cultural resonance and magnitude" and are "noticeable, understandable, 
memorable, and emotionally charged" (Entman, 2004, p. 6). After the first and 
the second day of reporting the story, these five key words will "command the 
field" (Hall et al., 1980, p. 58), supplying a definition of the problematic issue, 
identifying the cause of the problem, and providing moral judgement with 
a remedy for it (Entman, 2004). These key words at the same time answer 
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'the SWs + H' questions, supply the public with links to the wider cultural and 
social context, and make the frame for this news story. 
By employing the same set of key words, the New Zealand newspapers 
answered the demands of journalism practice to provide the public with 
unambiguous answers to 'the SWs + H questions: the key players in the story are 
identified together with their motives, their actions, and the consequences of the 
actions. Coutts, his act of betrayal, and money he got for that, the America's Cup 
and the campaign in 2003, and why New Zealand suffered as the result of the 
betrayal - it is all covered by the answers to the '5 Ws + H. By using only five key 
words and consistently repeating them - or their variations - the New Zealand 
newspapers kept the communication with their readers simple and efficient. All 
that the news story needs to offer to its readers is presented instantly and clearly 
- the actors, their reasons, their actions, and the consequences. 
Thus, New Zealand newspapers saw Russell Coutts' decision to leave 
Team New Zealand as an act that breached collective trust and the bonds of 
the national 'We' (Akestrom, 1991) and accordingly labelled it as a betrayal and 
as treachery. When what was once trusted becomes untrustworthy, the result 
is pain (Bateson, 2000). Hence, there were swift and consolidated reactions to 
a suddenly discovered treachery that apparently threatened not only the New 
Zealand sporting community, but New Zealand as a whole. Consequently, 
yesteryear's hero was immediately exposed and discursively constructed as a 
traitor who deserved to be excommunicated. Dynamic exchanges of meanings 
between a national environment, the newspaper and the public, are at the same 
time realised and solidified in a news discourse that reminds us of the symbolic 
power of media to construct a national imaginary. 
The key word 'traitor' saturates the social and historical processes that the 
journalistic language of New Zealand newspapers reveals in their reporting and 
framing of Russell Coutts' role in the America's Cup 2003. Meanings are elusive 
conveyors and, however the words in the news story are organised, they reveal 
more than was intended in the first instance. What seemed commonsensical 
at the beginning, when the initial news frame was constructed, was mediated 
and transformed into the compulsory demands of the national 'We'. An act 
of signing a professional sporting contract was elevated to a matter of crucial 
national importance and framed as an act of treachery to New Zealand. The 
label 'Russ versus Us' (Laidlaw 2003), as the slogan that epitomised New Zealand 
newspapers' framing of this story, was almost customarily repeated as a handy 
moral choice three years later when the America's Cup 2003 was about to finish. 
Hence, amplified by the coverage of New Zealand newspapers, the initial news 
story that Russell Coutts left Team New Zealand and signed a contract with 
the rival team Alinghi turned into a ritualistic public ceremony of castigating 
yesteryear's hero and reinforcing the patriotic feelings of the rest of the nation. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
A CRITICAL LOOK AT NEW ZEALAND 
JOURNALISM EDUCATION 
Ruth Thomas 
Over the last two decades, increasing numbers of New Zealand students have 
been trained as journalists through a university course. This shift has, as yet, 
made little difference to the traditional emphasis on teaching mainly vocational 
skills. Although worldwide there is a tension between the media and universities 
(Deuze, 2006; Deuze, 2005; Reese, I999), learning to become a journalist in this 
country remains strongly aligned with the requirements of the media industry. 
New Zealand has a two-tier system of journalism education in both polytechnic 
institutes and three universities (Hirst, 20ro). However, a broader approach is 
slowly developing in line with the emergence of journalism studies with their 
own political, economic and cultural conditions (Macdonald, 2006; Zebzer, 
2004; Skinner, Gasher & Compton, 200I). The publication of this book signals 
that such a change in New Zealand journalism education is ongoing. 
From 1972 to I993, I worked in New Zealand community newspapers as a 
journalist, editor and managing editor. I was also a council member of the New 
Zealand Journalists Training Organisation (NZ]TO), representing community 
newspapers. This organisation, funded in part by representatives of newspapers, 
television, radio and magazines, has the authority through the New Zealand 
Qualifications Authority to accredit journalism schools. It sets competence-
based assessments for the training of journalism students, known as unit 
standards. Journalism schools are expected to fulfil the strict requirements of 
these standards and their courses are regularly moderated to check they are 
doing so. 1 also sat on selection panels and advisory boards for the journalism 
schools, provided opportunities for work experience, and gave guest lectures to 
students. The system appeared to work well and 1 considered the media industry 
exerted a strong, beneficial influence on young journalism students. 
It was not until later when I became a journalism educator that 1 began to 
question some of the benefits of this industry control. Students are taught the 
skills of news writing using similar methods to those employed in the media 
industry. Students emulate journalists by writing news 'stories', using a format 
described as the "inverted pyramid" (van Dijk, 1986, 1988), because the most 
important information is placed at the top. In the newsroom, journalists' stories 
are 'subbed', or brought to publication standard through correction, revision 
and sometimes rewriting by a subeditor, so that they conform to the standards 
and style required by the newspaper. In the journalism school, tutors act as 
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subeditors and correct the grammar, change the lead sentence and the structure 
and generally make suggestions so the story follows the style required for a 
local newspaper. This system has many educational advantages, the primary 
one being that students receive individual attention from tutors, all of whom 
are former or practising journalists. Emphasis is also placed on emulating the 
media industry in as many other ways as possible. Computer rooms are seen 
as 'newsrooms', students write their stories not as class exercises but directed 
to various publication outlets. Work experience, widely known as cooperative 
education, has become increasingly popular since the 1970s, as a link between 
the 'real world' and tertiary study. A key factor is that students gain "authentic 
tools" and are enculturated into their workplace (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 
1989). This process is primarily suited to producing job-ready graduates for the 
news industry. 
Enlightened by my own career change from the industry to AUT, I started 
to think about how journalism education reproduced industry practices with 
little question or debate, and realised there must be other ways of teaching. 
And, 1 wondered, why were we not encouraging critical thinking, discussion and 
debate about the state of the media industry and where journalism education 
was headed in the future? Starting a Master of Education (M.Ed) degree in I998, 
specialising in adult and tertiary learning, opened my mind to a whole new 
world of different ideas. Courses in educational pedagogy, research methodology 
and critical theories of education confirmed some of my beliefs. Australian 
educationalist David Boud sees as an essential part of work experience the need 
for critical awareness through reflection (Baud & Feletti, 1991; Boud & Walker, 
1990, 1993; Boud, Walker, & Moreno, 1998). I was also influenced by some of 
the research on how people learn to write. The writing model of Flower and 
Hayes (1980) had shifted traditional writing instruction from the final product 
to the process. Instead of instruction concentrating on such things as grammar 
and the completed written item, the writing model studied the way that people 
arrived at the final product and their thought patterns (Flower, 1985; Flower & 
Hayes, 1980; Flower, Hayes, Carey, Schriver, & Stratman, 1986). Yet journalism 
education continued to be taught in the traditional fashion, concentrating not 
on the process but on the written product. 
For my M. Ed thesis (Thomas, 1999), I tested out what I had learnt. I 
researched two groups of students: one learning news writing using the process 
method, and the other the traditional one-to-one subbing method. Rather than 
having their work subedited on an individual basis, the process group learnt self-
regulation strategies, peer collaboration, and how to reflect on their experiences. 
My study found that news writing could be taught successfully by the process 
method, reducing the time it took for students to learn, and also teaching the 
students important strategies about evaluating and editing their own work. 
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Many journalism educators at the time, however, were not convinced. In 
retrospect, it was not surprising. They were simply reflecting the needs and 
views of the media industry, the dominant force in journalism education of 
the time. 
History of NZ journalism education 
In the early days in New Zealand, the only education for journalists was to learn 
in the newsroom following the English model, as the usefulness of training was 
not highly regarded and on-the-job and apprenticeship training was preferred. 
Some believed the newsroom was the only place to learn to be a journalist while 
others argued the ability to ask questions and write was a natural disposition 
or a 'gift', an attitude that remained prevalent until the 1970S (Herbert, 2000). 
The NZ Institute of Journalists provided the catalyst for the establishment 
of formal education in r891. The members, including both newspaper owners 
and reporters, wanting to increase the social and professional status of 
journalists, sought to control entry to journalism through the formal testing 
of qualifications (Elsaka, 2005). The university, where other professionals like 
doctors and lawyers were educated, was seen as the proper place for any formal 
education to take place. In 1908 the first formal discussion about a university 
course for journalists was held. A well known academic proposed a university 
course, culminating in a Diploma of Journalism at Canterbury University 
College (Newth, 1997). 
While both the owners and their staff seemed to support the proposal, 
the few students expressing an interest were not sufficient to start the course 
until 19II, and it was another 10 years before the first graduate emerged (Elsaka, 
2004). The preferred place for journalism training remained the newsroom. 
Mistrust for anything else was evidenced by the small number of graduates 
for many years to come. Dissatisfaction with the Canterbury course did not 
diminish but increased over the years, times of crisis occurring when it failed to 
meet the needs of industry. In 1956 it was closed and did not reopen for some 
years. This theme occurred frequently in the history of New Zealand journalism 
education, indicating both the power of the industry and the lack of a credible 
and workable alternative at the time. 
The failure of this university course and another in Auckland led to the 
establishment of 'trade schools' in the polytechnics, or technical institutes, with 
the first year-long programme being established in 1964 in Wellington, followed 
in the next decade by a six-month course at the Auckland Technical Institute. 
The New Zealand Journalists Training Board, later to become the NZJTO, 
was established in 1973. It was to become the most influential force in journalism 
education, representing various media companies, mainly newspapers, with a 
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token delegate from journalism educators and journalists. In the 1980s, the 
influence of employers was further strengthened by a government initiative. 
The government of the time reduced the available funds for vocational training, 
thus placing pressure on employers to provide more money. More than 70 high-
ranking industry representatives met and pledged support for a jOint training 
organisation. While this financial support has varied over the years, the input of 
at least some parts of the media has remained constant. 
Since 1989, New Zealand has seen major reform in its education, health 
and welfare systems, with greater emphasis on specifying outputs and 
increased accountability. As part of this reform movement, the New Zealand 
Qualifications Authority was established. It proposed a national qualifications 
framework incorporating all nationally recognised qualifications. These are 
the unit standards, derived from competence-based training popular in the 
1980s, which also dominated journalism education. Generally universities have 
rejected them as reductionist and a curb on academic freedom (Sligo, 2004). 
After a period of prolonged negotiation with the NZJTO, the three New Zealand 
university journalism programmes are now moderated in line with academic 
regulations, rather than unit standards. 
From the beginning of the NZJTO, unit standards set detailed criteria for 
the skills to be taught to journalism students. They are a list of the professional 
skills considered essential for a journalist and cover news gathering, news 
writing, shorthand, broadcasting and television skills, editing and design, and 
ethics, to name just some. Work experience is a core ingredient, reinforcing 
the importance of time, no matter how short, spent in various branches of 
the media. What is little mentioned is critical thought or media criticism. 
Journalism education is expected to reproduce the occupation, routines and 
constraints of journalism. Teaching to these standards has led to 'learning by 
doing'. Learning by doing - without critical thought or analysis - is just a step 
away from apprenticeship training. At this time, most journalism schools were 
at polytechnics and, often staffed by a single over-worked tutor, were grateful for 
the gUidance the standards and the NZ]TO provided. 
These standards were reviewed in 1997 and 2008 and although there have 
been some modifications, particularly in relation to new technologies and new 
methods of online reporting, the criteria remain essentially the same. Until 
2009, all New Zealand journalism schools were formerly accredited or approved 
by the NZJTO to teach the standards, except for the only university course 
at Canterbury University. It was never accredited because of the university's 
opposition, but in a little-publicised compromise was 'approved' by the NZJTO. 
A similar compromise was also reached in 2009 with the two newer universities, 
Massey and Auckland University of Technology, where they have agreed that 
the curriculum would be informed by unit standards but can deviate from 
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their strict requirements. Today in 2011, the university courses and the larger 
polytechs have gained much more independence and offer well-established 
degree programmes that complement their diploma courses. 
The study 
Because there has been little research in this field, I decided to do a study to 
consider the effects of this industry control on New Zealand journalism 
education. Seven years later, the result was my PhD thesis, The Making of a 
journalist: The New Zealand Way (Thomas, 2008). 
The first stage, the preliminary study in 2003, involved interviews with 
journalism educators at each of the then-II tertiary institutions, in order 
to gather basic data about New Zealand journalism education. In 2002, z6S 
students were receiving journalism training at II journalism schools. In 2010, 
although one school had closed, the numbers were almost the same with 263 
students studying journalism. Of these the majority, 55.5 percent, were at 
polytechnics (Fletcher, zoro). Students in this country studying journalism 
follow a worldwide trend and are predominantly female. In a 2005 study, it was 
found that in some New Zealand journalism schools the ratio was as high as 
seven females to one male (Densem, 2006). Hirst and Treadwell (zon) confirmed 
this trend in their 20ro national survey of journalism students. 
My preliminary study found that journalism education in New Zealand 
was similar in all journalism schools, based around 'learning by doing', where 
students learnt the inverted-pyramid format and practised their writing 
skills under the guidance of tutors experienced in the media industry. Work 
experience was seen as the prime component 
This pOinted the way to the fundamental features of New Zealand 
journalism education and allowed the more in-depth study to follow in 2003. 
The main study was designed to assess the achievements of zo journalism 
students from two representative journalism schools, one a university in 
a major city and the other a polytechnic in a regional centre during their 
year-long training programme. The students volunteered to take part and 
were considered representative of all the journalists studying for a National 
Diploma of Journalism. Six were male and 14 female. The average age of the 
students at the university course was 28 years old, while the average age of the 
students at the polytechnic was 22 years old. This factor also influenced other 
findings: the older students had had more education and had achieved higher 
educational qualifications. 
The study's aims were two-fold. First, it sought to investigate fully whether 
the focus remained on the inverted pyramid and learning by doing. Secondly, 
it aimed to test whether this was a successful method of preparing students to 
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write news stories to a professional standard and to gain a deeper and critical 
understanding of the news media or whether some reform was necessary. 
At three points during the year - the beginning, middle and the end - a close 
analysis of the students' news stories and reflections on their writing was carried 
out. The news stories they had written were collected and compared with the 
version a professional journalist produced, using discourse analysis methods 
(Bell, 1991; Fairclough, 1995; Ungerer, 2004). The students also tape-recorded 
their reflections, known as retrospective protocols, reflecting on the decisions 
they had taken in writing their news stories (Green, Igg8}. 
At the start of the year, the students' stories were often confused, showing 
little organisation or planning. Little time appeared to have been devoted to 
learning about the importance of news language and lexical choice or to think 
critically about their choice of words, so the students failed to make their 
words more vivid, thus further enhancing their news values. They also had a 
tendency to reproduce the actual words used by their sources without smoothly 
integrating the different discourses into the story. This contributed to many 
of the stories appearing promotional in tone and message. Another noticeable 
feature was the stories' lack of spark: there was little sense of excitement, or a 
desire or ability to inform, investigate or entertain. 
In the middle of the year, there were definite signs of improvement. Many 
students had been on work experience during this time and it was noticeable 
that some were now able to write more concise, structured news stories in 
the inverted pyramid model. The development of their lead sentences was a 
critical element. However, one disturbing feature of the mid-year stories was the 
tendency to write, in part or in whole, promotional stories, the students seeming 
unaware of the difference between this and journalism. This again can be linked 
to a heavy focus on learning by doing and work experience and the comparative 
lack of classroom discussion and debate about the role of the journalist. 
By the end of the year the students' stories were showing technical signs of 
regression. First, the stories were not written succinctly or clearly, emphasising 
the news. Secondly, the students had been inadequately trained to write outside 
of the jnverted -pyramid news story or to use the popular 'soft' lead sentences, 
so that their writing tended towards being promotional (Erjavec, 2004). Thirdly, 
because journalism schools have traditionally favoured subediting by tutors, this 
detracted from the students gaining understanding of their own writing and 
being able to self-monitor and evaluate it. Lastly, they failed to show the critical 
thinking skills and independence necessary for a professional journalist in order 
to research thoroughly, reflect deeply and write entertaining, informative and 
important news stories with flair. 
For me, the disappointing quality of the students' end-of-year stories 
raised questions about the nature of New Zealand journalism education. The 
160 
SCOOPED: THE POLlTICS AND POWER OF JOURNALlSM IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
widespread inability to write interesting, appealing news stories can be linked 
to the lack of instruction on the place and importance of news values. There is 
a tendency for journalists to assume that an understanding of newsworthiness 
'just happens'. This assumption seems to have influenced journalism education, 
with the result that the students were expected to gain this understanding 
without instruction, and for many this was not the case. The students had 
also learnt how to write in the inverted-pyramid format by doing it, but did 
not learn its purpose. Its purpose is not to write wholly objective and neutral 
stories which will be seen by readers as dull and boring. It is to enhance the 
newsworthiness through the lead sentence, the lexical choice and the structure, 
so that interesting, important and appealing news stories will persuade the 
reader to continue to buy the newspaper. 
The students particularly struggled when they ventured outside the 
inverted-pyramid format. The result was, among other things, a lack of focus in 
the stories, stemming from poor lead sentences, an inappropriate and ineffective 
use of informal language, and the continuing blurring of the boundaries between 
advertising and editorial. 
An element of journalism education that needs deeper thought revolves 
around the students' ability to gain a deeper understanding of their own writing; 
to be able to monitor and evaluate it for themselves (Pintrich, 1995). This has 
been largely ignored in New Zealand journalism education, which instead 
favours subediting by tutors, and may well have contributed to the students' 
apparent tendency to be largely unaware of the quality or lack of it in their own 
writing. Their end-of year stories, as well as their taped reflections, showed a 
reluctance to analyse and rework their own writing. 
Another component of my study centred on whether the students were 
gaining the critical thinking skills and independence necessary in a professional 
journalist so that they could research thoroughly, reflect deeply and write 
entertaining, informative and important news stories with flair. The students 
had not gained these skills, so that very few of their stories could be seen as 
important, informative or appealing. Even when confronted with a significant 
news story with considerable potential and public interest, their efforts were 
not strong. Their reflections confirmed these findings, suggesting some stress 
and disillusionment. The students could 'declare' what they knew about writing 
a news story but could not put it into practice. They blamed their failure to 
write high-quality news stories on the pressures of the course, the deadlines 
and high volumes of stories. The gaps in their journalism education were also 
revealed through what was not mentioned in their taped reflections: they 
failed to mention the importance of news values in making their stories more 
appealing. The major influence at first was the students' tutors, followed by 
work experience and the 'real world' of the media industry. The concentration 
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on job skills and gaining a job coupled with a lack of knowledge and discussion 
provided the students with an incomplete understanding of the pressures of the 
media industry they were being trained to enter (Thomas, 2008). 
Some recommendations for the future 
From the study's findings, I derived the following recommendations for the 
future of journalism education. Although not yet fully developed, what I hope 
they will achieve, if implemented, are new directions for journalism education. 
My first recommendation is that more debate and discussion is necessary 
to open the field of journalism education to new ideas. Until recently, there has 
been little debate in New Zealand about the appropriateness of a government-
mandated industrial training organisation being in the role of gatekeeper and 
standard-setter of academic programmes (Sligo, 2004), and even less about 
what journalism studies should encompass. The NZJTO has been the major 
influence on journalism education, particularly in the poly tech sector. While 
its influence has been beneficial in setting standards of what is taught in New 
Zealand journalism schools, it has tended to promote an outdated approach to 
journalism, with its concentration on the professional skills required. It has also 
actively discouraged criticism of the media industry. There is little commentary 
on what the increased concentration of media properties in the hands of fewer 
and fewer multinational corporations might mean for the future of journalism or 
on how the new media environment might affect the opportunities, challenges 
and expectations for aspiring reporters. 
Apart from occasional texts such as What's News: Reclaiming journalism 
in New Zealand (McGregor & Comrie, 2002), the textbooks used by all New 
Zealand students are also published by the NZJTO (Tucker 1992., 1999; Tully, 
2008), resulting in a lack of independent voices and new ideas. These textbooks 
corne from the same ideological perspective as the unit standards. They have not 
changed fundamentally in many years, even though they may now encompass 
new technologies and pay lip service to media criticism. What remains consistent 
is their emphasis on skills. 
It is timely that the role of the NZJTO is diminished because of its merger 
with the Communications and Media Industry Training Organisation. The 
merger appears to have led to a less rigid approach to overseeing journalism 
education, thus providing the opportunity for the stronger journalism schools, 
mainly in universities, to loosen their ties with the dominance of an industry-
driven training regime and for debate to commence about what are more 
academically appropriate ways of providing journalism education. 
Debate and discussion should go further than the role of the NZJTO. 
Although yearly conferences are held for New Zealand journalism educators, 
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there has been virtually no professional debate about journalism education 
until now. The November lOIO JEANZ conference in Timaru was notable for 
the number of well presented papers from emerging researchers, and this book 
is also timely as a signal of new ideas and fresh thought. It is only through 
discussion, debate, even argument, that new and different concepts will spawn 
different thinking and ideas about how best to prepare New Zealand students 
to become journalists and help to avert, or at least have an effect on, the crisis 
in the media. 
Secondly, the emphasis needs to move from a narrow view of learning-by-
doing to a different approach. 1 believe it is no longer appropriate for students to 
be expected to learn the skills of journalism in this educationally outdated way, 
through practising their writing, indi~idual subediting, and a strong emphasis 
on work placement in the mainstream media. While there is nothing wrong with 
these particular practices, they need to be tempered with a broader approach. 
Both tertiary institutions and the media industry have undergone major shifts 
in their environment which are also fuelling the need to consider alternative 
practices. The tertiary institutions have growing rolls and the universities an 
increasing emphasis on research-based funding. The sheer weight of student 
numbers produces pressures on staff that must result in a change to less 
intensive methods than one-to-one subediting. This kind of subediting done 
under pressure leads to a concentration on surface errors, spelling and style, 
which does not necessarily contribute to students' wider knowledge and, more 
importantly, reinforces the fact that the tutor is the controlling force. 
The shift to greater transnational ownership has also seen the media industry 
move to smaller newsrooms with greatly reduced staff so that it, too, has neither 
the time nor the resources to accommodate students for long periods. The 
smaller institutions struggle with traditional practices such as attachments and 
field trips because of the difficulties of placing a growing number of students 
in the media industry to gain this experience. At the same time, however, new 
opportunities are emerging in electronic media. 
Real world learning has an obvious place in learning to become a journalist, 
but it should not be seen as the only way. Complex skills, like writing, with 
large social components, are usually better taught by a combination of training 
procedures, involving whole tasks and components, individual training and 
training in social settings (Anderson, Reder, & Simon, I996). Journalism students 
need to learn an increasing number of skills; from writing for different genres to 
learning how to tell a story for television, radio or the internet in this new age of 
social media (Hirst & Treadwell, lOII). This would also open the way for more 
emphasis to be placed on the teaching of these skills. 
Knowledge of the workplace is very valuable, but it should not be seen 
as a means in itself of providing students with skills and attributes. It should 
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also be accompanied by meaningful discussion about the change the media is 
experiencing, which would encourage students to think critically about the 
industry. If the emphasis on the mainstream media - that is newspapers, radio 
and television - was removed, it would allow students to experience different 
workplaces and to understand there are many alternatives for employment for 
those who have ability and skill in writing. That this is beginning to happen is 
a positive sign; online multimedia publications give students an opportunity to 
move beyond the inverted pyramid and a print style of writing. 
Thirdly, self-regulated learning should be encouraged. The introduction of 
reflective practices and self-regulated learning is neither new nor untried. The 
movement became popular in the 1990S and has been adopted in a number of 
fields that train practitioners, including nursing and law. It has not yet gained 
full favour in journalism education, as it requires a change in attitude from some 
well-established beliefs focusing on professionalism. If such strategies as peer 
editing and the teaching of strategies for self-evaluation were introduced, it 
would relieve the pressure on present staff and also start to change the culture. 
This also gives students confidence to develop the ability to reflect on and self-
evaluate and monitor their own writing, and encourages them to become critical 
thinkers, using their intellectual abilities to consider the most suitable people to 
interview for a story, to ask the hard questions and to write in a considered 
and innovative way. Some courses are beginning to show elements of a change 
in this direction with the students now peer-editing each others' stories and 
collaborating on production projects. While this is still far from perfect, the 
students are now starting to think about what they write for themselves and to 
analyse and learn from each other. 
Fourthly, journalism educators require more than industry experience. 
Fresh thinking and new ideas would also be encouraged if the field was open 
to not only former practitioners who are strongly oriented to the industry they 
have come from. While knowledge of the media industry as a practitioner is 
very important for a journalism educator, it should not preclude younger people 
with fresh ideas and different experiences being employed to add to the pool of 
knowledge. The need for more education would also bring a broader outlook. As 
a former committee member of the NZJTO and a practitioner, 1 was convinced 
that the unit standards were an excellent concept. It was only through my own 
further education that my viewpoint has changed, as well as my understanding 
of journalism. A deeper knowledge of modern educational methods could 
similarly assist the whole field. 
Lastly, I recommend that critical communication theory should be 
integrated into journalism classes. In the Western world, debate has raged 
between those who favour a single focus on vocational training and those who 
would have journalism students follow a broader programme based on arts, 
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such as history, political science and sociology, and communication subjects. 
While the National Diploma in Journalism concentrates only on the skills of 
journalism, the universities have already found a broader compromise. The 
compromise has been the kind of programmes that exist elsewhere in the 
world and in New Zealand universities today, where arts and media criticism 
and the skills of journalism education are taught as separate subjects as a 
prelude to professional journalistic skills. The question that arises then is 
whether these university programmes bridge the gap between the academic 
and vocational elements and provide deeper insights into journalism as a 
professional practice. 
My study revealed that this compromise is not enough. Although students 
today may learn media theory as well as arts and communication subjects which 
encourage critical thinking in the earlier parts of their degree programmes, the 
concentration on the teaching of journalism skills in their final year leads to the 
fragmentation of knowledge. It also places the onus on the students themselves 
to bridge the gap between the theory they have learnt earlier and the practice 
they are now engaged in. And it results in the students favouring courses that 
will provide them with the required skills for their future careers, thus ignoring 
their earlier learning. To avoid this, some academics advocate the need to 
see journalism differently. Faculties of communication and journalism have 
been intertwined for many years, often unhappily. Nevertheless, the teaching 
of critical journalism studies would provide a better understanding of the 
journalism profession. 
In conclusion, I recommend that the teaching of journalism studies be 
widened so that journalism is taught as an institutional practice of representation, 
with its own historical, political, economic and cultural conditions. This 
would result in the journalism curriculum not only equipping students with a 
particular set of skills and broad social knowledge, but also showing the students 
how journalism contributes to the production and circulation of meaning in 
society. Critical communication studies are the key to this. 
It would be more beneficial if this teaching was done as part of journalism 
studies, not by separate staff at a separate time. While it would be unreasonable for 
young journalism students to be expected to become scholars of communication, 
it is not impossible for them to learn the basics of such disciplines as discourse 
analysis, semiotics, and the political economy of communication as an integral 
part of journalism education. This would allow the students to see how the craft 
of journalism is just one part of the communication system, and how and why 
different genres coexist in the media today - and their differences. Knowledge 
about the political economy of communication, for example, would provide the 
students with the tools to see why the spread of transnational corporations has 
occurred, and to study the results and debate the pressures. It would also allow 
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them to see, on a more practical level, why news values are not just a list of 
elements to be learnt by rote, but the key to appealing to the readership in order 
to fulfil the profit motive. Basic knowledge of semiotics would show the students 
why lexical choice is all-important, and how journalism plays a large role in the 
production and reproduction of particular ideas and conceptions of the world. 
For example, whether the word 'protester' or 'campaigner' is used; whether 'crowd' 
or 'mob' is chosen, can subtly influence the ideological slant of a story. While 
this may appear self-evident, the need to provide the students with the tools to 
understand the importance of words was obvious from my study. Knowledge 
of discourse analysis would also encourage the students to study their own 
writing more carefully and its effects, so that their peer editing would be seen 
as more valuable. 
These recommendations could be developed further. With more research 
and thought they could be developed into programmes that would benefit 
journalism students, so that they not only would gain the skills of journalism 
along with other writing skills, but would be provided with a broader knowledge 
and ability to think critically and in an independent fashion. 
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CHAPTER 10: 
JOURNALISM AND THE ELECTRONIC 
PUBLIC SPHERE 
Selwyn Manning 
To understand the transition of journalism and reportage from print-based 
media to online counterparts, I argue that it is necessary to evaluate the decline 
of mainstream media's ability to serve fourth estate ideals. As an example, 
the decline became evident from the mid-I990s when mainstream media-
watchers witnessed the Suburban Newspapers chain of publications expel its 
central investigative journalism team and abandon investigative-styled editorial 
strategies at branch publications. We witnessed how the Listener, once a proud 
organ that explored issues of national importance, transformed itself into a 
lightweight version leading with soft-cover stories preferentially targeting a 
narrow purchasing-elite audience. Until most recently, we observed how Metro, 
once a proud leader of investigative journalism and a publication to measure 
one's work against, turned into a glossy vehicle attractive only to a consumer-
based purchaser rather than pitch as a champion of fourth estate expression. 
It is pleasing to see that Metro, under the editorship of Simon Wilson, has 
returned it to a publication of investigative importance. 1 propose within this 
version of media history to demonstrate how the practice of fourth estate-
focused journalism declined in the latter period of the 1990S to a state where 
a few journalists explored a burgeoning web-based model as a vehicle for their 
investigative work. Moreover, I will focus this sketch on the greater Auckland 
region, and in particular, the southern sector of what now houses in large part, 
for electoral purposes, a voting mass that determines political outcomes for 
both central and local government. This argument also precedes the premise 
that through persuasive analysis-based journalism, sustained on the internet 
through convergence and identifiable syndication, measurement and reach, the 
fourth estate can reclaim a power of relevancy and overcome the tyranny of 
fragmented audiences and decreasing significance: a state that has arisen as a 
consequence of the digital age. 
In Auckland, New Zealand, by the mid-1990s, a trend was identified where 
two mainstream print media powers began a strategy to assume supremacy over 
the other. It was a turf war of sorts. It was geographical in its implementation 
and significant in that it was fought in Manukau City, South Auckland - a sector 
of the region that contained 350,000 people and where one sole media outlet 
operated initially without interference from any other competitive publisher 
or broadcaster. 
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Manukau City was then New Zealand's third largest population block 
and it was largely unrepresented, in a competitive sense, by the fourth estate. 
There was no radio station of note broadcasting to this population. The sole 
entities publishing to the region were two community giveaway tabloid-format 
newspapers - the Manukau Courier and Papakura Courier. The newspapers were 
produced from a single office in the heart of Manukau City, the former having a 
per-edition circulation of 101,000 and publishing four times a week. The latter 
had a per-edition circulation of 26,000 publishing weekly. The only broadsheet 
that was circulated in the sector in significant numbers was the New Zealand 
Herald. However, its reach into South Auckland was minimal compared to that of 
the Courier newspapers. The Herald published few articles on, or relevant to, South 
Auckland and there was a perception among the public that when the Herald 
did focus on South Auckland the editorial line was often negative, stereotypical, 
and framed for a more conservative and elitist audience than was in evidence, 
or of any relevance, in South Auckland. In contrast, the Manukau and Papakura 
Courier newspapers had a tradition of providing a community service, and had 
by the mid-1990s developed a fourth estate regional reportage style that was 
investigative in methodology and positioned to represent the region through 
advocacy founded on public interest ideals. This aspect of the Courier newspapers' 
editorial strategy was recognised not only by the public but also by members 
of the legislature, including central government's executive, and political elite. 
The media fourth estate in Counties Manukau 
The Courier newspapers had an editorial formula that was simple: when a 
political decision was struck and policy rolled out, the reporters examined 
the consequences of that decision on the people who lived within the South 
Auckland region. If the consequential impact was positive to the South 
Auckland experience, and progressively so, then it was reported as such. If the 
consequential impact of central and local government policy was negative to 
the people's interest and to the region's progress, then that too was reported 
and often presented in an advocacy style. The investigative methodology was 
simple: reporters would gather in evidence acquired from people at community 
level. Documents and decisions were investigated, collated, circumstances were 
evaluated from an observational perspective, and the chain of decision-making 
was pursued. Factually, the investigative trail began with the community, then 
the investigation pursued upward following a line of responsibility often all 
the way to Cabinet and to the minister who was ultimately accountable. The 
resulting reportage was demonstrable in its advocacy for the region. It identified 
the strengths, frailties, inadequacies of policy and sought to advance solutions 
both at community and central government policy level. This editorial strategy, 
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and the reportage that was produced, was at times evidently effective in the 
I990S in shaping progress and development for the benefit of the community. 
It held accountable those of the political apparatus, requiring them to express 
their logic, intention and vision, and ultimately to face responsibility, good or 
otherwise, for their reasoning and actions. The editorial style had its successes, 
causing government to abandon policy that was abhorrent to the population 
where it impacted upon it on several levels: personal, societal, and economic. 
After more than a decade of economic and social reform, many of South 
Auckland's people were wary of central government, and a thriving interaction 
had developed between the readership and the Courier newspapers. If a Cabinet 
minister was on the Courier newspapers' turf, the minister's staff always gave 
advance notice to the paper's reporters and prepared 'their minister' to be 
interviewed. The Courier's journalists and newsroom were often honoured at 
the nation's primary journalist media awards. 
By the end of the I990S that fourth estate and commercial advantage had 
been exhausted. The newspapers limped on, the advertising pages increased, 
leaving the publications with less than 15 percent of editorial space, while 
page numbers declined to I6, 12, or eight pages for some editions compared to 
standard 48-page editions in the mid-I990S. Arguably, editorial strategy was 
an underlying cause for this decline. Editorial decisions appeared to bend to 
pressure applied by general management to transform the newspapers primarily 
into a string of advertisement/advertorial publications. Reportage became 
secondary and reeked of tokenism, leading to a parody of the 'news' brand of a 
'news' paper. The journalists were dissuaded from writing investigative-styled 
reports, in favour of what can loosely be termed 'parish-pump' stories, the 
population lost confidence in its advocacy publication, and the political elite 
disengaged from interacting with the Courier newspapers. 
For journalists working at the newspapers, especially for those who entered 
into journalism with a desire to engage with the affairs of the nation and 
contribute through progressing professional public discourse, the publications 
ceased to be vehicles for probing and rewarding fourth estate-styled work. 
Why was this so? 
The dominant geographical hold of the Courier began to give way in a competitive 
turf war. It began rather benignly but soon became destabilising. The New 
Zealand Herald had identified an untapped potential market in south Auckland. 
If it was to successfully exploit this market it needed to erode the support the 
region's population offered to the Courier newspapers. The Couriers were owned 
by Suburban Newspapers Limited (a subsidiary of Independent Newspapers 
Limited, which was a subsidiary of Rupert Murdoch's News Limited). The 
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Herald's strategy was to market its flagship daily broadsheet in the thriving 
sectors of Manukau City, and develop a wedge strategy of sorts driving beneath 
the Courier newspapers in the lower socio-economic suburbs of Manukau City 
and Papakura District. It did so by producing small-circulation, small-page 
editions with masthead titles representing small towns. The Papakura Week and 
the Manurewa Week newspapers embarked on an editorial style that reported 
the small stories, the stories that were important to a few rather than to the 
whole. Stalwarts in the communities became satisfied that their efforts, often 
of a voluntary nature, were being recognised by the weeklies. Each weekly's 
sole journalist was able to gather in information that suggested where the 
Courier newspapers were weak, where there was dissatisfaction among the 
population. Eventually, the Herald strategy caused the Suburban Newspapers 
Limited management to panic, fearing it was losing touch with its core support. 
Journalists were encouraged to abandon regionally focused, fourth estate-styled 
reportage, in favour of short, snappy, community-based stories. 
The wedge strategy employed by the Herald, expressed through its 
community weeklies, was sustained only long enough to cause the Suburban 
Newspapers chain to become divided and irrelevant. Successive editors-in-chief 
became resistant to what many dedicated journalists felt were important issues 
that the readership deserved to be aware of. The effect was higher staff turnover, 
less specialisation, and a drift by some journalists to discover and pioneer more 
independent vehicles for their work. 
The arrival of the internet creates 
an opportunity for early adopters 
A few far-sighted people, including sports journalists Simon Kaye and Mike 
Marsden had, by I996, identified that technology had advanced enough to make 
it possible to sustain an independently owned sports newspaper pitching to the 
Counties Manukau region; this became the Sports Week(y. Desktop publishing 
software and affordable, yet relatively powerful, hardware made production 
possible where it had previously been the luxury of the wealthy and elite. By 
I998 1 too had left the Courier newspapers and began publishing a weekly 
investigative supplement, The Pulse of Manukau (later a monthly small format 
magazine), which was distributed with the Sports Week(y newspapers. The 
move was supported by significant sectors of the region including progressive 
businessmen such as Sir Peter Leitch, 'The Mad Butcher', and an assortment 
of local politicians. The printing costs were always a challenge, but the skills 
developed through the whole experience honed our independent thinking. We 
had sustained our operation but sought alternative vehicles within which to 
publish our work. A new technology era was looming. 
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From South Auckland, we became aware we were on the cusp of a brave 
new era. By mid-1999, the internet, while in a New Zealand news context was in 
its infancy, became a potentially cost-affordable way to disseminate our fourth 
estate work. What was unclear to us, at that time, was how we would make 
a living out of publishing via the internet. We observed how in Wellington a 
small group of independently minded journalists had created Newsroom.co.nz 
- a web-based news and information portal. Some of its team drove a brave 
editorial stance, critical analysis was at its core, and it appeared courageous in 
its delivery. Newsroom also published press releases in a form previously unseen 
by the wider public, in that it provided an open depository of information 
that emitted from executive government, parliament, and the legislature's 
respective parties. 
Both Simon Kaye and I were interested in testing our material but still could 
not fathom how to sustain publishing efforts via this new burgeoning media 
sector. Primarily, in 1998-99, the world wide web, as far as news was concerned, 
remained a text-based medium. Here in New Zealand, where bandwidth data 
rates were restricted to around 28kbps, and later in 1999, S6kbps, images were 
difficult to express to an audience on narrow bandwidth dial-up services. 
Certainly, audio and video were almost impossible to upload and difficult to 
download. Flash-based embedding technologies were unheard of. But we knew 
open-source technologies were advancing at pace. Our networking efforts with 
online communities and colleagues in the USA revealed broadband trends 
were advancing there: ADSL and DSL networking technologies were providing 
fast and stable access to the internet and we understood these technologies 
would soon be appearing in New Zealand, and once rolled out to consumers, 
an expanding domestic community of online commuters would provide a 
burgeoning industry with a scent of sustainability and possibly viability. 
From a fourth estate viewpoint, it was important to test how responsive the 
political elite would be to the medium. I began testing how my work would 
tit inside the new web-based medium and began pushing examples of South 
Auckland-based research and analysis to Newsroom.co.nz. Once published, the 
results and response were encouraging. In May 1999 a community impact socio-
economic piece that critically examined a co-relation between a blowout in the 
health care budget of South Auckland Health and Wellington's market rents for 
statehouse tenants policy caused an immediate, direct and knee-jerk response 
from the National government. In a press release titled 'The Doom Merchant 
Needs to Get Honest', the National Party pushed to the nation's journalists a line 
that attacked my journalism and credibility. 
The response was a breakthrough for us. It had drawn the attention of the 
legislature and Wellington's policy watchers to National's Achilles heel. The 
south Auckland housing/health investigation demonstrated how the market 
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rents policy was siphoning over $1 million per week from the Manukau economy 
and distributing it back into central government coffers and the party's natural 
stakeholders: private sector landlords. All the while, South Auckland Health 
executives had evidence that the housing policy had created overcrowding in 
households throughout South Auckland, and that the consequential rise in 
communicable illness and disease had caused its budget to blowout by millions 
of dollars. From a fiscally prudent viewpoint, the market rents housing policy 
had created a shambles. 
We were encouraged that an article of research journalism, published via the 
world wide web, had sparked debate and argument, justification, .and ultimately 
a discussion on an alternative policy shift. Here was evidence that the internet-
based news medium, like its alternative counterparts in the mainstream press 
and broadcasting sector, was able to pressure the political power elite into 
justifying its logic and policy, and ultimately expose (sometimes via their own 
pen) the illogic and failure that they had initially advanced in their stakeholders' 
interests. From a media practice viewpoint, that was the encouragement we 
were seeking. 
In the early to mid-1990s, my south Auckland colleagues and 1 had 
experience of how investigative reportage channelled through the print media 
had caused positive outcomes. My own work had caused regulatory change 
and a ministerial inquiry ('Farmed for Their Blood', the Listener, 1993, and 
'The Shame of Auckland Zoo', Metro, 1994) and campaigning journalism via 
the Courier newspapers had challenged, for example, the government's plan 
to institute exclusion criteria for core health services (Manukau Courier, 1995-
96) - criteria that excluded individuals from accessing public dialysis treatment 
where there was evidence of a history of mental illness, intellectual disability, 
anti-social behaviour, previous criminal offending, blindness and other clinical 
health conditions that would not benefit from dialysis. After publication, the 
Labour opposition raised the issue in parliament and former Prime Minister 
David Lange led debate on the topic. Within months, the National government 
backed off exclusion criteria and disbanded the Core Health Services Committee 
that was established to introduce widespread exclusion-based health care policy 
for renal treatment, cardiac care, and oncology services. 
Shifting ideologies in online news delivery 
By 1999, the challenge we faced was to transfer our research-based, investigative-
styled journalism from the print media across to a low-cost internet publishing 
medium, while maintaining a position of fourth estate power. 
After the May housing/health investigation, Newsroom.co.nz began to 
show signs of internal division. Its editor-in-chief Peter Fowler wished for the 
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pioneering news-site to maintain a more objective editorial strategy. Others, 
including Alastair Thompson, Ian Llewellen and Andrew McNaughton, argued 
that internet journalism, with its potential to unleash a power shift from the 
hands of corporate/politico elite, required a rethink in editorial strategy. In 
simple language, this group felt that replicating the subservience of the old 
tired efforts at purist objectivity would fail. Today we might describe this as the 
beginnings of citizen journalism in New Zealand. 
The ideological tensions could not be sustained. Newsroom.co.nz's 
members split after irreconcilable differences. Alastair Thompson and 
Andrew McNaughton entered into the internet service provider's premises 
and unplugged Newsroom.co.nz's server from the grid. Newsroom.co.nz 
remained omine for a time, while Peter Fowler, the remaining shareholder 
and director, moved to have a new platform built and plugged back into the 
grid. in the meantime, Thompson, Llewellen and McNaughton rebranded 
the operation as Scoop.co.nz. Llewellen contacted me a couple of weeks later, 
inviting me to become involved. The new Scoop project committed itself to a 
staunch, independent editorial policy that gave weight to humanitarian ideals, 
environmentalism and sustainable business practice. Where Newsroom.co.nz 
had been clearly a Wellington-based, geographically focused operation eyeing 
circulation strategies as per the old media, Scoop.co.nz was unleashed. In 
June/July 1999, a beta version of Scoop was tested live, plugged into the grid 
and attracted a small but interested audience. By August, we began preparing 
reports, features and profiles that framed the up-and-coming Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders' summit meetings that were to be held 
in Auckland in September 1999. Apart from taking an independent approach 
to reporting on police, intelligence and foreign security preparations for 
APEC, we became mindful of geopolitical tensions in Asia PaCific, including 
Indonesia and its relative isolation and occupation of East Timor. We began 
research on who was who among the leaders of the states (and economies) that 
would be represented at APEC in Auckland, and who their press secretaries 
and support staff were. Among the leaders were: Vladimir Putin (representing 
then-Russian president Boris Yeltsin), then-US President Clinton, secretary of 
state Madeleine Albright and Japan's Prime Minister Obuchi. It was, at that 
time, a 'who's who of who controlled the world'. We gained accreditation. 
From my Auckland home base, photographer Jason Dorday and 1 familiarised 
ourselves with the faces and the names. From Wellington, Alastair Thompson 
prepared to produce and publish our images and copy. 
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A turning point for Scoop.co.nz 
APEC was a test for Scoop. We were eager to make a splash, and we did. East 
Timor was a backdrop to the APEC I999 summit and East Timor was in chaos. 
Indonesian troops and militia had begun to slaughter East Timorese after the 
former Portuguese colony had voted by way of referendum to inch toward 
independence. At APEC, Scoop broke story after story, including reports based 
on an exclusive interview with Indonesia's foreign minister via cellphone to 
Jakarta where he announced Indonesia had in effect no control over the militia 
and would consider international help to stop the violence. After a tipoff, we 
phoned through to the office of Britain's then-foreign secretary Robin Cook. 
Cook's press secretary confirmed the foreign secretary, who was in transit 
from London to Auckland, had ordered the HMS Glasgow to sail toward Dill 
Harbour as a sign Britain was in support of other world leaders in Auckland, 
for an international force to intervene in East Timor. We reported how New 
Zealand's National government, in particular deputy Prime Minister Don 
McKinnon, had sought to keep East Timor off the APEC agenda, and how, in 
contrast, the USA's Madeleine Albright had rejected New Zealand's trade-only 
focus and paved the way for all leaders to discuss the crisis. We reported how 
Japan was influential in persuading Indonesia to welcome negotiations on how 
an international force would help establish peace in East Timor, and explained 
the subtleties of Japanese/south-east Asian-styled diplomacy. We broke news 
that New Zealand, Chile, and Singapore had begun negotiations for a trilateral 
trade pact - which Prime Minister Jenny Shipley insisted was simply not true 
while Chile's president confirmed the report (this negotiation was later proven 
to be correct and has in recent years expanded to include the United States 
and others and is now known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP]). And we 
observed how Yahoo news, in an age prior to Google being conceived, was listing 
Scoop news alongside the New York Times, the BBC, Washington Post, Reuters, 
AFP, and other world news brands. 
It was an interesting experience having groups of journalists gathering 
around the computer station at the APEC media centre, observing Scoop's 
operation, listening as we conducted cellphone interviews with significant 
leaders. They then witnessed how we would immediately write a breaking news 
report, and publish directly into the CGI publisher window and hit the live 
button. Personally, back then, it was fascinating for us to observe the internet 
traffic rising onsite as consumers and other journalists began a trend of digesting 
- then citing - he latest Scoop. We appreciated great support from White House 
correspondent Connie Lawn who commented at APEC: "I love you guys!" And 
I remember a sad figure, a former colleague from Suburban Newspapers, who 
came in to say hello and to see for himself how we were doing it. He told me 
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that prior to APEC, Suburban's editors had told their journalists not to attend 
nor report on APEC. 
Nearing the conclusion of APEC 1999, Scoop published an analysis of the 
event, with a report titled 'Goodbye APEC It's Been Nice Knowing You', where 
for our audience we analysed all relevant information that had emerged from 
the summit, reporting this in a magazine-feature style. 
In the years that followed, analysis (particularly foreign affairs analysis) 
became a mainstay of Scoop's editorial strategy. 
The next two years were led by Alastair Thompson, who almost single-
handedly ran Scoop from a shed at the back of his wife's home in Karori, 
Wellington. His salary was largely sustained by seed capital injected into the 
company by his parents, Stephen and Margaret. By September 200I, Alastair and 
his family were nearing exhaustion. Then 9in occurred, an event that injected 
new energy into Scoop and attracted me back into the fold. By early 2002, it was 
evident that Alastair had established a thriving hub of information. Almost all 
entities in New Zealand were submitting free content to Scoop, to be published 
onsite. Press releases, statements, speeches, columns, and analysis were flooding 
into Scoop. 
Politically, we had observed an interesting phenomenon. Scoop committed 
to keeping its database open to the public whereas Peter Fowler's Newsroom. 
cO.nz had closed off public access to its database. Only paying clients and 
subscribers could read Newsroom.co.nz's content. In contrast, Scoop embraced 
an interesting ideal, loosely referred to as the democratisation of the internet. 
Academics have long argued about whether this ideal is achievable or able to be 
sustained. In the first instance the ideal needs selective and accurate definition. 
Scoop defines it through its experience: internet democratisation occurred 
by Scoop committing to publishing press statements from parliament and 
executive government, it published the information unabridged, it allowed the 
public for the first time to see what only journalists once saw, and it built push 
services where clients were alerted as soon as their competitors' information 
was published online. We noted how the political discourse was accelerated by 
this action, where one party would issue a statement, an opposing party would 
be notified via Scoop, and it would then in turn decide whether to engage on 
the issue or strategically distance itself from it. Prior to the Scoop project's raw 
news strategy, an opposing party would only become privy to its competition's 
position through a journalist notifying it of a release, or by reading of it in the 
newspapers the following day. Its opportunity to respond retrospectively in the old 
media days was limited at best. Parliament, and the wider public sphere, became 
more informed as a consequence, and the pace of information dissemination 
became a significant factor founding informed debate. One of Scoop's roles is for 
its journalists to make sense of this information, to prioritise relevancy through 
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framing it through the company's founding editorial ideals of humanitarianism, 
environmentalism, and sustainable business practice. The ideals keep the team 
focused, consistent and non-aligned to political party bias, nor ideology. 
In 2002, Scoop's audience was dominated by international traffic, most 
significantly traffic that originated from the United States. Between 2000 and 
2002 Alastair had done a superb job of stimulating alternative media writers 
based Stateside to express their work through Scoop. Many of these writers had 
been blocked from having their work published by conservative elements inside 
the US. The writers included Jason Leopold, and others critical of the George 
W. Bush Administration's domestic and foreign policy. Alastair's contacts were 
excited by Scoop; they appeared to see it as representing a brave new world 
of international discourse. Some in New Zealand criticised Scoop for having 
attracted a horde of conspiracy theorists. 
Irrespective of how one categorises this work, a powerful new search engine 
had emerged on the global block: Google had become the single most important 
factor for a progressive online entity and Google's algorithms ranked Scoop high, 
driving thousands and thousands of viewers to the site per day. 
By late 2002, Scoop was attracting thousands of viewers by the hour. We 
were witnessing a phenomenal growth period both with international traffic 
but, from a sustainability Viewpoint, we were delighted that domestic traffic was 
climbing. What we needed was credibility and respectability. Under the Helen 
Clark Labour-led government we had noted how our investigative work was 
often ignored. The Clark government was not to be swayed into reacting to 
work published to the internet. It focused on the television networks, prominent 
radio stations and the two leading broadsheet newspapers, the Dominion Post 
and the New Zealand Herald. 
Through 2002, New Zealand domestic traffic however had climbed to 
a rate that was attractive to a burgeoning online advertising sector, and we 
had significant numbers of New Zealanders visiting Scoop for a daily dose of 
independent news. 
My idea in 2002 was to leave behind the handle 'alternative media' and adopt 
the 'independent' brand. It worked for Scoop, and we were ready to push our 
analysis of foreign affairs and geopolitics to a worldwide audience. We needed 
a strategy that would attract domestic traffic. Sustaining the project was reliant 
on that. We did this while ensuring Scoop remained free of the constraints of 
old media expressions on the Internet, where geographically aligned circulation 
strategies remained in evidence. Scoop's argument rested on the fact that New 
Zealand, while isolated geographically, had a unique tradition of independence, 
that we were a part of the global village, a community of nations, and whose 
moral arguments had empowered it to punch above its weight on the global 
stage. We believed our domestic audience would support us in numbers when 
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we embarked on analysing issues of international importance. And when we did 
so, we discovered support from all sectors of the nation and the globe. 
When the White House issued its National Security Strategy document 
in September 2002, we began a series critically examining the consequences 
of US neo-conservative policy on our region and the globe. Most significant 
was an article titled 'Is Germany About To Stiff Bush?' The report analysed the 
geopolitical positions that Germany was exploring in response to the USA's pre-
emptive defensive programme. Under Gerhard Schroeder's leadership, and that 
of his Green Party coalition partner and foreign minister Joschka Fischer, the 
report argued Germany would resist the United States' efforts to garner support 
for its pre-emptive defence goals from the North European states. About two 
weeks post-publication, Germany did exactly what we predicted, but not 
before our analysis had been published in the UN Observer and translated into 
French and German. We fonowed with another instalment titled 'Imperial PAX 
Americana' that analysed what affect an aggressive foreign policy would have on 
the US domestic economy: 
For PAX Americana, Europe's old money is essential. The consequences of 
the alternative will be dire and rock the very fabric of American society. 
The cost to the 'American People'for their leader's lust to settle a decade-old 
family feud with Iraq is only the beginning. Should Germany not come back 
to the war table, $200 billion will be siphoned from the US economy. Forget 
Medicaid, forget government-assisted housing programmes, forget moves 
toward education equality, and most destructively, a predicted end through 
necessity to United States industrial protection isms, removal of subsidies to 
heavy industry and commodity producers ... Without such protectionisms, 
United States industry and manufacturers will surely collapse. It cannot 
and will not compete with low CD?, high labour-force economies of ASEAN, 
APEC and indeed developing economies within sectors of the former USSR. 
Faced with economic collapse, the 'American People' would face failing 
consumerism, a domestic economy in free-fall, societal chaos, and the 
further collapse of the United States' pillar institutions. We are witnessing 
the rise and, while yet the means is to be determined, the probable future fall 
of Imperial PAX Americana. 
Reading the analysis today, it feels prophetic. This style of writing was used 
to build the credibility of Scoop. Once earned, we were able to command a 
space of significance and move to occupy a vacuum in New Zealand where few 
embarked on foreign affairs and geopolitical analysis. We fathomed that where 
executive government may pretend to be indifferent to our web-based reports, it 
could not escape well-reasoned and argued analysis that framed issues (such as 
the Ahmed Zaoui case and Blackbox, the Diebold voting hardware in the United 
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States). Scoop's reach was also assisted where its argument was picked up by 
other parliamentary press gallery reporters, and where radio stations here in 
New Zealand (9SbFM, RDU, KiwiFM, Radio Live) and a few abroad (BBe world 
service, BBC Five Live London, Radio Australia, SBS, Radio Adelaide), and, later, 
television current affairs programmes (Russell Brown's Media7 and Martyn 
'Bomber' Bradbury's Citizen-A) opened up guest bulletins for us to deliver our 
live analysis. That tradition, of taking reportage and analysis born from within 
the internet and exporting it to other media, has worked for Scoop.co.nz. Since 
2002, Scoop's New Zealand-based journalists have reported from all over the 
globe, including the Pacific, Asia, Africa, Europe and the United States, including 
the United Nations. 
A measure of Scoop's success rests in research-based analysis which makes 
it different from opinion-founded blogs. Within the vast moving depository 
of discourse and ideas that shape the public sphere is a realisation that this 
marvellous vessel is robust enough to house it all. There is a place for both 
analysis and blogs, but each must be defined separately. Analysis begins with 
a foundation of fact, which is considered against relevant issues; evaluation is 
applied, and a time line is often used as a guide. Good analysis can state what 
happened in the past, present, and predict the future given certain specific 
occurrences or conditions. A blog can too often be founded on opinion, or based 
on an argument of comparative viewpoints, and framed in a style designed to 
accentuate the writer's stance. Scoop is however a broad tent and the two modes 
of persuasion are now published on the site. 
Our work has challenged authority and the political elite in a style that 
was conceived, in my view, in the early 1990S in South Auckland, an editorial 
product that has caused much debate both from within parliament's chambers 
and out. Its database remains open to the public, a public service in kind; a body 
of open source information that assists policy analysts, academics, researchers 
and students to make sense of today's information and political environment. 
As detailed above, Scoop's definition ofinternet democratisation is bracketed 
by its on-publishing of unabridged press releases, statements and speeches 
from parliament and executive government. We have observed how Scoop's 
servers present these items in high volume to politicians, other journalists, 
non -government organisations, the judicialjsocialjbusinessjeconomicjpublic 
and private sector. By disseminating this information without fear or favour in 
a format that assures the user it remains untouched, containing the message 
from the horse's mouth, so to speak, it exposes the argument emanating from 
the political elite, lays bare the logic underlying any given position, and presents 
it naked and vulnerable to be tested freely by any user. The lesson learnt from 
this experience by politicians, journalists, the public and Scoop's members is 
that policy justifications, the intended progression/direction of an issue and the 
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morality of one's argument can be tested in both real time and in hindsight, and 
that time can no longer be a refuge for those who subscribe to poor rationale. 
This realisation arguably leads toward a more informed public sphere, where 
multi-axis online research and fact-based analysis is possible and effectively 
challenges elite discourse. Journalists and interested citizens can continue 
drawing upon a depository of what was said, discussed, and decided upon in 
the past into contemporary debates. It enables political memory, which has 
heightened relevance when historical data is presented within a timeline of 
developing political/public argument. This arguably and potentially empowers 
the public sphere through the application of fourth estate principles and 
research journalism. 
Today, Scoop Media Limited is structured in a way to prevent it from takeover 
by raider interests. The company believes its independent ethos is a sustainable 
and viable brand. It attracts approximately 620,000 individuals (including around 
355,000 New Zealand-based viewers) globally, per month, to its site. Many of the 
viewers return repeatedly for another dose of independent news. It has been an 
interesting project. The challenge from here is to ensure fourth estate-styled 
works actually serve societal progress, that they command attention irrespective 
of the vehicle used to disseminate the information. However, the reality is that 
if a print-based magazine attracted a monthly readership of over half a million 
viewers, it would command immediate attention from decision-makers. Scoop, 
like other web-based news entities, is too often ignored by the elite. A strategy 
to counter this is through convergence, in a networking sense, with other media 
entities. Scoop has collaborated and partnered with other media entities in 
two distinct ways; through commercially considered convergence models and 
editorial strategic convergence alliances. 
As an illustration of the former, Scoop has partnered with other popular 
web-based offerings, including those who may or may not run editorial 
strategies close to those employed by Scoop. These include Kiwiblog, a pro-
conservative National Party-aligned blog operated by a former National Party 
researcher, David Farrar; and Public Address, a blog that is owned and operated 
by prominent web-media personality Russell Brown and whose editorial line 
is more centrist/moderate in tone. The Scoop Media Cartel, a sales division, 
represents these entities and others by selling online advertising inventory. The 
returns aid the sites to be sustainable and independent. 
Scoop's editorial convergence strategies have seen it form alliances with 
Gordon Campbell, a former senior reporter with the Listener magazine and 
one of New Zealand's most prominent journalists analysing political policy; 
Business Desk, a news agency led by former Time writer Pattrick Smellie, and 
former Bloomberg journalist Jonathan Underhill. It has also teamed up with 
Parliament Today, led by Tom Frewen who has for decades provided leading 
181 
SCOOPED: THE POLITICS AND POWER OF JOURNALISM IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
analysis of parliamentary debate on radio; 3 News, New Zealand's second-
largest broadcaster of news and current affairs, where the relationship sees 3 
News' editorial product web cast via Scoop to its domestic and global audience; 
and Pacific Scoop, an arrangement where Scoop provides the technical web 
framework and an internet conduit to its audience so AUT University's Pacific 
Media Centre journalists can develop editorially and present their Asia Pacific 
news and current affairs work to a highly political and discerning audience. 
Scoop also has commercial arrangements with Factiva, a division of Dow 
Jones, and The Knowledge Basket, where Scoop data is packaged and onsold to 
offshore and tertiary research databases. 
Scoop also expresses its content to hundreds of outlets through internet-
established conduits with media delivered via rss, xml, podcast, video embed 
functionality and traditional lift agreements. The editorial product includes raw 
news and data, news reports, fact-based analysis, opinion-styled argument and 
blogs, all presented as a multimedia offering that includes text, graphic, video 
and audio formats. Much work has yet to be done in this area as syndication, 
cross-platform production models and content sharing are, to a degree, in their 
infancy. But now the question of how to sustain a web-based news site is largely 
answered, the challenge is to ensure the bias possessed by the new millennium's 
power elite in favour of old media models, an attitude that advances a prejudice 
against web-based and digital media, is exhausted. If numbers count, then 
convergence is the answer to ensure power - political or otherwise - is once 
again in the hands of the digital expression of the fourth estate. 
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CHAPTER 11: 
FROM FESTIVALS TO FAMINE 
AND THE SILENCE IN BETWEEN: A REFLECTION 
ON PACIFIC ISLANDERS, PRESENTATION AND 
RE-PRESENTATION IN MEDIA 
Richard Pamatatau 
"It is great to have you on board as our first Pacific Issues Correspondent but 
we thought you would be darker. " 
"Do you think you could bring some tapa cloth in to give the newsroom a 
nice Pacific feel?" 
"1 hope you don't mind me saying this but you don't really sound like a 
Pacific Islander." 
In my first week at Radio New Zealand - the country's state-funded public 
broadcaster - three colleagues uttered these statements as part of their ice-
breaker conversations with me, the 'new person'. 
There was neither malice in the comments, delivered with the frankness 
that is part of daily life in a bustling newsroom, nor cognisance of the possibility 
of embedded racism. 
What was also absent was any insight of how such statements might be 
an indicator of a broader tone or attitude within the organisation that might 
contribute or influence the approach used to report a population marked first 
by ethnicity, then by a host of negative evidential indicators and associated 
perceptions of difference. 
There was, however, a genuine belief that a piece of tapa - cloth made from 
the paper mulberry tree and covered with geometric designs - would serve a 
double purpose. There was also an insistence I bring some in. 
On one level the tapa would have been decorative, joining the raft of items 
and souvenirs that become part of a newsroom's history collected over time 
- like freebie promotional peak caps from a news conference, or tacky mugs 
emblazoned with a logo. On another, it would add atmosphere by giving, imbuing, 
decorating or possibly even colonising the newsroom with a 'Pacific feel'. 
Just what a 'Pacific feel' is eludes me. Events around the region such as 
continuing political unrest in Fiji, election issues in Vanuatu, tensions across 
Papua New Guinea and alarming rates of HIVjAIDS, rising rates of obesity-
related diabetes and the de-population of many Island nations are but a few. 
They point to a somewhat strained 'Pacific feel: 
Then there are the geographical, economic, ecological and climate-related 
issues that a tourism brochure ignores while promoting a relaxing 'Pacific' break. 
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Among those are climate flight, sinking atolls, and algae blooms that afflict 
lagoons and coral reefs, plus over-fishing of tuna stocks by companies that pay 
minuscule access fees compared to the profit reaped when the protein is sold far 
from the source. 
At the time I also thought it presumptuous to assume that I owned tapa, and 
that I would be happy to part with it. 
The value of tapa and how that value is measured and ascribed differs across 
the Pacific. Among those measures that mayor may not intersect are the type 
of tapa, its age, who made it, how long it has been in a family and who may have 
owned it before; not to mention the cost, design or, depending on the occasion, 
the size of the piece. 
And alongside this is the notion of reciprocity and exchange - tapa can also 
hold embedded values outside its materiality. What form of reciprocation would 
I receive from colleagues? 
From a pragmatic point of view, high-quality tapa is not always easy to corne 
by either, which adds to its value. Some Tongan manufacturers now make tapa 
of a lower quality that is aimed at tourists, for example. 
But there was also an implied compliance - somehow 1 would accept this 
invitation and see it as an opportunity for me to create some space for 'my 
identity' in the newsroom. In other words, I would give to facilitate reciprocation. 
Can you imagine say a new employee with Dutch ancestry being asked to 
bring in clogs, a model windmill or a wheel of Gouda to give the newsroom a 
nod to the Netherlands? 
I pointed out to the person making the persistent requests for tapa, that it 
would be impossible to capture the diversity of the 8.5 million plus people who 
live across the world's biggest ocean, through a piece of material culture that, 
of itself, has different forms depending on the country of origin and has, as one 
would expect, a host of different names. 
I also told him that 'Pacific Feel' was too much responsibility to assign to a 
piece of cloth. To this day 1 am not sure he understood what I was talking about, 
though maybe that had something to do with how I said it. 
Bundled with these comments was a broader conversation across parts of 
the organisation about 'our specialist correspondent' who would bring in stories 
about the vibrant and dynamic Pacific community. 
At the time Radio New Zealand was making a genuine attempt to rethink its 
content to make broadcasts more relevant to the country's changing population. 
(An article in the New Zealand Listener noted my appointment: "New 
Auckland staff already appointed include a Pacific Island correspondent ... ") 
It is a given in any news organisation that the role of a correspondent is to 
generate stories from a strong contact base rather than falling back on the use of 
material extracted from press releases. 
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In the case of Pacific issues there has also been an increasing stream of 
reports, many from government departments or universities, examining the 
state of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand and the region. 
Such reports are often a valid departure point for an investigation but a 
tension was emerging between what was expected as news content and what 1 
considered would be a more informed approach. 
Another expectation from senior colleagues was that the role would 
probe and find out why "Pacific economic, education and health performance" 
was so far behind the European population in New Zealand. Much of this 
was generated by these reports and is justified as a news topic, but what sat 
alongside this was an expectation of the approach that was expected to be 
followed. 
That was clearly the 'issues' part of the job description - which was fine, but 
not matched in the titles of the other correspondents at Radio New Zealand. 
The economics, health and education correspondents were just that - not a 
prefabricated issue in sight - though it would be easy to argue each is involved 
in the reporting and analysis of issues. 
But the Pacific, as well as the perpetually unfilled Maori and now defunct 
social issues correspondent roles, were tagged with the loaded term 'issues'. 
1 came to recognise this over time more as reporting and analysis based on 
deficits (and there are many of those) rather than investigating a population 
more broadly dominated the coverage. It was reporting-to-order to fit with 
mainstream New Zealand's commonsensical stereotypes about the Pacific. 
Those first day statements, however, have remained with me for other 
reasons, which will be discussed further in this essay. On one level, this chapter 
is an examination of what makes the news and who has a say or voice, but, on 
another level, it is more of a personal and critical reflection of what it is to be 
seen as a Pacific Islander working in a euro-centric news environment. (And not 
quite the 'Pacific Islander' pre-imagined by some of my new colleagues) 
That reflection is burnished by conversations with other Pacific Islanders 
working in the New Zealand media - especially my colleagues at Radio New 
Zealand who describe themselves as Pacific Islanders (at the expense of any 
other ethnicity they may lay claim to). 
Those colleagues were Sara Vuitalitu, Leilani Momoisea, Uto Vilisoni and 
the late Elma Maua. 
Conversations with Maori colleagues revealed similar stories and the 
challenges that are part of every day for those who are not Pakeha. 
Of particular interest is how the news, and then subsequent comment 
or analysis of it, is boxed to fit a set of values held in common by many news 
organisations. (And which bit of the 'Pacific feel' was wanted or could be applied 
outside of these boundaries?) 
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Similar parallels in this form of identity pigeonholing can be made with 
stories and content around other categories like ethnicity, Asian, disabled, gay 
and lesbian. 
Work by Risto Kunelius and Mika Renvell (2010) from the University of 
Tampere in Finland also confirmed what I observed and subsequently informs 
this essay. Their study on journalism and the validity of citizens' testimonies had 
resonance for me personally and for my role at Radio New Zealand. The research 
explored how the perspectives of 'ordinary people' could assume more than a 
subordinate role in media reporting and instead give authentic voice to their 
experiences. It is interesting to note their research took place in Finland and was 
based on the care of old people in the medical system. 
In particular, I refer to thinking around how to bring the 'ordinary person', 
or in this case the 'Pacific person', in as a component of news content without 
using stereotypes, and from there how that might relate to information used by 
the audience to form its opinions. 
Conflicting stereotypes 
It struck me in the first weeks of employment at Radio New Zealand that I was 
working hard to present Pacific Islanders in a 'good light', and as more than 
stereotypes, in a bid to better inform an audience who, for the most part, are 
white. I acknowledge also the burden and shame that is attached to persistently 
reporting deficits. 
A plethora of sometimes conflicting stereotypes are available. 
Painters like Charles McPhee, known in Auckland for his seductive portraits 
of Pacific women on black velvet, or the Frenchman Paul Gauguin who, while 
creating a large canon of work, especially exoticised Tahitian women and hinted 
at their apparent sexual availability. 
Likewise films like the 1934 Flame of the Pacific, which begins with a 
voiceover: "The sun that rises from the sea finds no spot in all the world more 
beautiful than the south sea islands. Beneath the feathery palms the Polynesian 
race dwell like children of nature ... no one need work in this garden of Eden ... " 
The opening vignette is a scene of bare-breasted women harvesting coconuts 
and working in plantations. Films that mirror this in another context are those 
depicting early European pioneers in the United States working hard while 
defending themselves against the Indians, or First Nation people, whose land 
they had grabbed. 
Another film is Siane's Wedding, created by well-known comedians in 
Auckland which promotes similar notions of otherness - but this time built 
around migration and people living in the central city, and the exotic female, 
while still beautiful, is now clothed. The Pacific male in this film has become 
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a contradictory mix of 'lazy fella', or the plaything of white women, wanting a 
taste of darkness but from a position of cultural and ethnic superiority. 
Then there are the everyday representations in the mainstream media of 
New Zealand - the hip-hop rappers, gangsters, criminals and down-and-outs 
or obese people suffering from heart disease or diabetes. Polynesian and Pacific 
have become de-facto descriptors for 'problems'. 
Personal genealogies 
By now though you might be wondering just what or who this Pacific Islander 
is and, for the purposes of this essay, a definition is mandatory. So too is an 
explanation of where I fit in. 
My definition is neither anthropological nor ethnographic in a formal or 
academic sense. 
It does, however, enable me to tick a box when answering questions for a 
census. 
For me it is simple - my mother was born on Mauke, one of the three islands 
that make up Nga Putoru in the southern Cook Islands, and that makes me by 
birth, heritage, DNA and history, a Pacific Islander. 
One branch of her family has lived there for hundreds, possibly thousands 
of years and many tupuna or ancestors are buried in a cemetery in the centre of 
the island. 
And, for the purposes of this essay, highlighting the Pacific aspect of my 
heritage at Radio New Zealand ignores my British, German and Australian-via-
New Zealand ancestry. At no stage ever has a colleague said: "You don't look or 
sound German." 
No one ever asked me for sauerkraut or bratwurst. Though one day when I 
gave a colleague a lift to the local coffee shop he expressed surprise at the car I 
was driving - a Mercedes E320. 
1 still smile at his statement: "Gosh, I had no idea you drove a Mercedes." 
My reply was both defensive and quite funny - though I don't know if it 
could be construed as 'Pacific humour' - whatever that might be. 
"Well, we don't all drive vans or cheap Japanese imports." 
It was also an attempt to belittle my colleague through a passive-aggressive 
sneer (he drove a cheap import) while standing up for Pacific Islanders who were 
not - to use a local term - 'fresh off the boat' or FOB. 
I also wanted to assert myself as someone outside the perceived norm. 
Something similar occurred when arranging an interview with the chief 
executive of a company exporting corned beef to the Pacific. Corned beef is a 
popular food in the region and its delicious mix of meat plus a high fat and salt 
content makes it both tasty and a toxic dietary timebomb. 
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Tinned beef is clearly a contributor to obesity-related health problems 
alongside the slew of cheap and fatty meat cuts exported to the Pacific from 
countries like New Zealand or the United States. What was interesting was the 
question prior to arranging the interview. 
"Are you an ethnic person?" I was asked. 
My reply was, "That depends on what you mean by ethnic, but 1 don't have 
a bone through my nose." 
Another incident in the same vein was when my cousin Bruce Pamatatau 
was the subject of a press release. 
1 walked into the newsroom and the chief reporter asked me if I was related 
to "a Bruce Pamatatau". 
My reply was "Yes 1 am and has he killed someone?" 
I said that because I do have a cousin who did kill someone and he ended up 
in prison - and because I thought the worst might have happened. 
My cousin Bruce is a barrister and solicitor, so I thought it better to make 
light of what could have been a potentially bad situation by starting with 
humour in case something untoward had happened. It had: Bruce was acting 
for a multinational that was suing a deceased person's family over unpaid bills. 
1 mentioned this to him at a family gathering some weeks later, which 
prompted him to tell me that, now that I was working at Radio New Zealand, 
the judges he was appearing before were starting to pronounce his name more 
accurately. 
Festivals, famine and silence 
But let's get back on track - festivals, famine and silence. 
From my experience, festivals and famine as news events are key markers of 
Pacific identity in a New Zealand news environment and between them there 
is silence. 
Festivals are a catch-all for the notion of a Pacific Islander as a decorative 
item in the news ecosystem - a singing, dancing, cultural being often at the 
periphery of the 'real' news agenda, or added for colour to ironically lighten a 
bulletin at the end of the run-down. A parallel might be drawn to the quirky 
story about the parrot that squawks in three languages or the aged cat that saved 
the life of a dog. 
That position in the bulletin will change if the news item is about a person 
playing sport and will change again if the Pacific Islander has committed a crime. 
If they do both, that is even better. 
Famine embodies all that is negative about the population from the 
aforementioned crime and disease rates to low educational achievement and 
poor jobs. And I've always wondered where the 'Pacific feel' fitted in with this. 
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Stories about obesity, diabetes, low home ownership rates, low wages and 
the like play into a news media that is often tut-tutting towards the Pacific 
population. 
And the silence is what lies between - either the absence of Pacific Islanders 
commenting on anything outside these areas or even the expectation they 
would hold a view and would desire to participate in the broader conversation. 
Good and regular examples of this are to be found across the New Zealand 
media when the government reveals its budget every year. Media commentary 
on the budget adheres to an established formula that sets the agenda for how 
the country will think about it. There is little diversion. 
Across the media, experts analyse the budget as it is read - either 
broadcasting or blogging and increasingly through new media outlets like 
Twitter or Facebook. Filleted into this might be comment from the opposition 
that responds in the house. 
Then representatives from finance, manufacturing and related business 
groups have a say, closely followed by the agricultural sector. Next come unions 
who assume a role of speaking for the so-called 'working class' and then perhaps 
art organisations or groups representing health interests. 
Generally the assessment of budget coverage fits a couple of camps -
perceived as either not enough for the group speaking, or too much for the 
sectors that are privileged over others. 
There is rarely, if ever, satisfaction with what is delivered. 
What I noticed while working at Radio New Zealand was that if opinion 
was sought on the budget from Pacific Islanders it had to relate to 'Pacific issues'. 
There was never space for a general view on the budget from a Pacific Islander, 
or for that matter, members of the Asian population. Seeking comment from 
(the assumed to be representative) Pacific Islanders, though, also becomes 
problematic very quickly. 
Those members of the Pacific population who are articulate in English 
and informed become framed as 'community leaders', but that leadership 
does not necessarily play on a broader field. They also become 'go-to' people 
for a slew of Pacific-related matters whether or not they have expertise in 
the area. 
What I learned too is that this approach to reporting supports the notion that 
'the community' is a group of people who know and associate with each other. 
In most cases the community is a construct designed by the news organisation 
to suit a news presentation purpose that is then re-presented by the selected 
spokesperson. The spokesperson is someone who speaks 'good English' but still 
'sounds like an Islander' with grass-roots authenticity. I recall offering talent 
for a panel discussion and being told that an academic (who happened to be a 
Pacific Islander) was not 'grass-roots enough'. 
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My Pacific ethnic affiliations are from the Cook Islands and Niue, but I 
don't know every person with a similar heritage and speaking for them is clearly 
problematic and - from a news reporting point of view - I was never taking a 
'Cook Islands' slant. 
Kunelius and Renvall (2010) further explore this matter by drawing attention 
to the relationship between the construction of ordinary people - in my case, 
the so-called 'Pacific community' - and the mainstream media. 
At times I found balancing the function of news reporting and providing fair 
coverage difficult. And 1 have become very aware of how powerful the views of 
mainstream news organisations are when approaching stories about minority 
groups, and how problematic this is when trying to present and represent fairly 
some of the views of a population group. 
The (ethnically invisible) IT journalist 
My views don't come out of the blue. 
Most of my 2o-years plus working life as a journalist has been in what is 
called mainstream news - mostly print and radio, but I also have online and 
television experience. 
For the bulk of that time I was a business journalist specialising in 
information technology on the Dominion, the morning metropolitan paper in 
Wellington. 
I worked my way from reporter to acting editor on the IT section which was 
known as New Zealand InfoTech Week(v and for a time I ran its Auckland bureau. 
New Zealand InfoTech Week.(v was the first newspaper section with an online site 
in the country which was launched by then-Prime Minister Jim Bolger. 
It was the job that saw the team covering everything from the technical 
side of computers, telecommunications and information management (chipsets 
and operating systems) to news conferences or interviews with luminaries 
like Microsoft boss Bill Gates, Oracle founder Larry Ellison, the head of IBM, 
politicians, venture capitalists, geeks, film directors and media and technology 
theorists. 
It was at a time when the graphical World Wide Web was emerging as an 
economic force, and the age when the browser Netscape gave way to Internet 
Explorer and the slew of systems since then. 
During that time my ethnicity was never mentioned by co-workers or those 
being interviewed, though I recall a news event where the journalists were 
surprised by a visiting representative from Apple who was not only high up in 
the company, but also a black American. 
The biggest news for the media at the briefing session was not the 
information on Apple's direction but the fact that the speaker was black. 
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The rest of my career was then spent on a range of other rounds as a 
freelancer, including a period as a contracted columnist at the New Zealand 
Herald, Auckland and again specialising in IT. 
At no time during the latter period was my ethnicity referred to as a feature 
of my journalistic skill set. 
Radio New Zealand newsroom culture 
But back to Radio New Zealand, a Crown entity established under the Radio 
New Zealand Act I99S. 
It offers three nationwide networks: Radio New Zealand National, Radio 
New Zealand Concert, and the AM network which also takes the proceedings of 
parliament to the country when the house is sitting. 
The organisation also has an international division - Radio New Zealand 
International (RNZI) - that offers a shortwave service to the Pacific Islands. It 
also provides 'Pacific News' for the broadcaster's flagship morning programme 
Morning Report and, from time to time, the evening programme Checkpoint. 
RNZI is funded by the Ministry of Culture and Heritage and provides what is 
recognised as an invaluable service to the region. 
Within the country, Radio New Zealand News has a reputation for fairness 
and accuracy. That reputation is based on processes for news gathering and 
reportage which are honed by people who value attention to detail following a 
style book developed over the years - plus the belief that those employed in the 
news team are the best on offer. 
This gives Radio New Zealand authority in the country's news eco-system 
making it a very powerful vehicle for agenda-setting. 
The flagship news programmes mentioned earlier, Morning Report and 
Checkpoint, which go out live between 6-9am and 5-7pm, are touted by the 
organisation as the shows for news-makers and decision-makers. 
On any given day news-makers and decision-makers, selected from an 
established group of contacts, effectively are 'the news'. For example any 
discussion on tax is likely to have comment from the PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
chairman John Shewan fonowed by business interest groups and then welfare 
agencies, while bank economists are regular commentators on the state of the 
economy ahead of say university academics. Nowhere in this arena is there 
space for Pacific comment on such matters, unless say a 'Pacific tax' was to be 
introduced. 
But should the tax debate shift to a rise in GST - the goods and services 
tax - a Pacific comment might then be expected around how such a hike might 
affect living standards for low-income families. 
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Depending on who is critiquing the content, and who is being talked to in the 
political sense, a further dialogue might open up: one that usually describes Radio 
New Zealand as either left-leaning or not critical enough of right-wing agendas. 
Those assertions, however, about Radio New Zealand's reporting of political 
matters are unlikely to be supported, as any audit of that content would, I 
argue, reveal an even airing of views from many sides of the political spectrum. 
Reporting of Pacific stories is another matter - something I learned during my 
employment at RNZ. But analysing the output is difficult. 
Like the comments from colleagues on my first day, nothing is rooted in 
a malicious attempt to keep Pacific stories in a particular place. It is more that 
those making decisions are deeply ignorant about these things and resist their 
values or assumptions being questioned. It was also about rank, and what and 
who was important in the eyes of the Radio New Zealand decision-makers. 
A consequence of that means that Radio New Zealand becomes a vehicle 
that drives a particular mindset when it comes to how the Pacific population is 
perceived by the audience of citizens, policy-makers and politicians, because its 
stories unconsciously fit a particular 'problem' frame. 
Ironically the population I reported on is not a big consumer of the Radio 
New Zealand product. 
People 'from the community' would repeatedly ask me about the station, 
its radio frequency and whether or not it offered free community notices about 
births, deaths, marriage and community festivals - a feature of community-
oriented stations, many with Pacific-language programming. 
Another feature of working in this field were the attempts by the news 
subjects to locate me ethnically and genealogically. Frequent questions were 
about my family and who I was related to. 
Everyday news framing 
But back to news framing and its manifestation on a daily basis. 
I first noticed this ranking of news and obviously people when Jasmine 
Underhill, the deputy mayor of Porirua, died some two weeks after I started 
work. With a large population of Pacific Islanders, many living in state-provided 
houses, Porirua's mayor has always been European. 
Mrs Underhill was the first Pacific Island woman in New Zealand to be 
elected into a senior role in local government and held her position for I9 years. 
I thought her death was an opportunity to discuss a woman who had been 
a trailblazer in her community. Mrs Underhill had mentored other Pacific 
women: one who became the first Pacific Island female elected to parliament 
- Luamanuvao Winnie Laban - and showed others there was a role for them 
in public life. 
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Moreover, there is news value in the death of a prominent person and there 
would have been a lot of things to talk about in an obituary piece. Among them, 
the work she undertook with other women of her generation to establish a 
polytechnic, health care providers and community facilities in Porirua. 
That she was my aunt was not the reason 1 wanted to talk about her life. 
The editor of Checkpoint declined the offer and subsequently sent me an 
email outlining her reasons. 
She said obituary pieces were only done about prominent people: politicians, 
judges, writers and artists were cited as examples. 
Naturally, I was disturbed by the rejection of the offer for content that 
was, in my opinion, news about a prominent person, albeit one who was not a 
headline grabber in the European world. 
I discussed this email with Victoria University's Dr Teresia Teaiwa, a Senior 
Lecturer in Pacific Studies. She works at the Va'aomanu Pasifika, the University's 
centre for Samoan language, alongside Pacific academic researchers. Her 
succinct reply stated that Jasmine Underhill's influence was not recognised by 
those outside her community and that prominence was determined by those 
with power. 
What the Radio New Zealand audience missed out on was not only a chance 
to hear about a person who belied some of the negative statistics that dog the 
Pacific population and who contributed a lot to her community, but also insight 
into another productive life. 
At the time I discussed the matter with another colleague who was born in 
the Cook Islands and worked in two Radio New Zealand departments, sport and 
international. That colleague was the late Elma Maua who had worked for the 
organisation for many years. Her statement to me was one of both resignation 
and cynicism. 
"What you will learn at Radio New Zealand is that it is a struggling outfit 
that does not like people who speak up, and it likes minorities who speak up 
even less. 
"You need to pick your battles and give them what they want for a while 
and then start telling them what is what - not because they don't want to know 
about things, but they don't know what it is they want to know and things move 
very slowly around this place." 
Those were prescient words from Elma Maua and many times over the 
years before her death we would have similar conversations over the in-house 
messaging system when her, my or our joint annoyance would be vented 
privately so as not to cause ourselves harm. 
Sometimes we would end up laughing at how culturally illiterate some 
of our colleagues were, though it was difficult to find humour when another 
colleague referred to Pacific Islanders as 'fuzzy wuzzies', 
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And, by picking the battles, there were some wins - though landing them 
did take some time. One of those was educating a bulletin editor about the 
importance of matai or chiefly titles in Samoa because this particular person 
did not recognise them. A matai title is bestowed on someone to recognise their 
status and often that becomes the name they are known by and is significant in 
Samoa. I informed this bulletin editor, with much careful explanation, that it 
was not her place to recognise them or not. 
However, while smarting over the rejection of the story about the death 
of Jasmine Underwhill, I did a search of the Radio New Zealand obituary and 
prominent people or newsmakers files. It revealed the dearth of content about 
people outside of mainstream society - or those who were not European. 
The exceptions of course being political activists, sports people and criminals. 
At the time - 2005 - Radio New Zealand was, as mentioned earlier, 
going through its self-proclaimed relevancy audit, which was a top-to-tail 
examination of all the broadcast content, though I note in hindsight, not of the 
people responsible for decision-making. That audit was designed to help the 
organisation present a more forward-thinking face to the world with content 
that reflected better the increasing diversity of the country and the people 
living here. 
As stated earlier, the appointment of a Pacific Issues Correspondent was 
part of that so-called shift in the organisation's thinking. But little in the audit 
invited serious thinking about race or ethnicity and its representation across 
the organisation's broadcast day. Radio New Zealand's unconscious institutional 
euro-centrism could be seen as benign neglect. 
1 am not singling Radio New Zealand out for any reason other than I 
worked there for five years and saw it in action every day. By way of balance 
- conversations with well known New Zealand journalists with Pacific Island 
heritage - confirms the issue is widespread in other organisations too, though 
they are reluctant to speak out about it. 
In any newsroom, stories are ranked on merit and every journalist recognises 
the system of values that places them from the highest status or strongest story, 
through to rote things that must be noted, the light and fluffy, to the soft story 
to round out a bulletin or programme. 
The media researchers Galtung and Ruge (I965) drew up a classic list of 
news values in I965. These values embodied characteristics that are used to 
rank stories by a media organisation such as negativity, proximity, uniqueness, 
simplicity and personality. Part of this set of values is determined by the status 
of the person or group being reported on. Hence, any story about people or 
countries that are deemed important will have greater news values than 
something about a country with less influence. And, naturally, the same value 
system applies to people. 
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So at Radio New Zealand this meant many Pacific Island stories were at the 
end of the bulletin or played in the later part of programmes. 
Packages prepared for Morning Report or Checkpoint would often be assigned 
to what became known by colleagues in the Auckland newsroom as the 'Pacific 
slot at the arse end of-the programme'. 
Often the 'rundown' for these programmes - the working document 
drawn up before the content is processed and goes to air - would slot such 
stories in these marginal times before scripts were written or audio processed. 
Conversations with the late Elma Maua and other Pacific Island colleagues often 
revolved around such story placement. 
The researchers Kunelius and Renvall (20ID) explore the notion that "the 
recurrent findings of journalism research show that access to the news and 
public discussion is severely structurally limited. Elite speakers tend to appear 
as 'primary definers' while ordinary people play the subordinate role of 'symbol 
people'" (p. SIS). They are picking up on work by Stuart Hall and others who first 
coined the former term in 1978. 
At Radio New Zealand, 1 saw it as my role to be the person who created a 
bridge to bring the 'ordinary person' into the mainstream news environment 
as a central player in the content, rather than as an adjunct or colourful 
commentator. But sometimes that was far harder to do than could be imagined 
and reporting Anzac Day is a good place to demonstrate this. 
ANZAC rituals, and eccentric Tongans 
Every year, Anzac Day, like the budget, has a formula to its reporting. Firstly, 
there are the dawn services that occur across the nation and reporters are 
assigned to those where the Governor-General, Prime Minister and other high 
profile people attend. 
And the stories report what the high profile person said, how many military 
veterans and their families were attending and then the crowd numbers plus 
the weather. 
The pattern is repeated across the bulletins all morning. 
But if you are the Pacific issues correspondent covering the service organised 
by members of the Niue population for its military contribution, getting airtime 
on a bulletin is nigh impossible. Niue contributed about ISO soldiers for service 
in World War 1. 
The number appears small but what makes it significant are a number of 
factors. At the time Niue's population was about 4,000. Most of the men had 
never left their home island and they travelled to the war with the Maori 
Contingent. Many of the soldiers died on the way to Europe because of 
conditions that were foreign to them. The service never made it to the main 
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noon bulletin until Radio New Zealand appointed a bulletin editor who 
happened to be Niuean, and who recognised the news value of the story. Once 
the story made it to the bulletin, other programmes requested packages on the 
contribution - unlike in the past. 
Reporting on the kingdom of Tonga was another area that proved to be 
challenging. For many in the mainstream media the country's monarchical 
system has been something to sneer at or ridicule as out of place, out of touch 
and out of sorts. The kingdom with a population of some IIO,OOO is three hours 
by jet north of New Zealand and has undergone immense change in the last 
five years. 
When I started reporting on Tonga I adopted the view followed by a long 
line of journalists before me - namely that the monarch and the aristocracy 
were very out of touch, the country was un-democratic, and people were living 
in poverty and desperate for change. 
To me, as a reporter, that Tongans were, at all times, to be seated below the 
King and other members of the Royal Family was an anachronism. 1 found it 
difficult to watch ordinary Tongans sit on the floor if the King was present and I 
wondered just why they did it. 
I also found it quite absurd that the Crown Prince - who later became King 
- was driven around in a London Taxi. I never questioned why 1 found this 
absurd, however. 
What I discovered over time was that the late King of Tonga - Taufa'ahau 
Tupou IV - was in touch with his people in what can only be described as a 
Tongan way. And, as an outsider, it took me a long time to gain a tiny piece 
of insight into what the Tongan way is. Like many I had been captured by the 
reporting that ridiculed not only the late King, but his monocle-wearing son 
who became the King on his death. 
Even though Tonga had been a constitutional monarchy since r875, the 
nature of its electoral system, which was based on social rank, frequently drew 
comments that the country was un-democratic. 
The fact is there was an electoral system in place and, while different from 
New Zealand's universal suffrage model, elections did occur. This did not mean 
all Tongans agreed with the system, and subsequent reform in 20W has begun 
to shift the power away from the King and nobility to the ordinary voter and this 
will continue to develop over time. 
I had become acculturated by stories of excess and eccentricity that had got 
in the way of facts and truth. But, in an age where a pop singer like Lady Gaga 
can get around with a fancy get-up and freedom of expression is seen as a plank 
of modern life, this approach does seem contradictory. 
Certainly, many of the money-making practices of the Tongan royal family 
are questionable - especially around the ownership of assets such as power and 
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telecommunications companies. But such behaviour happens in many sectors 
on a daily basis. The recent global financial crisis is an example. 
But what struck me most when reporting Tongan matters was how the 
'community' seemed more tolerant of the King's behaviour than the mainstream 
media and possibly even New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
1 recall taking kava, a mildly narcotic drink, with a group of Tongan men 
after a riot that saw much of the capital town Nuku'alofa burned. 
Each of the men had a degree from universities like Harvard, MIT and 
Stanford but, at that moment, they were men in shorts talking over kava. 
I asked them, (as we were talking about the need for political change), what 
they would do if the King arrived. They said they would sit on the ground but 
I could stay on my chair. They said that was because they were Tongans and 
he was their King. So, for me, as a journalist whose background for reporting 
Tongan stories was based on Western norms, this answer was a surprise. I had 
expected them to say they would stay seated and challenge him. 
Until then, their views had been silenced by journalists reporting on what 
they saw, but not necessarily understanding what they saw. And what struck me 
also was the big system at play around entitlement and the sense of who allowed 
people to speak from the bulletins of the mainstream organisation that is Radio 
New Zealand. As journalists, it is easy to bring to a reporting environment 
outside our world view expectations of what we think the facts or news should 
be, and what we should therefore be reporting. 
Another example was when Tae Karni, a young Tongan girl dying of cancer, 
was visited by the King days before his coronation in 2008. The house was 
cleaned and all furniture was removed from the lounge area, save a day bed 
for Tae and a special chair for the King. Fresh mats were laid and her parents 
(both university graduates) sat on the floor below the King while their dying 
daughter sang. The two media organisations present - Radio New Zealand and 
TVNZ - also had to sit on the floor in another room out of sight. 1 had expected 
to be in the room for the audience with my microphone close to the action. 
Later when I spoke to the young girl's parents they saw no issue with sitting 
on the floor (contrary to the perceptions of most of the visiting journalists) and 
to them, they were entitled to that as Tongans and I was told that is just the 
way it is. The matter remains problematic because clearly there is also dissent 
within the Tongan population and selecting people to represent that dissent 
is predicated on what makes good news and what is truth - something every 
journalist wrestles with on a daily basis. 
What this means, though, is that the New Zealand public who still rely 
on the media for information that accurately describes the situation on the 
ground in Tonga are sometimes being sold short and that is problematic for the 
development of an informed society. 
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The power of who gets to speak 
In a paper I lead at Auckland University of Technology called Maori and Pacific 
Media Industries we examine firstly the structure of the news reporting outlets 
in New Zealand and the region, followed by content. 
What the students are reporting through critical analysis of content is a bias 
around the representation of Pacific Islanders and Maori within the mainstream 
media. We are still working on this and gathering evidence, but a pattern of 
reporting is emerging. 
By way of example, the students examined reporting following the 
earthquakes that struck Christchurch in September 2010 and then in February 
20n. Their examination of media coverage showed another form of silencing ~ 
similar to that of economic reporting and analysis. 
The students identified that 'informed comment' about the earthquake and 
its effect was presented by Europeans, whereas Pacific Island and Maori were 
mostly absent, or represented as bystanders outside the action. 
Part of that can be explained by the lack of Maori and Pacific Islanders who 
are geologists, for example. However, when they examined Pacific- or Maori-
specific media, what they saw was an approach that presented the subjects as 
central agents of the story, rather than as passive bystanders. 
So, even in this case, a 'famine' situation generated by the earthquake, 
the Pacific and Maori population was marginalised because the dominant 
population was also afflicted. 
The broader issue speaks to issues of resource allocation which in the 
Christchurch situation means those who are seen to be in the worst position get 
the bigger share of the resources for repair. 
This, in effect, is a mirror of society, and an example of media and cultural 
politics that imbues text, audio or images and how they are used. 
As an aside to this, what was interesting to me was the reception I received 
when I began this AUT project from a former coworker whose father is Fijian. 
She is a senior producer at Radio New Zealand. 
I told her I wanted to examine content and supplement the research by 
talking to staff who identified as Pacific Islander in some way. Her most obvious 
signal of one aspect of her ethnicity is around the discussion of food and some of 
her relations, but it rarely ventures past those boundaries. She talks about Fijian 
curries and raw fish. 
However, she did not want to participate and said her job was to source good 
content and not take any sides or operate with an agenda, Pacific or otherwise. 
I did find that curious, but not surprising. 
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When I extended my thinking from news to other programmes, for example, 
I noted that Maori women, for example, who have written a book about being 
'on the block' or gang-raped as part of an association with a gang are able to talk 
about it as a feature interview. However, they are excluded from the space that 
is sometimes available to other authors, who get to talk about their book while 
also playing songs as part of magazine segments known as Playing Favourites (an 
irony there) or Eight Months to Mars. 
In the end, though, what is needed is more thinking around representation 
in the media, and how groups other than mainstream and dominant populations 
are reported. Without that the audience is short-changed in ways it does not 
even begin to understand. 
What I also learned is that it is easy to point a stick - something the poet Dr 
Karlo Mila pointed out in a poem she wrote about an encounter we had early on 
in my employment at Radio New Zealand. 
While we laugh about it now, it was in fact the departure point for the 
thinking that informs a lot of my work today. 
The poem says it alL 
A media sound bite. 
Before the tape recorder is turned on 
the Radio New Zealand Pacific Correspondent 
asks me if I am famous 
because he has never heard of me, 
I tell him that 1 am not. 
When the tape recorder is 
turned off 
he says 
that I do not sound 
like a Pacific Islander. 
1 smile politely, 
noting 
neither 
does he. 
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CHAPTER 12: 
THE POLITICS OF PRACTICE AND THE VOICE OF 
THE NEW ZEALAND LISTENER 
Finlay Macdonald 
The Alliance House Journal 
In April 2008, some four years after taking over the editorship of the Listener 
magazine, Pamela Stirling was indirectly quoted by the New Zealand Herald's 
media correspondent, John Drinnan, as saying that "for a long time [the 
magazine] had been the house journal of the Alliance Party" (Drinnan, 2008). 
It was not a new or particularly original line, nor did Stirling's own long 
and successful career at the Listener appear to have suffered during whatever 
period this hard-left editorial regime allegedly existed. If anything, the jibe 
tended to flatter the magazine, albeit unintentionally, implying a degree 
of principled conviction it might have benefited from at certain points in its 
own history. 
Rather more intriguing was Drinnan's next reported comment: "Stirling 
says the magazine is more centrist and allows everyone to express a view." 
Suggestions of ideological bias are one thing, but the implication here was that 
the Listener had been intolerant of political viewpoints other than, one assumes, 
an Alliance-style leftism. There was the added inference, too, that by echoing the 
political credo of a minority party the magazine had alienated readers and thus 
compromised its ability to reverse an historical circulation decline stretching 
back some 25 years (Drinnan, 2008). 
The reported remarks were made during a minor controversy over the 
magazine's environmental ~lumnist being dropped, coincidentally or not, after 
a complaint about comments in one of the columns. As Drinnan explained 
it, "Eco activists and left-of-centre blogs got hold of the story and blog 
correspondents were opining about how the Listener - once a journal of the 
liberal left - had gone to the capitalist running dogs." 
Without exaggerating the significance of a few throwaway lines, the episode 
reminded me again of how this crucial aspect of the Listener's history and the 
basis of its liberal reputation deserved closer examination. Having edited the 
magazine for five years, from late 1998 to early 2004, been deputy editor for 
the 18 months before that, and previously a staff writer from 1986 to 1994, I 
had some knowledge of the period in question, from the years leading up to 
the formation of the Alliance Party (in 1991) through to its demise (in 2002) -
the period when, logically, the Listener must have been its "house journal", if 
only figuratively. 
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As well as having been a Listener editor, I worked under six others. I have 
no idea how they voted, though at least one of them was in a relationship with 
someone very close to the National Party. None of them struck me as particularly 
doctrinaire in any tangible sense, and indeed some of them were what you might 
call 'classical' newspaper professionals, for whom the scoop was more important 
than any perceived partisan angle or sub text. In my entire time as a writer and 
editor of the magazine 1 don't recall a single incident of editorial interference 
that could be described as ideologically driven. Like all media organisations, the 
Listener suffered its fair share of political pressure, legal threats and lawsuits, and 
played host to staff and contributors of many varied backgrounds and outlooks. 
None of this, it seemed to me, contributed to any kind of coordinated, coherent 
or prescriptive 'house' ideology. 
That is not to say that an identifiable liberal vein cannot be traced through 
the Listener's pages, almost from its inception in 1939. But that must also be 
examined in the context of the times and the various political eras the magazine 
has witnessed, influenced, and been influenced by. What might once have 
been viewed by the New Zealand establishment as impertinent journalism of a 
pinkish hue can be seen in hindsight as simply one symptom of a political and 
social reaction that would in turn produce a new establishment. 
At the same time, it has become something of an article of faith that the 
Listener has always been (at least until purged of its 'Alliance house journal' 
leanings in recent years, one assumes) a constant beacon of liberal- even radical 
- thought and writing. A trawl through its back issues is enough to disabuse one 
of this misconception, its many fine hours of brave and illuminating journalism 
notwithstanding. 
It is my contention, then, that the Listener's reputation as an overtly liberal 
or left-wing organ is not entirely true in either its complimentary or pejorative 
senses. The magazine is better understood as an oddity - in the words of 
commentator Gordon Campbell (2008), "a great ragbag of a read", the product 
of unique circumstances, shaped by changing political and economic forces, and 
worthy of better than tired caricature and shallow stereotyping. 
A unique place in New Zealand journalism 
When I became editor of the Listener near the end of 1998, it struck me 
as remarkable that for a long time no one had tried to define precisely what 
the magazine was (if only to help confused advertising agency media buyers 
sell its pages to their clients). As 1 recall, the task fell to me simply because 
an easy-to-grasp precis was required for some corporate 'mission statement' 
and I happened to be in the editor's chair. After much agonising and over-
thinking I eventually settled on a seemingly anodyne yet refreshingly 
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straightforward label: "The New Zealand Listener is the country's only national, 
weekly current affairs and entertainment magazine." This epigrammatic 
masterpiece still resides in various corporate blurbs and on the magazine's 
online masthead. 
It may seem an obvious, even bland, description, but the fact is the Listener 
defied proper definition for much of its existence. Noone confident or foolhardy 
enough to launch a new title these days would come up with anything like this 
strange amalgam of features, columns, reviews, TV and radio listings. This 
unwieldy mix of the serious and trivial, of analytical journalism and practical 
programme guide, has been both a commercial boon and a cross to bear for the 
Listener, sometimes simultaneously. 
It has always been difficult to estimate how many of the magazine's 
subscribers and casual buyers took it primarily for the TV coverage, and certainly 
no proprietor or editor has been game enough to find out by jettisoning it. 
Reader surveys tended to show a large proportion still wanted the TV and 
radio listings, despite the explosion and fragmentation of both having meant 
the Listener could not possibly accommodate every available channel within the 
relatively few pages it dedicates to that service. 
In the period since the mid-I980s several attempts were made to rationalise 
these two sides of the magazine's personality. The TV and radio coverage 
was once even broken out into an inserted stand-alone guide - causing one 
jaundiced commentator and prominent broadcaster to joke that it made reading 
the Listener so much easier, since all he had to do was pull out the middle section 
and throw the rest in the bin. 
Eventually, however, the programme guides were re-absorbed by the main 
magazine. This may have been due to the extra costs and resources required 
to produce what was effectively another publication. But it was also indicative 
of the constant 'fe-branding', 're-positioning' and even 're-launching' of the 
Listener from the mid-to-Iate 1980s to early in the 90S. And that, of course, 
was largely in response to an ever-declining circulation that no editor had (or 
subsequently has) been able to arrest since its commercial heyday in the late 
I970S and early I980s. To understand that historic decline and the pressures that 
have contributed to it, we need to look back to the birth of the magazine and the 
origins of its 'liberal' reputation. 
The Listener grew out of an existing publication, the Radio Record, 
re-launched in 1939 as the official journal of the New Zealand Broadcasting 
Service (or NZBS - in effect the network of radio stations nationalised by 
Michael Joseph Savage's Labour administration in 1936). Required to list and 
promote the programmes offered on radio, the Listener quickly filled its pages 
with background features about the arts, drama and music. As its second editor 
M. H. (Monte) Holcroft wrote in his memoir Reluctant Editor: 
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In trying to find a balance between serious and light topics the Listener 
had gradually formed its character, reaching beyond radio to life outside, 
fostering the arts, and setting standards which had already given it a unique 
place in New Zealand journalism (Holcroft, 1969, p. 19). 
But it was Holcroft's idiosyncratic blend of erudition and liberal temperament 
that established the Listener as more than just an interesting programme guide. 
By introducing a signed editorial each week he signalled his intention that the 
magazine be part of the national conversation - even at times lead it. As Andrew 
Mason wrote in a biographical sketch of Holcroft: 
At a time when most New Zealand journalism betrayed a narrow 
confo nn ism, Holcroft not only opened up the range of topics considered 
acceptable for public debate, but applied to them a depth of understanding 
and tolerance born of his wide reading and reflection. He engaged with 
issues by examining their context, and invited his readers to reflect as 
well as react. His editorials on especially sensitive subjects, such as capital 
punishment or the 1956 Suez crisis, are reported to have attracted attention 
at the highest political levels (Mason, 2010). 
This, then, was the source of the magazine's enduring liberal reputation; not 
so much any ideological predisposition, but a healthy and heterodox scepticism 
of the official version and the voice of authority. Holcroft was also an astute 
judge of the peculiarities of New Zealand's social order, as he explained in 
Reluctant Editor: 
The Old Boy network which holds the Establishment together in Britain is 
replaced here by the penumbra from the tribe; and whereas a network may 
be infiltrated, or broken down at points of strain, the cohesion of the tribe 
or the silent pressure of the village bends most men towards conformity 
(Holcroft, 1969, p. 73). 
Holcroft wrote from more than just second-hand knowledge, of course, as 
his role brought him into constant contact with the very elements of the "tribe" 
dedicated to encouraging that conformity. Early in his career, for instance, he 
was criticised by the broadcasting hierarchy for not giving enough space to 
programmes broadcast by the Commercial Division of the NZBS: 
Their real complaint, 1 think, was that we did not give enough attention 
to sponsored programmes; they were no doubt responding in their own 
way to pressures from one or two of the big advertising agencies which 
specialised in radio. I could scarcely tell them that these features were often 
rubbish, but 1 did say that the Listener had certain literary standards and 
a reputation which would be quickly lost if we introduced third-rate serials 
with trumpet-notes of acclamation (Holcroft, 1969, p. 18). 
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He may "scarcely" have been able to say it out loud, but one ventures that the 
champions of commercial radio picked up the signals well enough. And herein 
lies the essential tension that would define the magazine's split personality 
for decades to come - between populism and perceived elitism, between the 
serious and the trivial, between public service and commercial reality. It's no 
coincidence, either, that some of the harshest and most dismissive critics of the 
modern Listener came from commercial radio and television. In a country where 
intellectualism and liberalism are sometimes conflated, the magazine became, 
for some, the embodiment of cultural snobbery. 
Ironically, Holcroft's real interests· lay much less in imitating the BBC 
model on which the Listener and the NZBS were based than in fostering the 
nascent indigenous voice in literature and the arts that was just beginning 
to make itself heard. The names Alan Mulgan, Dan Davin, Frank Sargeson, 
E. H. McCormick and Denis Glover all appeared in Holcroft's first edition in 
June, 1949. Over the next 18 years he would be instrumental in nurturing the 
careers of, among others, O. E. Middleton, Maurice Duggan, Noel Hilliard, . 
Joy Cowley and Janet Frame. Had the commercial stations got their way, 
pages devoted to short stories that would soon become part of the local literary 
canon would instead have carried advertisements and programme listings for 
the ZB network. 
Again, this mild but principled opposition to both the broadcasting 
bureaucracy and vested business interests was instrumental in shaping a 
perception of the Listener in some quarters as elitist; that it considered itself 
above the fray of everyday journalism and broadcasting. On the other hand, 
there were those to whom the magazine wasn't serious enough. Holcroft offers 
a telling anecdote involving the noted writer and critic Bill Pearson (whose 
landmark 1952 essay 'Fretful Sleepers' also wrestled with ideas of national 
identity). Pearson had taken exception to an article about the West Coast in 
1956. In a letter to the editor, he accused Holcroft of "encouraging a type of 
journalism that tries to be clever, amusing and sophisticated. I find it very 
shallow, an intellectual counterpart to the bright vulgarity of the ZB announcers 
... " (Holcroft, 1969, p. 55). 
So, too shallow and entertaining for elements of the intelligentsia, yet 
too intellectual and unworldly for the commercial mainstream - the Listener 
dilemma in a nutshell. Over the coming decades a succession of editors and 
proprietors would find themselves confronting this dichotomy in the eternal 
quest to keep circulation up while balancing the needs of multiple and not 
always congruous readerships; from television viewers who wanted nothing 
more than a reliable guide to their favourite programmes, to the politically 
engaged and highly literate, who had come to expect high standards of critical 
thought and journalism from 'their' magazine. 
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A journal of the effete intellectual trendy left 
The foundations of the Listener's extraordinary commercial success in the late 
I970S and early 80S were laid by Ian Cross, a celebrated author and journalist 
who had drifted into corporate public relations before being invited to take up 
the editorship. In his career memoir, The Unlikely Bureaucrat, he wrote, "As a 
young reporter, I had regarded the Listener as a beacon of literary and cultural 
values shining beyond what were then the limited confines of daily newspaper 
journalism." What he discovered upon taking up the job in I973, alas, didn't 
quite match the shining ideal. "The Listener ... reminded me of a feather-bed for 
tired journalism covered by a massive eiderdown of bureaucratic inertia" (Cross, 
I988, p. I2). 
The magazine had recently survived a showdown between its board and 
previous editor, the mercurial Alexander McLeod, the messy result of which 
saw Monte Holcroft return in an interim capacity. Morale and circulation were 
low, and the new Labour government was doing what all new governments do, 
meddling with broadcasting policy. Cross set about remodelling the magazine 
from its content to its design, with special attention given to the placement 
and layout of the programme listings, which moved to the back of 'the book' 
where they were easy to find and navigate. He also made a seemingly minor yet 
commercially shrewd change to the listings schedule, bringing it closer to the 
on-sale date. "As circulation started to climb and pundits offered explanations 
for this," he wrote, "it was amusing to see how the importance of some of these 
decisions was overlooked entirely" (Cross, I988, p. I5). 
Cross also modernised the magazine in other ways, hiring new talent -
including columnists Rosemary McLeod and Tom Scott, and cartoonist Burton 
Silver, all of whom would both make their names at the Listener - and expanding 
coverage of the arts and sport. While this reinvigoration undoubtedly helped, 
the advent of a second television channel in I975 was arguably the single biggest 
factor in the Listener's extraordinary circulation growth during that decade. 
According to legend, when sales peaked at nearly 400,000 - more than ten 
percent of the country's population - overseas publishers came to study the 
phenomenon. But, as Cross wrote: 
Its success ... eventually became too great for some people, and by 1976 the 
anti-Listener lobbying of politicians began, launched by New Zealand News, 
publishers of the New Zealand Woman's Weekly and other magazines. After 
the election of the National government in 1975, claims were made that the 
Listener's success was produced by its 'monopoly' of radio and television 
schedules, ignoring the fact that every newspaper in the country had free 
access to our daily, weekend and holiday programme schedules, and that the 
arrangement whereby the Listener had sole rights for the weekly schedules 
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had existed since I939 in radio and 1960 in television. This suggested, sure(y, 
that some other factors were responsible for the Listener's recent eminence 
(Cross, 1988, p. 21). 
Cross was scathing not just about the newspaper industry's naked 
commercial self-interest, but about its inability either to compete with the 
Listener on quality or learn from its example and expand the coverage of current 
affairs and popular entertainment in its own publications. He may have been 
correct in his low estimation of the competition at the time, but the picture that 
emerges is one of mutual antipathy, with a long-building resentment towards 
the magazine's supposedly privileged and protected status coming to a head. 
One sometimes hears it said that the removal of the Listener's programme 
listings copyright in 1982 by Robert Muldoon's National government was an act 
of revenge for Tom Scott's critical and satirical political writing and cartooning, 
and perhaps this did play some part in the decision. The Listener was not the 
voice of 'Rob's Mob', as Muldoon's conservative heartland supporters came to be 
known, and editorially it reflected the baby-boomer experiences and values of its 
younger staff writers. But there's a degree of mythmaking, too, in later depictions 
of the magazine as a hotbed of permissive thought or leftwing radicalism during 
this era. The Listener was still very much a mainstream title, with a subscription 
base so vast it couldn't afford to pander to just one viewpoint. A scan of covers 
from this period is instructive: for every hard current affairs lead about the 
Vietnam war or sporting ties with South Africa there are ten more about 
Coronation Street or the latest light entertainment offering from Television New 
Zealand. Nevertheless, Cross tacitly acknowledged a liberal predisposition: 
My other comments as an editorial writer caused me to be viewed with dark 
suspicion by a few of my own staff, and the huge pack of people who went 
hunting Springboks over the coming years. 1 have always believed that New 
Zealand will finally wriggle clear of the cocoon of its colonial mentality only 
by giving expression to, and respecting, the scarcely articulated reactions of 
its native-born people (Cross, 1988, p. 19). 
Yet the fact that he swam against the current, such as it was, shows again 
how the Listener cannot be easily stereotyped. If that predilection for "hunting 
Springboks" eventually found voice in the magazine's pages after his departure 
as editor, it might also be said that an enormous number of New Zealanders 
shared that passion, and the journalism it produced was some of the finest 
ever to appear in the magazine, with the awards to prove it. Cross by then had 
become chairman of the Broadcasting Corporation, and watched the magazine's 
fortunes from above (where he also sought to protect it from the relentless 
lobbying against its programme listings 'monopoly'). This was the period 
of an overt portrayal of the Listener as a left-wing publication by Muldoon, 
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who referred to it in a speech in 1981 as "a journal directed towards the effete 
intellectual trendy left" (Cross, 1988, p. 180). Cross did not deny the magazine 
deserved some criticism for its occasional tendency to be "a little precious and 
remote", or "prone to rather smug displays of a bleeding heart or becoming 
cause-ridden". But he also argued that: 
... New Zealanders needed to be stirred, provoked, angered, delighted, as a 
stimulus for their own opinions; perhaps, as a result, they would be warmed 
by flickers of a newly lit fire of discovered commitments of their own 
(Cross, 1988, p. 174)· 
In a socially conservative country, and within a generally conservative 
mediascape, the Listener's brand of questioning, opinionated and occasionally 
crusading journalism was almost by definition going to be labelled liberal. It 
was during this era, recall, that dancing cartoon cossacks were employed in 
an election campaign advertisement to frighten voters away from the Labour 
Party's mildly socialist tendencies. One shouldn't overlook the fact, either, that 
magazine feature journalism does differ from other forms of reporting; the 
writer is often present within the text, guiding the story, drawing conclusions. 
That doesn't make it immune from the rules of evidence or a duty to the truth, 
but it can make it stand out from the orthodoxies of neutrality and "balance" 
observed in other newsrooms. For a long time, the Listener was virtually the only 
home for sophisticated, analytical and opinionated writing. 
Unfortunately, that home wasn't built to last. Circulation began its gradual 
and seemingly inexorable slide more or less from the moment the exclusive 
publication rights to the programme schedule were removed. Descending 
milestones - 300,000, then 200,000 - were passed during the 1980s and 90S, to 
the general glee of the competition and anguish of successive editors. By then, of 
course, enormous structural changes within broadcasting had contributed to the 
magazine's faltering sense of purpose and identity, while economic deregulation 
and technological progress had radically changed media competition and 
consumption patterns. 
Alternative in the best sense 
If previous eras of political change had tested the Listener, the radical economic 
and state restructuring of the fourth Labour government was of another order 
entirely. The magazine was merely a part of the larger broadcasting whole, and 
such a significant commercial entity owned by the state was hardly going to avoid 
the reforming free-market zeal of finance minister Roger Douglas. Television 
New Zealand and Radio New Zealand became state-owned enterprises in I988 
after the dissolution of the Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand. Both 
became shareholders in the Listener, which effectively became a slave to two 
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masters, neither of whom seemed particularly interested in owning it, not being 
publishers and busy reinventing themselves as they were. 
The editor burdened with negotiating the Listener's fate during these years 
was the eminent broadcaster and journalist David Beatson. As a junior staff 
writer at the time, 1 recall his frequent absences and general preoccupation 
with what had, by all accounts, become something of an internecine war in the 
broadcasting bureaucracy for the eventual spoils of corporatisation. The upshot 
of all this was that the Listener was finally privatised in 1990 - bought by Wilson 
and Horton, publishers of the New Zealand Herald and holders of the magazine's 
printing contract. Having been a cash cow for decades under public ownership, 
but with its profits drained into the general broadcasting fund, the Listener's sole 
valuable asset was its iconic title. 
In some ways, though, landing in the lap of a real publishing company had 
its advantages. The Listener was finally free from the threat - real and imagined 
- of editorial interference by governments or civil servants. New proprietor 
Michael Horton seemed to understand and care about the magazine's legacy. 
During the years of his ownership (1990-97) there was no sudden edict that it 
should lurch to the right or reflect the interests and values of big business and 
the Auckland Club. 
Far more pressing from the new owner's perspective, one assumes, was 
the need to arrest the circulation decline. Theories abounded as to its essential 
causes; from the objective - that fragmentation of the magazine market and 
mass media in general was eroding the Listener's readership on all sides; to the 
subjective - that readers' attention spans were also contracting and the magazine 
should become more like a newspaper, with shorter articles. The latter notion 
presented considerable logistical challenges, given the Listener was printed over 
a week in advance of its cover date, and final copy deadlines were at least three 
or four days ahead of the issue appearing in letterboxes and on newsstands. 
Nevertheless, various attempts were made to reinvent the title according 
to the perceived dictates of the changing marketplace. Geoff Bayliss and Jenny 
Wheeler, editors in the late 1980s and mid-I990s respectively, were both 
veterans of the newspaper industry and both in their own way tried to inject 
some currency and topicality into the Listener's feature pages. However sincere 
their motivations, the result of the various shifts in direction looked from the 
outside like symptoms of a title struggling to define itself. The magazine had 
already shrunk from its previous A3 format to a standard magazine size - a 
logical cost-cutting exercise, but one that also did away with its most obvious 
point of difference. 
Undoubtedly, there were forces beyond the magazine's control at work. 
The proliferation of television channels, with the advent of a third channel and 
Sky TV, from the late 1980s, meant the listings pages simply couldn't cope - a 
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magazine that once existed primarily as the official, authoritative programme 
guide was now no longer even comprehensive. The rival TV Guide, a cheap TV 
listings and celebrity gossip title spun off from Truth in 1986, grew rapidly to 
become the country's biggest-selling magazine, taking a significant portion of 
Listener buyers in the process. 
Ominously, the magazine's core readership - like the population in general 
- was ageing. I used to joke there were two kinds of lawyer's letter I dreaded 
when I was editor: the first was in response to a story and made representations 
of a threatening kind on behalf of some aggrieved party; the second was from 
the executors of a deceased estate instructing us to close a subscription account. 
It's hard to say which made my heart sink more. It is enormously difficult to 
recruit new and younger readers at the rate a magazine is losing older ones, 
especially at a time when those young readers are migrating to the internet and 
getting their information for free. The impact on advertising ratios and income 
was significant, with agencies reluctant to buy space in a publication skewed 
towards an older demographic. 
As budgets and resources inevitably shrank in the name of profit, the 
same content needed to be generated under a sinking financial lid. That trend 
accelerated in the mid-I990s when Irish magnate Tony O'Reilly's Independent 
Newspapers took a major shareholding in Wilson and Horton. By Igg8 O'Reilly 
had taken control of the company, later merging it with his Australian -based APN 
News and Media Ltd. The Listener was now one title in a large media group (that 
included The Radio Network, the old Radio New Zealand commercial stations), 
answerable ultimately to foreign shareholders and Australian managers. From 
being the protected organ of state broadcasting to acquisition by a multinational 
corporation, the magazine had certainly mirrored the fortunes of its society in 
more ways than one. 
Despite all the upheavals at the Listener during the Ig80s and 90S, and 
the sometimes confused editorial directions that resulted, the magazine's best 
traditions of journalistic independence and excellence weren't abandoned. One 
often overlooked but vital element in whatever continuity persisted over the 
years was the arts and books coverage. As former staff writer, political columnist 
and arts editor Denis Welch argued: 
The true glory of the magazine then was the books section, which under 
first Vincent O'Sullivan and then Andrew Mason, attained an authority 
unmatched before or since. In the 1980s, as the front of magazine began to 
lose shape, the books pages kept theirs ... (Welch, 200g) 
The feature section's loss of shape aside, the Listener of the late Ig80s and 
199os maintained - sometimes against the odds - the sceptical, non-conformist 
conventions that had marked it out from the days of Holcroft and Cross. Where 
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once it had been a thorn in the side of the Muldoon government, so it was to 
the Labour government of David Lange and Roger Douglas (the Listener coined 
the term 'Rogernomics', incidentally). In an online rebuttal of Pamela Stirling's 
reported claim that the magazine had become the "Alliance house journal", 
former senior writer Gordon Campbell gave various examples of the "liberal, 
compassionate and contrarian" thread that ran through the magazine's history: 
The voice it had in our national debate was alternative in the best sense, 
of standing apart from the mainstream and analysing it critically. It was 
that contrarian spirit that saw the Listener endorse MMP, and run fair and 
balanced profiles of Roger Kerr, Lindsay Perigo, Winston Peters and other 
polarising figures in its pages. 
During the years [999-2004 inclusive - which presumably spans at least 
part of the alleged Alliance house journal phase - the Listener defended 
Army chief Maurice Dodson, slammed the Clark government over its half 
baked TVNZ social charter proposals, profiled the US conservative thinker 
Francis Fukuyama and championed the free speech rights of the Holocaust 
denier David Irving (Campbell, 2008). 
Again, however, it has to be stressed that this was merely one dimension of 
the Listener's identity. As editor at the time in question, 1 can confidently say that 
so-called 'lifestyle' journalism, popular entertainment profiles, travel and food 
writing, crime reporting and photographic essays were as vital to the editorial 
mix as campaigning journalism with a political edge. Campbell also criticised 
the Listener under Stirling for its focus on "the lifestyle choices and social 
anxieties of the baby boomer elite". But the fact is those aspects of the magazine 
have always been prominent to some degree. Less an Alliance house journal, you 
might say, than a house and garden journal with political undertones. 
Different editors have placed more or less emphasis on various aspects of the 
magazine's content, but the Listener's fortunes have always been determined by 
much more than its editorial leanings. Its liberal reputation undoubtedly owes 
much to the magazine having been more or less a lone progressive voice during 
a protracted period of stolidly conservative print and broadcast journalism, as 
well as having played an integral role in the emergence of a modern indigenous 
literary and artistic scene. Yet its commercial success during and after that 
period was primarily the result of its exclusive relationship with an expanding 
state broadcasting industry and the television viewing habits of the population 
at large. 
Now, as a mature tide in a fragmented media market, with the internet 
and changing consumer demographics having a real impact on reading, 
viewing and buying habits, the Listener's political orientation - left or right - is 
arguably its least pressing concern. Despite claims that it is now a more 'centrist' 
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publication (with the implication it is therefore more inclusive), audited surveys 
show circulation continuing to decline. According to the NZ Audit Bureau of 
Circulations (ABC), average net paid sales to 31 December 2010 were 59,176. This 
was down from the previous year's average net paid sales of 60,232. However, 
the magazine recorded a net circulation increase of 2.2 percent - based on non-
paid copies included in the calculation - from 62,532 to 63,930. The difference 
was an increase in the number of copies described as "direct circulation 
requested" and "capped promotional copies", up from 2,300 to 4,754 (NZ ABC, 
2010). For historical comparison, at the end of 2001 the Listener's average net 
paid sales sat at 73,887 and total net circulation at 76,858. That is a circulation 
loss of nearly 15,000 in a decade. The rate of decline is not consistent, with 
some years (and half-years) recording small upticks, others sudden downturns. 
Similarly, the number of non-paid copies that could legitimately be included 
in final circulation figures has changed over time, as have the rules governing 
their inclusion. But the overall trend is clear, and has been evident since before 
the beginning of the previous decade. It is certainly not the only magazine to 
be experiencing that unhappy ride, but as the Listener embarks on its eighth 
decade, it is less the existence of a 'house journal' style that is the issue than it is 
the long-term existence of the journal itself. 
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CHAPTER 13: 
TWENTY-FIVE WAYS TO HAVE BETTER 
JOURNALISM 
Nicky Hager 
The final chapter is a good place to focus on how things can be better. That 
means how to have better journalism and support journalism through a period 
of multiple, deep problems in the news media. The future of the news media is 
surrounded by uncertainty and pessimism. The question is how the future of 
journalism - which is a separate issue - can be improved and hopefuL 
Some of the problems of the news media are about huge and historic 
shifts in technology. The answers here are about how to adapt to things we 
cannot change or even properly predict. Other serious problems stem from 
commercialisation and other structural changes to the news organisations. The 
least recognised problems stem from changes to the environment in which news 
media operate caused by the growth of public relations (PR). News organisations 
have been ill-prepared and slow to adapt to this massive change. There are 
things that can be done to protect and improve journalism here as well, the first 
step being an understanding of the nature and scale of the problem. 
This chapter looks at the different types of changes and problems and in each 
case proposes what can be done to provide our society with the good journalism 
it needs. The chapter is in four parts: the impact of public relations (which 
could be called the commercialisation of news-making); the commercialisation 
of news organisations; the profound effects of technological change; and, the 
only relatively stable factor, the long-term shortage of investigative journalism 
in New Zealand. There are constructive things that can be done to improve 
journalism in each of these areas. 1 will list some and hope, in doing so, to 
prompt other ideas from readers. 
Setting the agenda: PR versus the newsroom 
The dominance of public relations over journalism and news has grown 
gradually and is still poorly understood and hugely underestimated. It deserves 
the most attention of the four areas. From the 1930S until the 1970S, most PR in 
New Zealand was from the government, particularly the Tourist and Publicity 
Department from 1930 and National Film Unit from 1941. In these early years 
there was a tiny number of private PR people and lobbyists: maybe one person 
for the alcohol industry, another for the manufacturing association, The 
numbers and influence of professional PR people have grown hundreds of times 
larger since then. 
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Today there are PR staff in every government agency, ministers' offices, local 
government, universities, crown research institutes, state-owned enterprises 
and so on. There has been even greater growth in the private sphere. Private 
PR firms began to appear in the 1970S and 1980s and since then there has 
been exponential growth. In Wellington, for example, there are about 50 PR 
companies with hundreds of clients and campaigns. They far outnumber the 
news organisations and their shrinking staffs. In addition there are numerous 
PR contractors, in-house PR people in large companies, specialised lobbying 
companies, industry lobby organisations, law firms that offer PR and lobby 
services and a wide industry of support services that further enhance the 
advantage to those with the money to pay. 
Each of these professions has emerged to help influence what is and is not 
featured on the daily news agenda. On most issues, and especially controversial 
ones, focused and well resourced PR people are dealing with journalists who 
may well have come to the issue only that morning. 
Public relations and other commercialised methods and channels of 
communication are harmful to journalism in two distinctly different ways. The 
first is when they actively manipulate or obstruct journalistic news gathering; 
the second is when there are so many paid communications, innocuous or 
manipulative, they simply crowd out other voices and messages from the public 
and democratic space. 
A lot has been written about manipulative public relations practices but the 
subject is still not well known. One New Zealand case study is the book Secrets 
and Lies, which I wrote with Australian journalist Bob Burton (Hager & Burton, 
Craig Potton Publishing, Nelson, 1999). Based on a treasure trove of leaked 
internal PR company papers, it is the story of a US public relations company that 
was paid to run a political and media campaign in favour of continued logging 
of public native forests in New Zealand. Seen through the company's planning 
documents and weekly teleconference minutes, we see PR professionals 
manufacturing a pro-logging campaign (including a fake pro-logging community 
group, 'independent' scientist allies qUietly funded by the logging company and 
so on), while at the same time putting large resources into trying to silence 
their environmental opponents (such as attacking their funding sources, paying 
informers to spy on the groups, and creating employment troubles for scientists 
who criticised the logging). The 'communications' specialists put most of their 
effort into trying to stop other people's communications. 
During several years of political and media debate over the native forest 
logging, news organisations almost all quoted the fake community group and 
paid scientists as authoritative voices and reported the orchestrated attacks on 
the environmentallobby without considering or investigating the PR strategies 
behind them. On most controversial issues there are similar PR campaigns, 
214 
SCOOPED: THE POLlTICS AND POWER OF JOURNALlSM IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
yet news organisations generally act oblivious to them, taking press releases, 
spokespeople and events at face value. They rarely ask what motives are at work 
or who is paying. 
Vigorous PR campaigns have been waged in New Zealand in recent times by 
the tobacco lobby, alcohol lobby, gambling lobby and genetic engineering lobby. 
Military PR has been another growth area, with good-news stories pre-packaged 
and delivered to news organisations from war zones but strict control and 
secrecy imposed on all subjects that are controversial or might not be supported 
by the public. Ten years of positive stories about New Zealand 'peacekeeping' 
troops in the Afghanistan war went together with an almost total blackout 
on news about controversial combat and intelligence operations, prisoner 
detentions and military mistakes. 
This does have a positive side, though, for anyone who wants to get beyond 
the PR and do good journalism. With the New Zealand military activities in 
Afghanistan, for instance, this leaves the field wide open to anyone who is 
willing to do some digging. Over those ten years literally thousands of New 
Zealanders have served in Afghanistan: some very supportive of everything they 
saw and some not, but all of them with good stories. In a country the size of 
New Zealand, a bit of initiative and persistence in looking for these people has 
a good chance of being rewarded and, as every investigator learns, each success 
encourages you to keep digging deeper. Thus, in between the PR stories, there 
has been good journalism on Afghanistan by people such as Jon Stephenson and 
Anthony Hubbard. There is plenty of opportunity for more of this. 
PR campaigns are most effective when we do not even know they are 
going on. Often the preferred option is to keep their issues out of the news, 
as with the long-term lobbying campaign by the Real Estate Institute to avoid 
capital gains taxes in New Zealand. In other cases the public can see a campaign 
is occurring but not who is behind it. For example, one of the biggest issues 
faced by the 1999-2008 Labour government was what action, if any, to take 
on climate change. Its main policy plan was a carbon tax, designed to be 
a disincentive to climate-harming economic activities and an incentive to 
beneficial ones. The carbon tax plans were vigorously attacked over several 
years in hundreds of news stories and eventually the government decided the 
political cost was too great. The whole thing was dropped. Almost no journalists 
asked the question or investigated why so much negative publicity against the 
tax had occurred. 
The answer is that the majority of the negative stories were orchestrated 
from one PR/lobby firm in central Wellington. Where was the impetus and 
money for the PR campaign coming from? The well-hidden answer is that it 
was the coal industry, which obviously had a vested interest in stopping the tax. 
The central role of the coal lobby was never revealed in this coverage. Many 
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journalists who wrote (or processed) the anti-carbon tax stories had, in effect, 
been unwitting tools of the coal industry campaign. 
Working to avoid negative news coverage is another large part of the PR game. 
Many PR people are in effect information gatekeepers for their organisations. 
They help advise on which information should be withheld or when and how 
to release unhelpful information that cannot be hidden (a bland-looking press 
release dropped just before a long weekend, for instance). They also note which 
journalists are sympathetic to their agendas and which they prefer to avoid or 
thwart. A journalist writing stories that they like will be helped with information 
and access for interviews (and sometimes free trips and free tickets to concerts 
and sports events). Journalists doing their job by raising difficult issues find their 
access for interviews blocked and are asked to submit questions in writing, often 
getting terse written replies that simply ignore unwanted questions. Games like 
these become routine and pass without comment. 
The PR professionals move between issues, such as the former head of the 
pro-genetic engineering lobby group Life Sciences Network, Francis Wevers, 
who moved on to head the pro-gambling lobby, the Charity Gaming Association. 
Lobby groups like these aim to have the news media view their spokespeople 
as neutral, authoritative sources and frequently the news organisations oblige. 
Paid spokespeople for the finance sector - bank and merchant bank 'economists' 
who comment on government policy from the point of view of their employers' 
interests - are quoted regularly in the news as if they are impartial specialists. 
They take pride of place in nightly TV bulletins. 
The work of PR people has made it harder to do good journalism just when 
newsroom numbers, experience and budgets have been dropping. There are 
good journalists doing their best and the news media sometimes produces 
spectacular work. But much of the time and on nearly every issue, the PR people 
are better resourced and more numerous and focused. Often former journalists 
themselves, they understand the dynamics of news and are well placed to plan 
and control news to suit their clients and to close down news if it does not. 
There has, of course, always been deception and manipulation in politics. 
What is different now is the army of full-time professional people whose job 
is to tum the news, by fair means or foul, to their employers' advantage. For 
a study in the arts of dodging questions, closing down unwanted issues and 
manipulating news coverage, my book The Hollow Men (Hager, 2006) describes 
three years of work by the paid political advisors (strategists, media officers, 
pollsters and speech writers) around the leader of the New Zealand National 
Party. In The Hollow Men we see news organisations taking much of the media 
manipulation at face value; uncritically passing on to the public the scripted 
messages, orchestrated events, evasions and crucial omissions as if they were 
simply reporting the facts. 
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A central part of the PR strategies revealed is the process offraming' the news 
agenda, which refers to a different level of influence than the usual spinning of 
fact and point of view. Framing of issues is about trying to influence the way that 
journalists and others think about and judge them. Roughly speaking, normal 
PR spin might say "X party will give the biggest tax cuts". PR framing would 
be getting journalists believing and repeating ideas like "This election is about 
which party will give the biggest tax cut". If the PR people win the framing, they 
are a long way towards winning the election. If the dominant election framing 
was instead "Which party will protect social services from cuts?" the result 
could be different. News organisations often unconsciously adopt framing from 
interest groups without realising they are being biased. 
There are also many public relations and paid communications people 
who are not doing deceptive or manipulative work. They are just helping their 
employers to communicate their information or points of view effectively. But 
even these straightforward paid communications are having negative impacts 
on the news media and journalism. The problem is the cumulative effect of 
more and more paid communications filling the public media space and the 
sheer scale of noise it generates. With so many press releases, and so many well 
resourced and skilful paid voices, the media space is flooded. This has crept up 
on us, often with little analysis of the effect on journalism. 
However, for those who are interested there are good resources and books 
available. The US Centre for Media and Democracy is an outstanding resource 
into which anyone can tap. It is easy to find on the internet and its regular 
publications, including the journal PR Watch and internet resource Sourcewatch, 
are very good both for alerting you to PR tricks, helping you research them and 
also simply as a source of intriguing stories. Likewise, critical books on public 
relations, such as Flat Earth News by Nick Davies (Chatto & Windus, 2008), open 
our eyes to what is happening around us. 
Meanwhile, the unequal fight goes on newsroom by newsroom around 
the country. News media marketing paints a picture of journalists out there 
tirelessly seeking the news. But anyone who works in the media or public 
relations knows that many news items on any given day are not the product 
of journalism. They have been scripted, timed and stage-managed by paid PR 
people. One chief reporter told me he introduced a rule of printing out press 
releases before assigning them to reporters. At least then, he explained, they 
could not simply cut and paste directly from the press release. His modest goal 
was to have rewritten press releases. 
The trend is for journalists to stop being gatherers of news and instead to be 
processors of all the material coming from the 'communications' staff. It is wrong 
to blame the journalists for this; they want to do a good job. But less reporters 
in the newsroom means less time to do more stories, often after not many years' 
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experience in the job. The inevitable result is that much of the agenda setting, 
framing of issues and language in news stories comes directly from the PR 
people. The public can sense the scripted artificiality of this sort of news, which 
tends to distance them and reduce their interest in and engagement with the 
news that they receive. The result is something we could call 'news product', 
that looks and sounds like journalism but where there has been little or no real 
journalism involved in its production. 
The cumulative effect on news of more and more PR activity is akin to 
what happens when industrial farms surround a river, with more and more 
water being removed and polluted water being put back in. We find the public 
spaces are being overloaded with paid spokespeople, spin and trickery; news and 
political discussion are being polluted by the glib outpourings of ever-growing 
numbers of PR people; and the public spaces available for real democratic activity 
are drying up. These problems appeared slowly just like problems with rivers -
too slowly to catch attention or prompt much concern - and then accelerated 
in the last 20 years. 
As a result, the main problem facing journalism today is the combined 
and cumulative impact of paid manufacturing of news, paid voices in so-called 
public discussion, organised media management and manipulation, scripting of 
politicians by unseen advisers and all the other PR techniques and devices. 
What can we do about the impact ofPR on news? 
I. Firstly, and most importantly, learning about the nature and techniques of 
public relations and commercialised news-making needs to become a major 
part of journalism training, not just a quick mention alongside the core 
subjects. Not focusing on public relations is like training someone to sail 
a ship without teaching them about the rocks, tides, currents and weather 
systems they will encounter. 
2. Journalism recruitment should favour people with training and experience 
in politics, business and the other areas about which they will write. It 
should also favour people who are politically astute. The aim should be 
that they understand issues and have a political analysis within which to 
judge the news. Too many journalists seem intellectually ill-prepared for the 
barrage of PR and other paid communications precisely because they do not 
have a strong analysis of power and politics. 
3. Journalism and public relations are not allied occupations. They should not 
be taught in the same university 'communications' departments. Journalism 
courses should instead have links to other disciplines, encouraging the 
creation of courses in politics, science, business and elsewhere that are 
designed for developing critical thinking and investigative skills. 
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4. News organisations should encourage a culture of scepticism and resistance 
to public relations. A vital step in this is making PR tactics and the PR people 
routine subjects of news stories and features. The era where PR people can 
arrange and spin invisibly should end. PR people should be routinely named 
and any dodgy tactics, evasions and unhelpfulness included in the stories. 
The public enjoy stories revealing back room workings and, anyway, there 
is no good reason why paid manipulators should be given special impunity 
from publicity for their actions. Since PR people and tactics are such a 
big part of the organisations and issues, they should regularly be part of 
the reporting. 
5. Even better, create dedicated PR rounds. This is a rich area for reporting 
with numerous intriguing stories waiting to be pursued. Equally important, 
when journalists start making PR the news, it will help to shift the power 
and initiative back to the news media, compared to the first decades of the 
PR explosion where too often it has been a walkover for PR people. 
6. Individual journalists also need to adapt their work to the environment of 
pervasive PR. It should be a matter of self-respect never to rely purely on a 
press release. Journalists need to treasure and protect the unique power they 
have in society to ask questions of people in authority. In particular, they 
should pledge never, ever to say, "Can I have your comment on ... ", which is 
simply an invitation for spokespeople to deliver their two or three sentences 
of pre-planned spin. The privilege of being able to ask questions carries with 
it the responsibility to ask good questions. This can mean just a moment's 
pause before dialling the number, or some quick reading or talking to other 
people about what issues matter most. 
7. Escaping the framing of paid PR people means taking the time to have other 
contacts and seeking non-commercially-provided voices for stories. Young 
journalists should question the merit of supposedly neutral news sources, 
even if they are routinely used by news media and have been suggested by 
chief reporters or news editors. Most of all, a reporter who knows about his 
or her subject is much less susceptible to being manipulated and falling for 
other people's spin. This means taking pride in reading about and becoming 
an expert on some subjects that interest them. 
8. It is a mistake to assume that people in a profession are all the same. There 
is always a range of personalities, beliefs and motivations within any sector 
or organisation, be they businesses, the military or political parties. It is 
just the same with PR people. While the profession as a whole is not the 
friend of good journalism, individual PR people sometimes turn out to be 
helpful and/or excellent sources for journalists. It's worth always keeping 
this possibility in mind. 
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9. Although it is a pity to say it, some journalists will for financial and other 
reasons end up doing PR work for a period of their lives. A plea to them: you 
do not have to stop being a journalist in your head. You can observe what 
is going on in your organisation and continue your journalistic mission by 
being helpful to and maybe even a secret source for working journalists. 
Keep notes and save documents. Maybe one day you will write the book. 
Commercialism: When profits trump news values 
On the afternoon of writing this section, I looked on Fairfax's Stuff news website 
to explain the idea of commercialism. The website recorded the 'Most popular' 
stories for the Sunday afternoon, giving a snapshot of the readers' interests. The 
first three stories were 'Missiles launched on Libya', 'Reassurance after quake 
prediction' and 'One Japanese nuclear reactor stabilises'. Below this list was 
another headed 'Editors' picks', giving a snapshot of what the news editors think 
are the readers' interests. This list was, from the top, 'Killer's release attacked', 
'Rewriting the history of Moriori', 'David Tua wins unanimous points decision', 
"'Safety net" secured future for Wellington Phoenix', 'Miraculous survivor 
story pulled', 'Bullitt car chase recreated', 'Hot dog mecca sues deli over name' 
and 'American Idol sends another finalist home'. Welcome to the world of 
commercialised news. 
Commercialisation refers to when news organisations increasingly allow 
commercial priorities to influence their news-related decisions. In traditional 
ideas of news, journalists and editors are supposed to make decisions based 
strictly on what is best for the news and informing the public, not on what 
will help advertising revenue and profits. But this has changed rapidly in 
recent decades. 
The process can be traced to changes in news organisation structures. 
Instead of the editor being fully in charge of news, layers of news executives have 
been introduced whose role, on behalf of shareholders, banks and financiers, is 
maximising corporate profit. These people have had increasing influence over 
decisions that affect news and it is only luck if they also care about journalism. 
Editors and senior news staff are inculcated with the commercial priorities. 
A highly corrosive aspect of commercialisation is when day-to-day news 
decisions start being made with daily or weekly ratings and readership levels 
in mind. In television, for example, the price paid for an advertisement during 
a news bulletin or programme is exactly proportional to the measured numbers 
of people watching. A small percentage rise in ratings will be worth millions 
of dollars of extra profit per year. Managers have increasingly influenced news 
content and presentation to advance these commercial goals. Celebrity anchor 
people, soft magazine-style news, breakfast 'news-lite' and short news items are 
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some of the ratings-driven characteristics of commercialised news. When news 
is a commercial product, there are few qualms about blurring the lines between 
entertainment and journalism. 
With newspapers, commercialisation leads to special attention being 
given to front pages. This is because subscribers get the paper anyway and so 
the profit-maximising emphasis goes to shop-counter sales. News decisions 
are heavily influenced by the imperative of grabbing the instant attention of 
buyers. This might sound like common sense - giving the readers what they 
want - but it is the mentality that favours photos with animals, cleavages and 
tears, and news stories about celebrities, crime and personal tragedy, often 
dressed up as moral indignation and concern. Managers have trouble seeing 
beyond an eternal and expedient present, where what matters most is capturing 
the attention of the punters that day. Meanwhile serious news is viewed as 
'worthy but boring'. 
In practice, the business managers plot the rises and falls of sales on a daily 
basis and editorial decision-makers obsess over what story and photo choices 
provided the movements. The result is that they are importing profits to the 
centre of their decision-making. Short-term reader interest in gossip, prejudices 
and triviality take precedence over other news values. There is a wide body 
of good writing and research about the poor news and shallow and formulaic 
journalism that results. Outstanding examples are the Murdoch tabloid 
newspapers and Fox News television in the United States. 
This approach seems to be even worse with internet-based commercial news 
sites, where there is data instantly available on how many clicks each headline is 
getting. It is no surprise that a story entitled 'Celebrity loses pants in theatre' will 
get clicked before and more often than 'Poverty hits children hardest'. But it is a 
long and ignorant jump from this data to suggesting that the public only wants 
beat-ups and gossip. At a time of fear inside commercial news organisations 
about their financial viability, it is understandable that the managers are caught 
in short-term thinking. But what seems best to a commercial news manager is 
not the same as what is best for the audiences or society. 
Another feature of commercialised news is the dominance of news 
competition. This does not mean competition to produce quality news or break 
important stories. Normally it refers to news organisations giving supreme 
priority to getting the same ordinary and obvious stories first, even minutes or 
seconds before competitors. Rather than producing quality or variety, this kind 
of competition tends to produce uniformity and lowest-common-denominator 
news. The public repeatedly sees the media having little feeding frenzies over 
the story of the day, moving through a predictable process of reactions and then 
losing interest and moving on. Typical news flurries last one to three days and 
then are forgotten. 
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In recent times, ratings-driven news organisations have found that their 
more educated and critical audiences are losing interest and moving to other 
news sources (e.g. specialist and overseas news sites). Senior journalists have 
talked privately about being explicitly instructed to dumb down the news 
for their remaining audiences. Rather than raising quality, the profit-driven 
approach is to reduce quality further. 
There are, unfortunately, powerful synergies between commercialised 
news organisations that put less effort into journalism and all the PR people 
who are happy to do the work for them. Commercialised news makers and 
commercialised news processors fall into unhealthy symbiotic relationships. 
In addition, foreign ownership of news corporations produces the 
same problems seen with other foreign-owned companies. For the ultimate 
owners, a New Zealand media organisation is primarily just an investment, far 
down its balance sheets. It may be owned for only a few years, meaning the 
foreign owners have no interest in long-term issues such as staff experience 
and quality, and a well informed population. Returns and share value can be 
increased most easily by cutting costs (fewer journalists in the newsroom, 
less subeditor checking, same stories shared across several outlets) and 
replacing local content with cheaper bought-in and mass-produced overseas 
content. 
New Zealand's publicly-owned television channel, Television New Zealand, 
has been artificially commercialised, producing the same negative effects on 
news. Successive governments have required TVNZ to produce an annual 
dividend to the government, compromising its news role and stopping it being 
able to set high standards for private media. 
What can be done about the 
over-commercialisation of news? 
I. New Zealand needs to rebuild its publicly-owned news media. Just as 
education and other public-good activities are funded with public money, 
more public resources are needed for quality public service news media. 
They should be competing in quality, not ratings, setting a standard for 
and filling the gaps left by commercialised private news media gathering 
the low-hanging fruit. Low quality commercialised news companies hurt 
society less when there are at least some news organisations doing a 
good job. 
2. There need to be deliberate government policies, developed by interested 
groups and political parties, for addressing the multiple problems 
threatening the supply of quality news to New Zealanders. This means 
recognising the public benefits of news and journalism, and defining 
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government actions that could improve them, including more public 
funding of news and controls on foreign media ownership. Note that TVNZ 
and Radio New Zealand were brought into existence as public services by 
government policies in earlier eras. There is no reason why, in the same 
way, future publics and governments cannot decide that news services are 
essential services and take similar action to provide them. 
3. Commercialised media can be disappointing places to work for 
journalists who care about doing good work. Many did not go into 
journalism only to discover "if it bleeds, it leads" really is the daily grind in 
most busy newsrooms. Current high staff turnovers caused by cost-cutting 
and redundancies and the accompanying loss of institutional knowledge 
are an unsurprising result. Perhaps the most important thing required 
to improve journalism in New Zealand is to strengthen the sense of a 
journalist profession separate from the news organisations. There are 
various possible parts to this. 
4. New Zealand, unlike many countries, has no journalist organisation (except 
for a minority of journalists belonging to a union named the Engineers, 
Printers and Manufacturers Union). Journalism awards are primarily 
marketing opportunities for commercialised media, reliant on industry 
sponsorship. Journalists themselves are often isolated (even within a 
newsroom), unsupported and, thanks to media competition infecting 
personal relationships, distrustful of journalists from other organisations. 
Many describe the experience of getting zero feedback on their work. There 
is negligible sense of being part of a profession (as opposed to just being 
in a job) and of common purpose. A difficult but important step in New 
Zealand will be establishing a journalist organisation defined by a belief in 
high standards and mutual support. 
5. Greater collaboration between journalists is a simple and practical way to 
improve journalism and the overall capacity of the news media to do their 
job in the era of public relations. While commercialised news organisations 
define themselves by competition, efforts should be made, starting in 
journalism schools, to encourage and foster collaboration between networks 
of individual journalists. 
6. Commercialised news media tend to reduce journalistic standards and so 
journalists themselves need to work to promote and uphold standards. This 
is what professional groups do (think of doctors and accountants), building 
an identity and agreeing on standards that are intended to endure even 
through difficult times. University departments and journalism schools 
could play a larger role in providing the infrastructure for this and other 
professional journalism activities. 
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7+ We do not have to accept the commercial news organisation view of the 
public as trivial, self-centred and uninterested in serious news. Experience 
out in the real world shows that 'ordinary' people think more about news 
and respond to good journalism more than they are given credit for. 
Everyone can have different facets: interest in news, intrigued by gossip, 
concerned about others, keen on a bargain, incensed in the moment and 
more considered over time. Commercialised news media appeal to the more 
trivial sides of people but good journalism can appeal to other parts: the 
citizens, the good neighbours, the socially concerned, the generous donors 
at times of disaster, the people who are affected by the political and business 
decisions of the powerful. 
The challenge of the internet and social media 
Journalists in the 1980s believed that computers were drastically changing their 
profession, as newspapers moved to computerised writing, editing, layout and 
printing processes. Many people lost their jobs. There were protests and strikes. 
But we now know that those changes were small compared to what was coming, 
both positively and negatively, in the full digital age. 
Technological change is too big a subject to look at closely here. Briefly, 
technological advances have changed forever the economics of news 
organisations. For hundreds of years the newspaper printing press was a stable 
economic unit, where a partial monopoly on providing advertising space 
produced revenue to help fund the news. The furniture advertisers cross-
subsidised the foreign correspondents, sports journalists and the rest. It has 
been much the same with commercial radio and television. 
The internet has changed this. If an advertiser can reach as many people 
with an advertisement on a popular non-news site, the traditional cross-
subsidising of news is undermined. Also, the internet draws away newspaper 
buyers and television and radio advertisement audiences. However, the internet 
is also being blamed for changes that started before it existed. Most of the 
decline of newspapers, reductions in journalist staff and other serious damage 
to news organisations has a different cause; the socially irresponsible actions of 
commercially focused news corporations. 
So far, in the short history of the internet, a proliferation of blogs and other 
new media have not shown a capacity to produce regular news reporting or news 
investigations on a scale that could replace traditional news organisations. On 
the other hand, the global reach and accessibility of the internet are producing 
profound and positive changes. Hard to control and naturally suited to openness, 
the internet and other technologies allow news more easily to cross borders and 
deficiencies in local news can be filled from near and far. News travelled fast 
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where once it could be shut out. 20II showed spectacularly that the internet is 
not the friend of dictators. 
But since we are in the midst of these historic changes, it is impossible to 
predict what future news will be like, and within what structures journalists 
will be employed. What is certain is that people will still want, need and value 
news. Journalism as a profession and role in society will not go away. But 
the coincidence of the technological changes with the dual phenomena of 
commercialised news-making and commercialised news organisations means 
maintaining good journalism in the coming years is under threat. 
What can we do? 
I. Again, an important part of protecting journalism through a time of crisis and 
change is to strengthen it as a profession that is separate from the unstable 
news organisations. There will always be journalists and journalism, but we 
need to stick up for and protect the mission, standards and ethics of the 
profession through the time of change. 
2. The era of being able to take provision of news for granted is over. There needs 
to be government policies and resources for strengthening and sustaining 
journalism, and for maintaining and developing news organisations that 
fulfil society's needs for news. 
3- Part of this is journalism that builds the public's understanding of the 
unifying and democratic value of mass media. The internet risks atomising 
society, with sub-groups going to different, non-overlapping sites for 
news and discussion and becoming increasingly separate. Mass media like 
television, radio and newspapers (even when politically biased and otherwise 
imperfect) help to ensure that citizens have the same basic information and 
that, at least to some extent, they hear each other and different points of 
view. Future government media policies need to keep this in mind, rather 
than assuming that new media are fundamentally the same as old. 
4. The internet and digital technology also have tremendous potential for 
improving journalism and news. Some of this will be new platforms for 
news, including with less prohibitive set-up costs. There will be new ways 
to fund news and already there is an astonishing array of new resources 
for doing better journalism. In addition, some other countries are far ahead 
of New Zealand in training journalists in computer-assisted reporting 
techniques. Wikileaks has been an outstanding example of how new ideas 
can allow better journalism and many more good surprises will follow. The 
important thing is that technological change is not just left to chance or 
corporate preference. People who care about news and journalism should 
be actively identifying and promoting the positive opportunities. 
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Investigative journalism and how to have more of it 
All around the world - in Malta and Macedonia, South Africa and Sweden -
there is a particular breed of journalists who enjoy digging into hidden and 
elusive issues, slowly building trusting relationships with inside sources, piecing 
together information and eventually exposing injustices, dodgy actions and 
dishonesty to the public. They are usually people who care about the issues they 
study, feel offended at lies or cruelty and who, generally, want to try to fulfil 
the role of monitoring the centres of power. You find them uncovering illegal 
logging in Mozambique, tobacco smuggling in Eastern Europe and corporate 
lobbyists in the United States. New Zealand needs them just as much. 
News has various social functions. Daily news reporting fulfils many of 
these: informing the public, allowing political discussion, unifying communities 
and providing the basis for public participation in the life and politics of the 
society. Daily news is less effective for uncovering news that is hidden, holding 
powerful institutions and people accountable for their actions and exposing 
wrongdoing. There also need to be people who check, on behalf of the public, 
whether public figures are telling the truth. These are areas where investigative 
journalism is important for society. As public relations becomes pervasive, it 
is needed all the more. So what can be done about the perennial shortage of 
investigative journalism in New Zealand? 
The classic image of investigative journalism is a major news organisation 
such as the Washington Post newspaper allowing full-time reporters doggedly to 
pursue big stories. It is an attractive picture but, if this is the model, then New 
Zealand is doomed to have little investigative journalism. Commercialisation 
of news organisations combined with the country's small size makes it unusual 
for editors to support this expensive type of journalism. The country has had 
spectacular examples ofinvestigative journalism - for instance Pat Booth's 1970S 
work on the wrongful conviction of Arthur Alan Thomas, TVNZ Frontline's 'Pro 
bono publico' 1990 documentary on the Labour government and Phil Kitchin's 
2.004 revelations about historic police rapes - but almost always they are the 
result of motivated individuals rather than being an ongoing priority for news 
organisations. There are, however, things that can be done to have much more 
investigative journalism. The answer lies in changing our picture of it to match 
the realities of the country we live in. 
• Step one is accepting that investigative journalism is unlikely to be funded 
regularly by most news organisations. 
• Step two is therefore detaching the role from being the strict preserve of 
news organisations and thinking who else might do it (or might already 
be doing it under another job title). The answer is that, besides journalists, 
there are academics, filmmakers, researchers of all sorts, retired specialists 
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in different subjects (health professionals? soldiers? accountants?) ... the list 
goes on and on. The common features should be the desire and skills to 
perform this specific role in SOciety. 
• Step three is establishing specialised training, creating opportunities for this 
more diverse group to meet together, and forming structures within which 
to support and cooperate with each other. A large part of this should be 
establishing and publicising an inclusive identity for investigative journalism/ 
writing/filmmaking that can help suggest the idea to this wider range of 
people. Journalism schools can help a lot in this, including promoting the idea 
to the news organisations that will eventually be among the outlets for 
this work. 
• Step four is ensuring that high standards of journalism are maintained. 
Indeed, investigative journalism should aspire to higher standards than daily 
reporting, since there is more time for thoroughness and ensuring accuracy. 
The ultimate goal is to establish this wider conception of investigative 
journalism as a recognised vocation and accepted role in society. The 
concept needs to be built on the best traditions of journalism, which include 
accuracy, balance, fairness and strict protection of sources. 
• Step five is to stop thinking investigative journalism is financially impossible 
in New Zealand. Adequate funding of public broadcasting will help and, 
beyond that, a useful model is the way other types of creative and socially 
focused professions support themselves in a small country like New Zealand. 
Take, for instance, authors. Based on the availability of institutional funding 
and the returns from sales, there should be very little book writing in 
New Zealand. In fact there is an astonishing volume, variety and quality. 
Authors write books because they want to and then find ways to fit it into 
their lives. Part-time, occasional and subsidised by other sorts of paying 
work, authors manage to get by. It can be the same for the wide grouping 
of people, existing journalists and others, who could be doing investigative 
journalism projects. 
All around the world, the common feature of investigative journalists is not 
their institutional backing but rather their strong personal motivation and sense 
of vocation. There is great potential for a larger and wider group of people to 
realise this role suits them too. 
As in the rest of this chapter, there are plenty of good reasons for pessimism 
about investigative journalism and plenty of people who will wisely predict its 
demise. But journalism and investigative journalism are human institutions 
that can be harmed or improved depending simply on human decisions and 
actions. Spectators will be no help in that; this is a time for action. 
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The most hopeful sign of the future for journalism is the people who choose 
this career, one of the most socially valuable and rewarding jobs that any of us 
can do. Every year there are talented and idealistic people attracted into the 
profession, with, if anything, the quality of students higher than in the past. 
These new journalists and everyone else involved in journalism need to be 
conscious of (and find ways to work in spite of) the multiple problems facing 
news media. They need to be thinking about all the ways it can be made better. 
But, most importantly, they just need to be doing good journalistic work: now, 
day by day, and that example will help define the future of journalism. 
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